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PART I: INTRODUCTION
“Ticket scalping” is a term akin to “loan sharking.” Both practices fill a
market need, but both practices also bring the disdain of the consumer, the
wrath of primary market competitors, and the microscopic attention of
regulators. From the time of Shakespearean England, those who resell tickets
have carried images of greedy speculators forcing innocents to pay unjust
sums for event tickets, being fleeced of their hard-earned shekels in the
process.1
But these secondary ticket market activities are not the isolated activities
of rain-coated clad tawdry entrepreneurs whose offices are street corners and
the curbs near stadiums and theaters on event days. Nor are they to be trifled
with, for history has shown that they are an inevitable economic presence in
high-demand/limited markets.2
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Market’s Online Revolution, June 20, 2007, http://knowledge.wpcarey.asu.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1439.
See also Courty, supra note 1, at n.2 (citing ALISON FUTRELL, BLOOD IN THE ARENA: THE SPECTACLE OF
ROMAN POWER (1997)).
3. SEGRAVE, supra note 1, at 9.
4. Courty, supra note 1.
5. Id.
From the time of Christopher Marlowe and William Shakespeare, the
locals have battled for a seat at high-demand events. England’s for-profit
theaters provided an introduction to the ticket speculation and pricing issues
we face today. The Internet may have changed ticket distribution, but the
issues in secondary ticket sales have really not changed much since theater
aficionados battled for Bard seats in the 1500s.3 At that time, England’s theater
houses, in the beginning of for-profit plays, were divided into sections of
increasing exclusivity. The allocation was quite simple, akin to the remaining
and current Las Vegas practice of tipping the maitre de. There are no tickets;
one enters the theater and gains access to better seats by paying (in the case of
Shakespearean England a penny and in Las Vegas, anywhere from a $20 to a
c-note) at each upgrade section for the right to move to a better location.4
Traffic flow issues not present in Vegas did, however, erupt in the Mother
Country’s theaters, something that resulted in the introduction of “checks,” or
round metal pieces that had predetermined seat sections on them.5 By paying
upfront, English play attendees could go right to the section of their choice
without the incremental penny-by-penny negotiations. However, there was the
small matter of the wait for the play to begin.
The inconvenience of sitting around the theater for hours brought paper
tickets, marked with price and seat. With this small step in simple access
logistics, the English took a giant leap into the microeconomics of high-
demand, limited-supply events. There was no turning back. Once those printed
tickets were in hand, and physical presence in a line just prior to the event was
no longer required, the economic imagination was launched: Could I sell this
ticket? Could I get more than one ticket and resell one for a profit? Could I get
others to stand in line and get tickets for me that I could then resell? Could
someone in the theater get me more tickets? Better tickets? The limits on the
number of new plays that could be written in timely fashion and the small size
of the English theaters made the demand for Marlowe and Shakespeare akin
to that clamoring we witness today for a Hannah Montana concert. When it
comes to economic principles that govern these types of markets, the draw
from the stage may be different, indeed, inexplicable, but there are still
2010] REGULATORY FUTURE OF TICKET SCALPING 117
6. The term secondary ticket markets will be used to refer to sales by those other than venue owners
(such as theater owners and sports teams) and promoters, producers, and sponsors.
universal principles that govern the demand for Hannah, Hamlet, and half-
backs in the Super Bowl.
Secondary ticket sellers have now existed for centuries and will continue
to do so despite an equal number of centuries of efforts to eliminate them as
a part of ticket distribution. Indeed, they will thrive because there is an
economic need for secondary ticket markets.6 Despite this market reality of
their survival as well as extensive documentation of a repeating historical
pattern over the centuries of the sheer market force of secondary ticket sellers,
the folly of regulation and market control continues. Trying to tame the prices
and demand in the inevitable secondary markets for the sales of high-demand
event tickets is a tall order. While we leave the loan-shark markets for others
to dissect, we do offer some critical insights on ticket scalping, or in its more
legal parlance “ticket brokering.” Secondary ticket sales, whether through
neighbors, brokers, or street-corner vendors, result whenever there are high-
demand events with limited seating availability for public events.
Primary and related secondary event-ticket markets raise important and
still unresolved issues related to property rights, pricing, and nuisance effects.
These issues, in turn, raise questions about the efficacy of and the voids in
existing and proposed regulation. With recent technological changes (primarily
via the Internet) that are serving to fundamentally alter the scope and character
of secondary markets, questions about further regulation have become acute
as consumers and primary and secondary ticket sellers grapple with access,
sales, buyers’ and sellers’ rights, and the fraud that tends to accompanying
burgeoning markets. This article provides a historical, social, economic, legal,
and regulatory perspective on the issues in and nature of secondary markets.
An understanding of the evolution of ticket markets provides indispensable
perspective and guidance for future market developments as well as regulatory
directions.
Secondary ticket markets have universal and eternal characteristics
because of microeconomic foundations. Attempts at regulation that do not take
into account these characteristics result in unintended consequences that are
often self-defeating and, more often, anticompetitive. The regulation of any
aspect of secondary ticket markets cannot be done in isolation from market
forces because the result may be little relief for the consumers the regulations
are designed to protect.
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7. The discussion in this section draws upon Stephen K. Happel & Marianne M. Jennings, Assessing
the Economic Rationale and Legal Remedies for Ticket Scalping, 16 J. LEGIS. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Happel
& Jennings (1989)]; Stephen K. Happel & Marianne M. Jennings, The Folly of Anti-Scalping Laws, 15
CATO J. 65 (1995) [hereinafter Happel & Jennings (1995)]; Stephen K. Happel & Marianne M. Jennings,
Creating a Futures Market for Major Tickets: Problems and Prospects, 21 CATO J. 443 (2002) [hereinafter
Happel & Jennings (2002)]; and SEGRAVE, supra note 1.
Well-intentioned regulations promulgated in order to increase access to
tickets may actually limit supplies and increase prices. An understanding of the
characteristics of ticket markets as well as their underlying economic
foundations provides insights for market structure as well as means of effective
regulatory supervision of ticket markets. Without a grasp of the historical and
regulatory evolution of ticket markets along with an understanding of
economic realities, future regulatory approaches to ticket markets are destined
to repeat past mistakes even as they fail to address the important public policy
issues that warrant regulatory intervention. Employing the lessons of the
history of ticket markets and applicable economic principles, on the other
hand, could produce a palatable regulatory framework with a utilitarian
balance of costs and benefits.
This article presents a framework for addressing the issues in the
secondary ticket market by providing insight into the irrefutable principles that
control it. These principles are supported by an understanding of the historical
development of ticket markets. Part II offers a discussion of the eight
principles that govern the secondary ticket market, including a discussion of
the microeconomics of ticket markets. These principles must be acknowledged
and addressed as part of any reforms, whether those reforms are based on
market structure or regulation. These principles provide insight into how
markets function as well as a review of the physical and legal nature of tickets.
Part III addresses the need for national law in primary and secondary ticket
markets, law that recognizes the reality of an interstate ticket market and
should be patterned after the development and adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code and its success in nationalizing the sales of goods and the
transferability of commercial paper. Part III also includes proposals and
recommendations for future structure, operation, and regulation of ticket
markets, in all their forms. Part IV provides conclusions.
PART II: THE LONGSTANDING PRINCIPLES OF TICKET MARKETS7
The history of event-ticket sales and ticket trading in the United States is
rich with colorful characters as well as shifting public and legal sentiments.
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8. SATURDAY EVENING POST, Aug. 13, 1927 (cited in SEGRAVE, supra note 1, at 200) (emphasis
added).
9. Alfred Branch Jr., Ticketmaster at Heart of Canadian Ticket Controversy, TICKETNEWS, July 11,
2008, http://www.ticketnews.com/Ticketmaster-at-heart-of-Canadian-ticket-controversy78114561. For more
information on Ticketmaster’s primary and secondary market involvement and vertical integration, see infra
notes 149, 164–72.
10. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1481 (1998).
The following eight principles serve as an overarching framework for
discussions of regulations and as a tutorial to guide those who seek reforms in
secondary ticket markets.
Principle One: Tickets for High-Demand and/or Limited-Supply Events Are
Typically Underpriced in Primary Markets
In 1927, the editor of the Saturday Evening Post revealed a profound
understanding of the nature of secondary ticket markets and who was playing
what role in creating the high prices that produced public outcry and
regulation:
The public which pays ten dollars for a three-dollar seat rather enjoys the experience.
Indeed, there are those who brag of being overcharged and who seem to like being
treated as suckers. The truth is that being charged outrageous prices is considered a sign
that they know how to live in a metropolis. It signifies their smartness. . . . After all, the
Government has more worthwhile things to do than to protect people from the
consequences of the last word in gilded indolence. Besides, there is just a little question
whether even the Government can repeal the law of supply and demand.8
Little has changed in the 81 years since this observation. Joe Freeman,
President of Corporation Communications and Senior Vice President,
Ticketmaster said, in 2008, in response to questions about his company’s
participation in the primary and secondary markets, “[y]ou can’t regulate away
the laws of supply and demand and, unfortunately for a lot of shows,
particularly in the Internet era, demand just far exceeds supply.”9
High-demand/low-supply goods and services unleash market forces that
arise to provide efficient allocation of that limited supply.10 An example from
Broadway illustrates how the demand exists just by the physical structure of
the theater combined with the obligations of the promoter/owners:
For example, assume that a certain Broadway theater has a highly touted play which is
debuting on the first Saturday of the following month. This theater has seating capacity
for exactly 4,000 people; however 5,000 Broadway enthusiasts wish to attend opening
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11. Jonathan Bell, Ticket Scalping: Same Old Problem with a Brand New Twist, 18 LOY. CONSUMER
L. REV. 435, 440–41 (2006).
12. See infra notes 46–47 and accompanying text for more discussion of fraud and deception related
to underpricing.
13. Morrow Mayo, Ticket Scalping Fine Art for Brokers, Worry for Owners—But Public Pays, L.A.
TIMES, May 29, 1925, at C1.
14. Happel & Jennings (1989), supra note 7, at 7–9.
night. The theater has 200 season ticket subscribers and wishes to withhold an additional
800 for critics, families of the performers, and local politicians. Therefore, only 3,000
tickets can be sold to the public, meaning at least 2,000 of the enthusiasts will be unable
to witness the opening night performance. The creation of the secondary market makes
it possible for some of these people, the ones who have the strongest desire and are
willing to pay a higher fee, to attend this event.11
A key point of demand and supply theory is that persistent reoccurring
lines (queues) for a product means the firm’s money price is too low. There is
a shortage. Microeconomists loathe shortages at existing money prices because
the long lines impose significant opportunity costs on those with a high value
of time (in general the more productive members of society) and because
“black markets” inevitably arise that may involve fraud, deception, a general
lack of transparency, and high enforcement costs.12 The usual market response
to high demand and limited supply is higher prices. In 1925, the journalist
Morrow Mayo wrote an article in the Los Angeles Times on the state of ticket
speculation and the role of ticket brokers across America. He noted that,
“[e]verywhere the practice is looked upon with disfavor by the general public,
and yet it exists and thrives with varying success in every large city in the
United States.”13 His research was thorough, complete with details on pricing
in markets across the United States, in everything from Broadway plays to
boxing. But, he was left flummoxed as to why something so maligned could
thrive so ubiquitously. Mr. Morrow was not acquainted with the principles that
drive markets, despite the disdain of those participating in these markets for
such principles.
However, these forces are the result of the behaviors of event sponsors
who do not price tickets in the primary market at the higher levels that those
tickets may eventually bring once the secondary market opens.14 The puzzling
economic question that springs from this longstanding practice is: Why would
a primary seller knowingly under price high-demand goods? Underpricing in
the primary markets is the driver for the allocation methods of the secondary
market, i.e., higher prices, and is actually a deliberate strategy on the part of
event sponsors because of any one or a combination of several factors that
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15. The relative certainty on pricing in 1960s and 1970s musical acts (Paul McCartney, Rolling
Stones, The Who, Crosby, Stills, Nash & Young) is a function of the bands being proven commodities as
well as the fact that the Baby Boomers attending the shows are in their peak, albeit adolescent arrested,
earning years. The average ticket price (primary) for Paul McCartney’s 2002 tour was $132.34, while the
Rolling Stones’ top-tier seats went for $350 that same year, and The Who brought $250. By contrast, the
Dave Matthews Band average price was $44.84, and Sheryl Crow, Alanis Morrissette, and Korn could bring
only $40–$45 per ticket. Other acts that same year, such as Marc Anthony (pre-Lopez years) and Britney
Spears (pre-Federline years) were unknowns in terms of draw, and still other acts were booking as opening
acts in order to hedge against the problems of pricing too high and demand being lower than anticipated.
Some artists are grouped together, ala 1950s rock-and-roll tours, to draw more fans, such as the pairing of
David Lee Roth and Sammy Hagar (formerly part of Van Halen). Jennifer Ordonez, How Much to Hear the
Who—$250? $505?, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2002, at B1.
16. Even in sporting events, we are seeing some of these unknowns. For example, the Yankees and
the Mets both had new stadiums open in 2009. By the end of April, the Yankees had not sold 5,000 seats,
including some of their high-price seats, in the season opening games. As the New York Times phrased it,
“[t]he empty seats are a fresh sign that the teams might have miscalculated how much fans and corporations
were willing to spend, particularly during a deep recession. Whatever the reason, the teams are scrambling
to comb over their $295 to $2,625-a-seat bald spots.” Ken Belson, Is This Seat Taken? In Front Rows of New
Ballparks, Not Yet, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, at A1. The article also points out that the empty seats show
up on television like a “big sore spot.”
have emerged over the centuries as we have developed a clearer understanding
of ticket markets.
Uncertainty as a Cause of Underpricing
First, underpricing may simply be a function of the event sponsor’s
uncertainty about actual market demand for the event. Popularity of a
particular performer has an ebb and flow. That ebb and flow of popularity,
when coupled with the logistical reality that a venue for a concert, for
example, must be booked months to years in advance, does force promoters to
grapple with significant parameters coupled with basic unknowns.15 They are
also faced with intransigent forces as they try to price event tickets.16 Even
when demand far outstrips the supply for a particular event, a promoter
normally does not have the ability to turn on a dime and switch the event to a
different, larger forum, and can rarely change the location. Further, even the
cost of adding an additional show can be prohibitive or impossible, depending
upon the schedules of the artists, leagues, and other available forums. In other
words, there are at least two factors that are out of the control of the promoter.
There are few options for increasing supply, and even if increasing the supply
is possible, it may carry prohibitive costs. Add into this mix the reality that
economic conditions in the location of the forum can vary across the country
and the world. In times of high unemployment, inflation, and recession,
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17. Again, the Yankees had the blocks of empty seats. While reluctant to reduce ticket prices because
of the backlash the management felt would come from fans who had paid the new seat prices, an increase
of 76% over previous season prices, the Yankees were forced by the market to do so. Id. As of the end of
the 2009 baseball season, available seats that were originally $2,500 can be bought on the Yankee website
for $900 for individual games and original $2,500 buyers have received comp tickets for no additional costs.
18. Economist John Tishler is a proponent of this long-term profits view. See John D. Tishler, Ticket
Scalping: An Economic Analysis and Proposed Solution, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 91, 101 (1993).
19. See Craig A. Depken II, Another Look at Anti-Scalping Laws: Theory and Evidence, http://
www.belkcollege.uncc.edu/cdepken/P/scalping.pdf (unpublished paper, on file with the Belk College of
Business) (last visited Mar. 14, 2010) (paraphrasing the work of W.F. Bernicke, Questions and Answers,
81 J. POL. ECON. 796 (1973)).
attendance at live events is a budget item that most consumers can cut quite
painlessly, even when the demand for a particular event or artist remains high.
In short, promoters and owners face pricing and demand factors that are not
plugged easily into Excel spread sheets for determining the real costs of the
event and the resulting appropriate price for tickets.
Price, Once Set, Is Difficult to Change, and Introduces Greater Risk
For one-time, high-demand events, the price, once set, is tough to
discount. If, for example, the price is set too high and the seats are not sold, not
only is the venue not filled (resulting in the psychological issues of perceived
lower demand, see infra), but cutting the price to the point where the tickets
sell means that those who have already purchased the tickets will be
alienated.17 The cost of that alienation is real. Over the long term, the figures
for the spread sheet may become more clear to the promoter. In other words,
with enough tours and enough concerts, put together using “goodwill” pricing,
the promoter does make money despite the individual event underpricing.18
Placing too high of a price on a ticket for an event may reduce demand to
a point where the dynamics of the market change to the point where the
promoter/owner must make the acknowledgment of either overpricing or a
lack of demand. Several economists have concluded that “sufficiently
stochastic demand encourages lower ticket prices so that promoters ensure a
certain level of ticket revenue while trading off potentially higher revenue
associated with greater risk.”19 Lower cost/lower risk is the simple financial
formula. For example, the Britney Spears 2009 European tour stunned the
entertainment world with the event sponsor’s announcement that it was
reducing ticket prices for the singer’s London concert from £100 ($162.50) to
£2 ($3.25). The stunning price drop was a desperate move on the part of the
promoters to avoid a “bare floor” at the concert and the resulting perception
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20. Tour organizers were “mystified” by the lack of demand. Jane Cohen & Bob Grossweiner, Ticket
Prices Slashed for Britney Spears Concerts at O2, TICKETNEWS, June 10, 2009, http://www.ticketnews
.com/Ticket-prices-slashed-for-Britney-Spears-concerts-at-O2-Arena6910488. Ms. Spears’ popularity may
be as unpredictable as the star’s behavior, or perhaps the behavior is the underlying cause of the ebbs and
flows in her popularity. These star dynamics illustrate the uncertainty of ticket markets and the resulting
challenge of accurate pricing.
21. While revenues have increased, there has been a slight decline in the number of concert-goers.
There is a point at which ticket purchasers balk, and the venue is unfilled. Ordonez, supra note 15, at B4.
22. An example of a canceled tour came in 2006 when the Dixie Chicks, because of a lack of
consumer demand, were forced to cancel their U.S. portion of a world tour. The demand dropped not
because of price but because of an alienated fan base that found the tickets plentiful but the buyers few
because of politically charged comments from one of the group’s singers. Lexi Feinberg, Dixie Chicks Nix
Concert Tour Dates (Aug. 8, 2006), http://cinemablend.com/music/Dixie-Chicks-Nix-Concert-Tour-Dates-
731.html. Lack of sales at certain levels means that the fixed costs for the event cannot be covered.
23. The psychology of high-demand events is beyond the scope of this work, but the authors’
previous work as well as that of economist Gary Becker, document the intricate psychological components
of these high-demand/must-see events. See Gary Becker, A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples
of Social Influences on Price, 99 J. POL. ECON. 1109, 1109 (1991); Happel & Jennings (1989), supra note
7, at 66. There is also a line of work on “mob goods” that provides the economic and psychological analysis
of high-demand/must have goods and experiences. See Allan DeSerpa, To Err Is Rational: A Theory of
Excess Demand for Tickets, 15 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 511, 515 (1994).
24. Once the perception exists that there are plenty of seats, demand and prices drop. For example,
the trustee for Bernie Madoff’s (the mastermind behind a $50-billion Ponzi scheme) assets placed
Mr. Madoff’s Mets season tickets on eBay for sale. The tickets brought $38,100, a figure not even close to
their face value of $80,190. Madoff’s Mets Tickets on eBay, N.Y. POST, Apr. 10, 2009, http://www.
nypost.com/seven/04082009/sports/mets/madoffs_mets_tickets_on_ebay_163525.htm. The sports world
referred to the low eBay bids as an “indignity” for the Mets. Belson, supra note 16, at A4.
25. In other words, the under pricing may actually help the promoter because the secondary market
frenzy contributes to the sell-out and over pricing causes customers to not return. Daniel Kahneman et al.,
Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 738 (1986).
that the tour was not a success.20 If an event sponsor sets the price for the event
at too high a level or range, consumer resistance to paying these higher prices
results in plentiful supplies of tickets.21 Indeed, one outcome can be the
cancellation of the event because of a lack of demand.22
The Loss of the Psychological Drive in Consumers
There is also a secondary risk associated with overpricing and a resulting
abundant supply of tickets. With a glutted primary ticket market, perceived
uniqueness, something of the mystique associated with these limited events,
is lost.23 Part of the secondary market is driven by the perception of being part
of an event that was not easily accessible.24 A sold-out primary market is but
one step in the psychological frenzy over an event.25 The very existence of
scalpers/brokers is, in and of itself, evidence of this principle. Brokers and
scalpers are a creation that springs from the primary market’s inefficiency of
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26. A Broadway producer noted, “[e]ven though we could sell tickets at $100, we’d be cutting our
own throats because it would be a P.R. disaster for Broadway.” John Tierney, Tickets: Supply Meets
Demand on Sidewalk, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1992, at A1, A24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/
12/26/nyregion/tickets-supply-meets-demand-on-sidewalk.html?scp=1&sq=&st=nyt.
27. As one contentious example, when the Chicago Cubs created Wrigley Field Premium, Ticket
Services in 2003 to sell VIP seats at what the market would bear, the public outcry was overwhelming
through the print media and local radio. See infra notes 134–38 and accompanying text for more detail.
28. Alfred Branch, Jr., Complaints Begin to Mount Over Paperless Ticketing for Miley Cyrus Tour,
TICKETNEWS, June 4, 2009, http://www.ticketnews.com/Complaints-begin-to-mount-over-paperless-
ticketing-for-the-Miley-Cyrus-tour609406. The controls were paperless tickets and IDs, a new strategy for
controlling primary markets discussed in the section on the nature of tickets.
underpricing. Brokers and scalpers provide a form of resolution for the
allocation problems created in the underpriced primary market for tickets.
Their simple, market-based allocation solution involves selling tickets priced
to reflect their true costs, including the time and effort involved in acquiring
the ticket in the primary market, as well as the actual demand that the primary
event sponsor may not have been able to predict accurately. The underpricing
of event tickets in the primary market is part of what leads to the high demand
in the secondary market, a high demand that is exacerbated by limited supply.
The Goodwill in Underpricing
Primary-market underpricing can lead to the preservation of goodwill with
fans and customers.26 The tightrope balancing act that event sponsors walk
carries the risk, on the one end, of selling tickets at a price so low that the
mystique disappears versus the risk, at the other end, which is selling the
tickets at a price so high that the mystique turns to backlash.27 With some
artists, the underpriced tickets for their events are a critical part of their brand.
They use the lower prices to market themselves as artists of the people.
Recently, the promoters for mega teen star Miley Cyrus used extraordinary
controls over primary market ticket sales in order to ensure that their “true”
fans of modest means are able to buy tickets and attend the event.28 Their goal
was to keep tickets out of the secondary market because of complaints from
parents about high ticket prices in that market for the young star’s previous
tour. However, Principle Six provides additional information and analysis on
how, in high-demand/limited-supply markets, even these good public relations
intentions often backfire. Because of the realities of underpricing and its
consequences, as well as the remaining seven principles that govern ticket
markets, the effects of trying to impose artificial constraints by actually trying
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29. For example, despite the Cyrus controls, the secondary ticket market opened for her tour with
far fewer tickets and a starting price of $999. Id.
30. Robert Gielissen et al., Perceptions of Price Fairness: An Empirical Research, 47 BUS. & SOC’Y
370 (2008).
31. Kahneman et al., supra note 25, at 731 (finding that judgments of fairness are susceptible to the
way a situation is presented). For example, they show that a nominal wage cut of 7% in a situation of no
inflation is perceived to be unfair, but that a 5% nominal wage increase in a situation of 12% inflation is not.
Id. at 731–32.
to control pricing may be a market with higher prices rather than a market that
maintains the face value of the tickets all in the name of goodwill.29
Fairness and Underpricing
This public perception of “fairness” is a psychological complexity in the
sale of tickets and the regulation of ticket markets. In an author interview with
Ticketmaster’s former CEO Fred Rosen in 2003, Rosen explained why concert
promoters and team owners in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s did not charge
higher prices or engage in significant price discrimination or in scaling the
house when they could see the market demand just in the physical
manifestation of long lines. Rosen highlighted primary ticket sellers’
sensitivity to charges by the public of price gouging and their desire to be
perceived as “fair” by the public. This notion of fairness is consistent with the
earlier discussion of promoters and owners understanding their potential for
long-run profit maximization, even with artificially restrained pricing because
these price constraints create a perception of fairness, a very real, but binding
constraint that public attitudes exert in event markets.
Gielissen et al. list five hypotheses regarding price and judgments about
fairness.30
• Reference prices. Actual price should be equal to what the consumer
expects. Both market prices (from similar events) and prices from
previous transactions can serve as reference prices. Individuals
believe that they are entitled to the reference price because other
consumers have recently paid this price, and sellers should not be
allowed to exploit excess demand.
• Prices that reflect incorporation of production costs. Consumers are
often willing to accept a cost-plus pricing approach as fair and
recognize that increases in various costs are likely to lead to higher
prices. At the same time, consumers also often overestimate the plus-
side of the approach (the profit margin) and do not always act
completely rationally.31 If consumers believe that a firm indeed is
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32. Sarah Maxwell, Rule-based Price Fairness and Its Effect on the Willingness to Purchase, 23 J.
ECON. PSYCHOL. 191 (2002); John W. Huppertz, Sidney J. Arenson & Richard Evans, An Application of
Equity Theory to Buyer-Seller Exchange Situations, 15 J. MARKETING RES. 250 (1978); and Lisa Bolton,
Luk Warlop & Joseph Alba, Consumer Perceptions of Price (Un)fairness, 29 J. CONSUMER RES. 471 (2003).
33. Gielissen et al., supra note 30, at 375.
34. Again the notion of “mob goods,” supra note 23, is applicable.
making large profits, then those feelings of unfairness are more likely
to occur in cases of price increases.
• Pursuit of social goals. High profitability is perceived as fairer if
buyers think a seller has the intention of serving some social goal
rather than just making a large profit. In the case of the sale of bottled
water after a natural disaster, a price increase is perceived to be unfair
if the sellers appear to simply be taking advantage of the situation.
However, consumers view the price increases as more fair if the
supplier announces the intention is to prevent a shortage by rationing
the water. Also, other work in this area finds that consumers attach
some value to prices that make the commodity affordable by
everyone. Price increases are perceived to be even more unfair when
they harm the average consumers.32
• Self-interest effects. Consumers who are denied market access
because of a price that is beyond their means perceives more
unfairness than someone who has the ability to pay that price.
• Biases towards poorer and smaller parties. Consumers consider price
increases to be fairer if they benefit poor agents rather than rich
agents (small organizations rather than large organizations). Using
survey questions from Gielissen, respondents indicated that: it is
fairer for a single coffee-bean farmer to use market power over two
large coffee-roaster buyers who want beans than for a single large
coffee-roaster buyer to use market power over two small coffee-bean
farmers; and, in the case of high demand for a certain software
package that can detect and destroy some new computer virus,
significant price increases by a small firm facing bankruptcy are
considered to be much fairer than those same price increases would
be by the highly profitable Microsoft.33
The notion of unfairness is writ large in the primary and secondary ticket
markets. Consumers have a particular desire to attend major events such as
concerts and sporting events.34 There is also a pervasive attitude among U.S.
consumers that major entertainment events should be open to the general
public and should not remain the exclusive domain of the rich and powerful.
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35. For example, when Ralph S. Lauder put his $135 million Klimt (“Portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer
I”) on display in 2006 at his Neue Galerie in New York City, he charged $50 per person on a Wednesday
morning, when the gallery was normally open to the public without charge. The normal general admission
charge was $15 at other times. The public outcry over the perceived unfairness of the additional charge for
access to a magnificent piece of art was so great that the gallery scrapped the idea. Similarly, Coca-Cola was
hooted down when it tried to up the prices in its vending machines on hot days. Judith Dobrzynski, Variable
Pricing for Museums, FORBES, Apr. 27, 2009, at 24, available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/
2009/0427/024-opinions-museums-lifestyle-on-my-mind.html.
Gielissen et al.’s theories on fairness, particularly with regard to reference
prices, are manifest in consumer reaction to high ticket prices and lack of
access to those tickets. Primary sellers who overprice tickets can experience
serious negative consequences in the form of regulation. Consumers who have
found the tickets to be beyond their means engage in public protests and
outcry, are quoted by newspapers about the “unfairness of it all,” and often
turn to legislators for redress.35 Museums that charge extra for special exhibits
or offer special access through higher priced tickets have traditionally met
consumer resistance because of public backlash. The public has strong feelings
regarding universal access to art. Public acceptance of pricing differentials
demands accompanying assurance that those who cannot afford the premium
will still have access at a different time for a lesser price. That differential
access is not available for one-time events, so pricing differentials are
problematic. Hence, the primary underpricing approach is minimizing the
effects of perceived unfairness of access and the resulting negative publicity
as well as potential regulation (see discussion of Principle Four infra).
Underpricing and Cross-Subsidization
Still another reason for underpricing primary market tickets relates to
event promoters’ need for cross-subsidization for lower-demand events. One
event could command significantly higher prices, but another event that
features a less popular team or musical act cannot bring either the higher ticket
price or the attendance. By underpricing a series, the promoter is able to
generate greater revenues for the lower-demand events. The promoter may
accomplish the cross-subsidization through an offer for a ticket series or the
pairing of events, one high-demand and one low-demand.
Ancillary Items Pricing vs. Underpricing
Yet another explanation for the underpricing by event sponsors is the
greater predictability, reliability, and margins on auxiliary items sold at the
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36. “Team Marketing Report created the Fan’s Cost Index (FCI), which tracks the cost of attendance
for a family of four. This calculation includes two adult average price tickets, two child average price tickets,
four small soft drinks, two small beers, four hot dogs, two programs, parking, and two adult-size hats.
Taking the additional items into consideration, the cost of attending a sporting event increases dramatically.
For example, a family attending a baseball game can expect to pay over $155, which is still the least
expensive of the four major sports. Football, on the other hand, will cost a family of four $321.62.” See
generally Team Marketing Report Online: TMI’s Fan Cost Index, available at http://www
.teammarketing.com/fci.cfm., as cited in Jonathan C. Benitah, Forgetting Antiscalping Laws, 6 TEX. REV.
ENT. & SPORTS L. 55, 62 (2005).
37. Liran Einav & Barak Y. Orbach, Uniform Prices for Differentiated Goods: The Case of the
Movie-Theater Industry 27 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 129 (2007) (Harvard Law School, Discussion Paper No.
337, 2001), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/337.pdf. This
phenomenon is not unique to high-demand events. There is, again, a psychological component to the
willingness to pay $25 for a $5 t-shirt. There are factors of enjoyment, uniqueness, and exclusivity that
contribute to the willingness to pay an excessive price. Popcorn in a movie theater is another example.
Again, the discussion of the full psychological components of this consumer behavior is beyond the scope
of this piece, but more information can be found in the work of Steven Landsburg. Steven Landsburg, Why
Popcorn Costs More at the Movies and Why the Obvious Answer Is Wrong, in THE ARMCHAIR ECONOMIST:
ECONOMICS AND EVERYDAY LIFE 157 (1993). The fundamental point is that movie theaters are pricing a
consumer package, i.e., entrance into the theater (the ticket price) and concessions (popcorn). Movie-theater
owners have a variety of options: low ticket prices and high popcorn prices; very high ticket prices and all-
the-popcorn-you-can-eat; or some combination in between. Landsburg concludes that, after taking into
account consumer preferences, the reason for relatively high ticket prices and very high popcorn prices by
theater owners is that they have come to recognize that many movie attendees also love popcorn. The goal
is to maximize overall profits from the operation, not just profits from ticket sales. This example helps
explain why event promoters resent secondary ticket sales. Brokers, in essence, strip the ticket from the
overall entertainment package and so may adversely affect concession sales revenues.
38. See Pascal Courty, An Economic Guide to Ticket Pricing in the Entertainment Industry, 66
LOUVAIN ECON. REV. 167, 174 (2000). See also Scott D. Simon, If You Can’t Beat ’Em, Join ’Em:
Implications for New York’s Scalping Law in Light of Recent Developments in the Ticket Business, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 1171, 1173 n.14 (2004). Courty focuses on the feeling of exclusivity that comes from
attending a sold-out event.
event.36 Economic research confirms that the stability of pricing is important
to consumer for many reasons and is used by sellers for high-demand events,
pricing that is uniform despite lower demand and cost levels across the events
(movies) offered.37 There is one additional reason under pricing or uniform
pricing is used despite high demand. Referred to by the authors as the “get ’em
in and fleece them on programs and t-shirts” business model, the perceived
“fair” price charged for the event brings in a full house that is then quite taken
by the opportunity of being there when so many others were seeking access.
The psychology of the once-in-a-life-time event fuels these sales.38 And
promoters also make money from items such as parking and food, and when
the number attending is down, these revenue sources, upon which the
promoters are dependent, are down significantly even with a higher ticket price
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39. See Ordonez, supra note 15, at B4.
40. Promoters have been known to admit that were it not for the sure sale of tickets to secondary
market ticket brokers that there would be no way for them to be able to front the funds necessary for
bringing in the biggest musical acts in the industry. Brokers serve as a co-investor for the promoters because
they provide sure ticket sales. Thomas K. Arnold, The Brokers Call it Public Service, Others See it as Just
the Opposite, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1988, Calendar, at 1; Ticket Scalping: Hearing on S. 13 Before the
Comm. on Crim. Justice, 1991 Leg., 72d Sess. (Tex. 1991) (testimony of Houston Ticket Center) (cited in
Sheree Rabe, Ticket Scalping: Free Market Mirage, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 57, 63 n.59 (1991)).
41. One writer describes this interconnection as follows: “Scalpers also have a more complementary
financial relationship with promoters than most people realize. Scalpers purchase blocks of tickets to
concerts, enabling promoters to count on a certain percentage of up-front money to finance a show.
Similarly, sports promoters rely on season ticket purchases for much of their revenue. Were it not for the
market liquidity provided by scalpers (in the sense that scalpers purchase most of their inventory from
season ticket holders who cannot attend a game and then resell to fans without tickets), consumers would
purchase fewer season ticket packages, thereby lowering promoter revenues.” Simon, supra note 38, at 1210.
42. Further discussion can be found at SEGRAVE, supra note 1, at 97, 102, 107.
43. See Simon, supra note 38, at 1210.
and few attendees.39 The high demand for limited tickets only increases the
desirability of the trinkets sold at the event. Indeed, the very presence of
brokers and scalpers only adds to the dynamic of exclusivity and the drive for
some token to take away as memorabilia.
Underpricing and Risk Transfer
There is also a logical business model explanation for the lower prices of
event sponsors in the primary market. At lower prices, the tickets do sell out,
particularly to brokers who are seeking to obtain the profits from the prices
gauged to real demand. However, the end result is that the secondary market
players assume the risk of not being able to sell the tickets.40 In the event of
shifting demand or even the unlikely event that the primary market was priced
accurately, the event sponsor no longer carries the risk of an event not selling
out to full capacity. This risk transference may be much more for formal
Broadway productions where there is some evidence of interactions between
producers and brokers with requests for their advance purchases of tickets for
a show that has yet to be produced.41 The result is that the producer has
transferred some of the risk of a flop to the brokers of the secondary market.42
Advance purchases by the secondary market provides the producers with
interest-free financing and leaves the brokers with the risk if the play does not
open or if it is not a success.43
However, there is a converse side of these transfers. An example from the
Chicago Cubs shows the effects and risk of hold-backs by the primary sellers.
The Cubs once used a business model of holding back bleacher seat tickets for
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44. Jasmin Yang, A Whole Different Ballgame: Ticket Scalping Legislation and Behavioral
Economics?, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 111, 122–23 (2005).
45. Ticket Scalping: Hearing on S. 13 Before the Comm. on Crim. Justice, 1991 Leg., 72d Sess. (Tex.
1991) (testimony of Houston Ticket Center) (cited in Rabe, supra note 40).
the day of the game with the hope of selling them on game day for a higher
price. The intent was to offer a resolution for the market reality that there is a
market for day-of-the-game sales, a reflection of the market reality that not all
ticket sales for one-time and/or limited-access events are planned ahead.
However, the team’s fate in terms of its ongoing performance (i.e., wins and
losses), resulting shifting consumer demand, and even the weather on game
day made game-day sell-outs of these hold-back tickets less likely. The result
was that the team itself absorbed the loss of unsold tickets instead of having
the tickets sold in the primary market to secondary sellers who then absorbed
the risks. The no-sales risk is thus transferred to the ticket brokers, a transfer
that allows primary sellers to make money in the primary market even as they
sell at a lower price.44
Ticket brokers absorb another risk, that of insulating sports teams from the
low ticket sales in the teams’ off years. That is, ticket brokers invest in season
tickets regardless of the team’s standing or potential, continuing to hold those
tickets even in years when the teams do not perform well, with the goal of a
substantial return on investment (ROI) when the team does have post-season
and/or championship play. Season-ticket investments in the lean years provide
the brokers with needed access in the play-off years. In the early 1990s, for
example, some ticket brokers in Texas held as many as 100 season tickets to
the Dallas Cowboys, an investment that would not pay off well until the
Cowboys’ Super Bowl streak.45 A more complete picture of the role of the
secondary ticket market and ticket brokers in professional sports is one of
unwritten partnership in risk. Through brokers, sports teams have ticket sales
that would not otherwise exist in the lean years of the franchise.
Underpricing for Later Silent Entry into the Secondary Market
One final explanation for the underpricing of tickets in the primary market
is the nefarious conduct of primary sellers operating incognito in the secondary
market. Subject to the financial and perception concerns highlighted in the
other explanations for underpricing, primary sellers are trapped with
underpricing revenues unless they can participate in the secondary market
profits from true-demand pricing without having to endure the consumer heat
for that pricing. Primary sellers thus often make more money in secondary
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46. Indeed, artists may have promoters or firms like Ticketmaster sell their holds on secondary ticket
websites without letting the public know. See infra notes 114–35 and accompanying text.
47. Id.
48. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976); RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11 (5th ed. 1998).
49. The United States Postal Service’s strategic plan highlights the competition it faces, the decline
in the use of the post office for services, and why it needed the expanded authority provided to it under the
Postal Act of 2006, a regulatory reform that permitted the USPS to offer more services and expand the
nature of its operations in response to increasing competition. Vision 2013 is the title of the USPS’s five-
year strategic plan, designed to address increasing competition documented in the plan and highlighting new
approaches such as the availability of services via the Internet. U.S. POST OFFICE, FIVE-YEAR STRATEGIC
PLAN FOR 2009–2013, at 1–4 (2008), available at http:/www.usps.com/strategicplaning/_pdf/
Vision2013FullDocument.pdf.
markets anonymously.46 A more complete discussion of the presence of
primary ticket sellers in the secondary markets is found in other principles and
Part III. However, primary sellers can enter the secondary market through
hold-backs, by creating a subsidiary ticket broker, or by limiting resales to
authorized brokers or sites that then provide the primary seller with fees from
the resales.
The effects of Principle One are straightforward: a large secondary
marketplace with high demand and limited supply means the opportunity for
high profits. This potential attracts entrepreneurs, but also serves as a lure for
fraudsters and tricksters trying to seize the moment. With or without the
nefarious conduct of primary sellers, the market, because of its underpriced,
high-demand nature, seeks a way around artificial constraints on price or
access.47
Principle Two: Underpriced High-Demand Events Produce Queues
The immediate results of too-low prices for high-demand goods are
shortages, queues, and waiting lists. The law of supply and demand is
irrefutable.48 Underpricing in a high-demand market produces a scramble
because of inefficient allocation of time costs. Secondary ticket markets are
not unlike the secondary markets or solutions that have emerged at the U.S.
Post Office, the DMV, Honey-Baked Ham Stores at Easter, parking offices at
universities, and countries with socialized medicine. The demand is high, the
supply is limited, the lines are long, and, as a result, alternative markets
develop. The U.S. Post Office faces competition from the Internet, FedEx,
UPS, and cell phones.49 Sam’s Club, Costco, Safeway, and others have
developed their own forms of a spiral, brown sugar-coated ham with slightly
changed names in order to compete with the brand name product, one that does
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50. A quick Google search yields such alternatives as the Holiday Baked Ham, the Spiral Sliced
Honey Gold Ham, the HoneyBaked Ham, Baked Honey Hams, Country Cured Hams, and Baked Honey
Hams.
51. There remain private sites on the Internet that direct citizens on how to get their necessary DMV
services without going into the DMV.
52. Now available online are state and private websites that provide direction and services for those
who have DMV issues.
53. Indeed, the Italian and Canadian prime ministers both had necessary surgeries in the United
States during the past three years. Stronach Went to U.S. for Cancer Treatments: Report, Sept. 14, 2007,
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20070914/belinda_Stronach_070914/20070914;
World Briefing: Berlusconi Has Heart Surgery in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2006, at A6. For more
generalized data, see Michael Tanner, The Grass is Not Always Greener, POLICY ANALYSIS, Mar. 18, 2008,
at 5, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-613.pdf. See also Michael Moran & Elizabeth Alexander,
American Democracy and Health Care, 27 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 573, 574 (1997). As quoted in and updated
with the following,
[n]onetheless, the United States is not only a major consumer of health care services, but also the
world’s largest producer of medical technology. Investment in new medical technology is
comparatively high, as is its rate of diffusion: “This is demonstrated by cross-national examinations
of the comparative availability of selected medical technologies such as radiation therapy and open-
heart surgery. Measured in units per million, the United States experiences levels of availability up
to three times greater than in Canada and Germany.”
Helen Evans, Sixty Years On—Who Cares for the NHS?, INST. OF ECON. AFFAIRS J., Dec. 30, 2008, at
26–54, available at http//www.iea.org.uk/record/jsp?type=economicAffairs&ID=338. See also June O’Neill
& Dave M. O’Neill, Health Status, Health Care and Inequality: Canada vs. the U.S. (National Bureau of
Economic Research, Working Paper No. 13429, Sept. 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w13429; Canadian Cancer Society, Cancer Statistics, http://www.cancer.ca/Canada-wide/
About%20cancer/Cancer%20statistics.aspx?sc_lang=en (last visited Mar. 14, 2010); National Program of
not demand the time investment of the original Honey-Baked Ham.50 The lines
at the university parking office and DMV differ slightly in that they are
monopolies. However, the market even found ways around government’s
monopolistic controls. Citizens began getting their cars and licenses in those
states with less dense populations, hence fewer people in lines if there were
lines at all. Private sites on the Internet offered alternatives to waiting in line
at the DMV.51 Private entrepreneurs began providing parking for students who
were frustrated with the pricing and time commitments of obtaining university
parking. As a result, states and universities, who once behaved as monopolists,
created online service systems for everything from registration to licenses that
are now available on nearly all campuses and in the 50 states.52 Even
monopolies were forced to offer a convenient and less time-intense activity
than a physical visit to the monopolist’s place of business or branch location.
When health care services are limited and rationed, citizens head to other
countries where the lines are not as long. The cost is somewhat higher, i.e., not
free, but the drive for self-preservation finds them seeking away around a
lower-cost, but inefficient system.53
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Cancer Registries, U.S. Cancer Statistics, http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/uscs/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2010).
54. Courty, supra note 1, at 90.
55. The deli “take and wait” system was described in Weekend Eating Out Update: Meal Ticket for
Ticket Scalpers, THE INDEPENDENT, Feb. 10, 1990, at 38, cited in Rabe, supra note 40, at 58. The author
noted the same phenomenon with S&H Green Stamps, the grocery store program from the 1960s that
awarded the stamps to consumers as a bonus when they shopped. The stamps were a “free” store benefit,
but consumers who did want to wait to earn those stamps with their purchases over time or who had stamps
from different companies and sought to exchange them soon discovered a secondary market where they
could buy the extra stamps they needed in order to reach the number of redemption points for desired items.
FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 432 F.2d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 1972). While S&H tried to shut down the
exchanges each time they emerged, the court held that these exchanges were not violating any laws and
refused to issue an injunction prohibiting the exchanges. Id. at 148.
To reiterate, beginning of commercial entertainment and modern ticketing
can be traced to England’s for-profit theaters in the sixteenth century.54 Also
since that time, the queues have been forming by patrons trying to gain access.
The drive for good ham on holidays or great hams on stage produces the same
effect: high demand results in long lines. Long lines require time
commitments, a cost that becomes incorporated into the price paid in markets
that evolve from sales of goods and services that are underpriced. Where there
is demand and limited supply, all on a fixed price, there will be lines.
Principle Three: Time Is a Cost
Ticket acquisition involves both time and effort, but the primary market
price does not incorporate the time cost of a ticket or good. Secondary sellers
offer the ticket for its actual cost, one that incorporates the time component of
the price. For example, brokers have stepped in to sell place-in-line tickets at
New York City delis during the lunch hour. The place-in-line tickets are free;
one need only walk into the deli and pull the number down from the machine
at the entry to the deli. But having eventual access is not enough for some
buyers because there is the time cost of waiting for that number to be called.
Brokers stepped in, obtained the numbers and corresponding places in line,
and for a fee, turned over that place at the optimum time for those who are
willing to pay that cost to another for the time involved in the labor
performed.55
Primary ticket sales demand time, as when fans camp out the night before
opening ticket sales in their quest for an early place in the queue when the box
office opens. For those who have high time costs and/or low patience for lines
(line rage), finding ways around the queues becomes their goal. This goal of
saving time will lead to the impatient among us, in effect, hiring agents to
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56. “Diggers” is the name given to those who stand in ticket line for others, whether their wealthy
employers or ticket brokers seeking to acquire more than the per-person allotted share.
57. Courty, supra note 1.
58. SEGRAVE, supra note 1, at 19, 103. The term “diggers” was derived from the description that they
dig out the tickets for others. They have also been referred to as “droids.” And the access problem was that
they were so aggressive, disorderly, or disheveled that standing in line became a test of one’s intestinal
fortitude, not one’s patience.
59. Happel & Jennings (1989), supra note 7, at 11–12.
inhabit the queues for high-demand/limited-seating events. Lines and diggers56
are not inventions that resulted from recent Broadway phenomenons such as
Cats, Mama Mia, and Spamalot. Even those at the dawn of the Enlightenment
had to find a way to get access to limited seats early. English theaters gave us
the precursors to diggers, those willing to wait in line for tickets. Those who
could afford the limited luxury boxes sent their servants to the box offices
early to purchase checks, the tokens that allowed entrance to the theaters. The
servants would then use the checks, take their seats, and hold those places for
their employers.57
However, the use of agents does produce one of the nuisance effects in
secondary ticket market sales and one that has garnered the attention of
regulators. As theater and other events evolved and not as many households
had servants, the relationship between the line and seat place-holders and the
actual ticket purchaser became more remote. Those who wanted tickets for
themselves or for purposes of resale used agents, hired to spend time and
compensated in colorful ways such as liquor and hard drugs. The use of such
agents does produce one of the nuisance effects in secondary ticket market
sales and one that has garnered the attention of regulators. When compensated
diggers, the name given to agents who act on behalf of those who really want
the tickets by doing their bidding, i.e., standing in line, entered as players in
the ticket markets, they were not necessarily subject to the types of pre-
employment testing requirements or screening that servants experienced.
These proxies, often called “shabby boys and half-grown men” (frequently
day-job messenger boys), often presented access issues for patrons.58 That is,
their somewhat ruffian appearance proved to deter patrons and even block
sidewalks and streets. Indeed, those occupying the ticket queues have often
been paid in alcohol and drugs.59 Liquored-up diggers standing in line for
Placido Domingo tickets are bound to produce some incongruous events.
Nuisance effects do result from the disinterested who are forced to stand
in line or even from the sober who are simply in line seeking to maximize the
number of tickets they can obtain. Too many diggers in line, varying degrees
of investment and commitment, and the presence of drugs and alcohol are
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60. Fistfights were not uncommon among the Broadway diggers, and the New York Theater
routinely had six police officers posted in the early 1900s for each night there was a performance.
Theatergoer’s Complaint, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1901, at 19. For information on the correlation between
drugs and diggers, see Lawrence Bershad & Richard J. Ensor, Ticket Scalping Legislation—A New Jersey
Case Study, 9 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 81, 97 (1985).
61. SFGiants.com, Ticket Policies, http://mlb.com/sf/ticketing/policies.jsp (last visited Mar. 14,
2010). The original policy appeared at The San Francisco Giants Ticket Policies, http://sanfrancisco
.giants.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/sf/ticketing/sf_ticketing_policies.jsp. See also Daniel J. Glantz, Note, For-bid
Scalping Online?: Anti-Scalping Legislation in an Internet Society, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 261, 278
(2005).
62. Amusements, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1856, at 1.
bound to produce eruptions of violence during the waiting and buying
processes.60 The straggled, unbathed or drunken appearance, and the conduct
of diggers are the fairly typical social issues that arise from ticket lines, thus
leading to Principle Four.
There is another form of “nuisance effects,” consequence that may not
spring from the existence of long lines, but rather from public resistance to
alternative methods of distribution of the limited supply of tickets. For
example, an alternative strategy for managing ticket demand has been a lottery
system of distribution. The San Francisco Giants, in pre-Internet times, used
a lottery system for the 500 tickets the team made available for sale just before
every home game. If there were more than 100 people in line at the marking
point of four hours before the game, the Giants held a lottery for allocation of
the tickets.61 The rebellion, the offense to justice, and resentment over fans’
time commitment becoming irrelevant in the allocation of the tickets resulted
in rancor and disruption.
Principle Four: Where There Are Nuisances, There Is Noise, Followed by
Regulation
Nuisance effects accompany the frenetic demand in the secondary ticket
market. In 1856, a New York Times journalist complained about the presence
of the barking brokers:
By the way, we would suggest to the management of the Academy of Music the actual
necessity of driving the ticket speculators from the steps of their building. The pertinacity
with which these gentlemen persist in thrusting reserved seats in your face is intolerable.
The prosperity of the present season appears to have greatly increased their number, and
if possible, added to their ugliness.62
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63. Id.
64. See infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
65. For example, in 1993, when New York still prohibited ticket resales for more than $5 above face
value, Barney—Live at Radio City had 11 scheduled shows. Tickets for the March 1994 shows sold out
within two hours of the opening of the box office, in December 1993. However, parents soon discovered
that ticket brokers had plenty of tickets that were selling initially after the primary sell-out for $200 (ticket
face value was $30). Hell hath no fury like a parent whose child has been deprived of the musical stylings
of a large purple dinosaur. The parents flooded the Consumer Affairs Department with complaints. New
York City officials rounded up the usual suspects and charged 10 brokers with operating without a license.
The backlash was so furious that changes to New York’s law carried the emotional baggage for almost a
decade following the Barney ticket scandal. SEGRAVE, supra note 1, at 185.
The reporter acknowledged that while it may have been impossible to
prevent these vociferous gentlemen from obtaining tickets, “it cannot be
beyond the resources of the Academy to pick them out of the lobby and off the
steps into the street.”63
One of the prime reasons government regulation finds its way on a
continual basis into the secondary ticket market is that a good ticket story
always inspires the masses. Indeed, the masses are often the impetus for the
good ticket story. The presence of the masses all in line, on phones, or on the
Internet who are all seeking to obtain the same limited seats for the same one-
time event are often the story. Those in the media seek to inspire the masses,
or at least glean the advertising revenues from attracting their attention with
a story. Those who regulate ticket markets and even those without jurisdiction
to do so desire to be a part of any news story that dominates the news,
particularly one that has the masses in a mode of fomenting high dudgeon.64
For elected officials, the end result of self-injection into a ticket story is
frequently positive name recognition.
Responsive politicians try to remedy nuisance effects with regulatory
intervention. “Fairness” comes into play. Regulators see themselves as Old
West sheriffs trying to keep the peace and make sure that those who stand in
line are treated fairly and not victimized by the brutes of the town. However,
others may see the regulators as being more like Old West cowboys who ride
into town and fire shots, with the hope that one of these random shots holds
some promise for righting the perceived injustices of pricing and supply. The
regulation is let off in rounds of fire with the hope of stopping the conduct that
produces the noise from consumers, the noise of emotionally charged issues.65
That high emotion produces public backlash, which is part of another
nuisance effect not related to the lines and chaos of barkers at events. This
nuisance effect emerges when the primary market is sold out and the
secondary ticket market prices are so high that artists or teams are the targets
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66. It is difficult to describe the centuries of emotion that surround ticket markets and resulting
regulation. For example, when the New York Supreme Court ruled against a 1927 state law that fixed ticket
prices, one press report included the following summary of public involvement and reaction: “Few decisions
of the Court have attracted so much attention as the five-to-four ruling.” SEGRAVE, supra 1, at 124. New
York City Mayor, William O’Dwyer pledged the cooperation of every city agency in trying to remedy the
problems that were plaguing consumers about Broadway ticket access in 1949. Mayor Pledges Aid to City’s
Theatres, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1949, at 14. The lobbying over New Jersey’s changes to its ticket scalping
laws in 1995 was as intense as any other proposal before the legislature. (Interviews of authors with
legislators and lobbyists during the course of observing the October 1995 hearings.)
67. Kahneman et al., supra note 25, at 728 (arguing that antiscalping regulation is the result of
perceived notions of fairness on the part of consumers, and consumers may even understand the economics
of the ticket markets but have a desire to remedy the unfairness and use their elected representatives to fix
the disparate results).
68. For example, in upholding a New York statute that required ticket brokers to be licensed, the
New York Supreme Court noted, 
[t]he overwhelming evidence shows an abuse. It is the duty, therefore, of governmental agencies to
meet the conditions and find a remedy. It is idle to say that the state and city are powerless to prevent
fraud and extortion in the resale of theater tickets. The evils of theater ticket speculating are
undisputed. The street speculator, in particular, has become a nuisance. His purpose is to prey on the
people by selling his tickets at an extortionate price. A statute which requires a ticket speculator to
obtain a license and thus protect the public is constitutional.
People v. Weller, 202 N.Y.S. 149, 153 (N.Y. App. Div. 1923). As a result, any market structure or regulation
must take into account the consumer response to the ticket markets. Economic reasoning aside, consumers
feel the way they feel about their events and access to tickets and their notions of fairness.
69. A magistrate dressed down an arrested scalper,
[y]ou men who sell tickets in front of theaters often charge $1.00 or $1.50 more than the ticket really
for the public outcry. While not the traditional sort of “noise” associated with
public nuisance, the hue and cry over access to tickets, distribution of tickets,
and prices of tickets reaches a fever pitch in the media, a sound that is akin to
Greek Sirens for elected officials. Further, those involved in the hue and cry
and those responding are enamored with a descriptive term that percolates in
every post-primary market ticket sale. The public outcry usually includes some
form of declaration that ticket sales or prices are not “fair.”66 The notion of
“fairness” is antithetical to efficiency-oriented economists, but it does
represent a rallying cry for consumer outrage, legislative action, and judicial
affirmation.67 Economic principles, however eternal or universal, that govern
ticket markets cannot and do not control emotional reactions of consumers and
the resulting regulatory action of legislators and the judicial branch.68
In 1907, New York City’s Mayor McClelland, noted in his annual “State
of the City” address to the alderman that scalpers had become an “intolerable
nuisance” and encouraged the group to take action. Following what was
described as “rancorous” public hearings, a law prohibiting street sales of
tickets above face value was passed, a law that would run through several
iterations, challenges, and more emotionally-charged hearings.69
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cost and if a poor man wants to take his wife and family to a theater he is compelled to accede to
your demands if he cannot obtain suitable tickets from the box office . . . . I am opposed to this . . .
and I think it is an imposition on the part of your men . . . . I am going to watch these cases closely,
and others who come before me on a similar charge will probably be sent to the workhouse instead
of being fined.
Magistrate Warns Ticket Speculators, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1911, at 2.
70. Happel & Jennings (2002), supra note 7, at 443–46.
71. Id.
72. The pattern of newsworthy events fraught with ticket problems, excessive prices, and public
outrage also preceded the New York 1911 experience. In 1850, The “Swedish nightingale” herself, Jenny
Lind, wrote to P.T. Barnum before her U.S. tour asking him to avoid ticket sales to speculators so as not to
taint her concerts with the negative press coverage that would result. SEGRAVE, supra note 1, at 3.
73. The 54-show 2007 tour sold out within hours (with some locations for the concerts selling out
in as little as four minutes), with a ticket in Charlotte, North Carolina being resold for $2,565. When
Ms. DeGeneres asked Ms. Cyrus about the high price, she responded, “Oh, gosh, it ain’t worth that!” Scott
Goldberg, Miley Cyrus Tour Adds Seats to Accommodate Demand, DIGITAL MEDIA WIRE, Oct. 11, 2007,
http://www.dmwmedia.com/news/2007/10/11/miley-cyrus-tour-adds-seats-to-accommodate-demand.
This pattern of large event sales, public outcry, and legislative/regulatory
action repeated itself around the country for the next century. The law review
literature through the early 1990’s reflects a movement toward consumerism,
legislation designed to protect consumers from extortion and market control
by ticket sellers.70 The specifics of regulation, in response to public outcry,
included controlling traffic congestion, fraudulent sales, and
misrepresentations about seat locations.71 The themes in the legislative
histories of these laws and regulation are also the same. There were innocent
consumers versus evil market manipulators in the form of brokers and scalpers
so depicted because of a recent event in which scarcity, prices, and/or ticket
fraud emerged as very prominent news stories.72
Over a century later, the pattern has not changed. High-demand, limited-
seating events for critical games or performances attract attention when tickets
go on sale. Since seating is limited, those who do not obtain a slot are prime
interview targets for media coverage. In their disappointment and the sticker
shock of initial secondary market ticket prices, there comes the usual dressing
down of ticket brokers by members of the public and others who seek reforms.
For example, the promoters for Miley Cyrus’s 2007 tour as well as the young
star herself were the recipients of the wrath of parents who had been unable to
get tickets for the Disney star’s concert through the primary markets. The
tickets were selling for as much as $2,565 on StubHub’s site and the outrage
from parents resulted in an appearance of Ms. Cyrus on the Ellen show to
explain that the parents did not cause the high demand and that it was the
“scalpers” who did it.73 True to the pattern, the Arkansas Attorney General
began an investigation into the practices of those selling “Hannah
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74. Stephen M. Silverman, Possible Hannah Montana Ticket Scalping Probed, PEOPLE, Oct. 4, 2007,
http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,20137827,00.html.
75. Often artists or consumers or groups of both will file suit against promoters and others for
antitrust violations as a means of responding to fans’ concerns about ticket distribution, ticket prices, and
access. Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (D.C.
Colo. 2004). In some situations, the artists rebel against the promoters’ market structures. A major dispute
between TicketMaster (TM) and the band Pearl Jam erupted in 1994. Pearl Jam wanted TM to drop its
service fee to $1.80 a ticket for its summer tour, but TM refused to go below its existing $2.50. Pearl Jam
then tried to book its own venues, but that failed. Pearl Jam filed a complaint with the Justice Department
over TM’s monopolistic practices. The Justice Department launched an investigation, and the Subcommittee
on Information and Justice of the House Government Operations Committee also opened an inquiry, holding
hearings in July and September. The Justice Department antitrust investigation ended abruptly in July, 1995.
Following a year of charges and counter charges, cross firing of legal papers, and insults between Pearl Jam
and TM, a meeting was set but then cancelled by the Government side the day before saying the inquiry was
being dropped. Instead, the Government was going to continue “to monitor competitive developments.”
Ralph Blumenthal, Oddities Continue with Ticketmaster and Pearl Jam, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1995, Arts
at 1.
76. Happel & Jennings (1995), supra note 7, at 72–74 (scalping prohibitions were labeled as the first
generation of ticket market regulation. A full discussion of the history of the types of prohibitions, their
penalties, and constitutionality can be found in the Happel & Jennings (1995) article).
Montana/Miley Cyrus” concert tickets in the secondary market.74 The Cyrus
backlash because of high broker prices resulted in a change to the young star’s
2009 ticket distribution system that involved controlled access to primary
ticket sales, identification requirements, and limited ticket purchases. This
form of self-regulation is also a result of the hue and cry from consumers who
experience a “bad” ticket sale in the primary market.75
There is little that is new in terms of the methods used to address the
nuisance effects of secondary markets. The types of regulations have included
outlawing secondary ticket sales (illegality),76 prohibiting sales at certain times
and in certain areas, creating disincentives through licensing requirements, and
allowing primary-market participants to “help” solve the nuisance effects by
changing the structure of the secondary marketplace. One final solution often
attempted as a means for remedying the nuisance effects, whether in terms of
lines or consumer noise, is a price control. Regulating the maximum mark-up
from a ticket’s face value does cut down on the activity in the secondary
market. Price controls are such that secondary market participants are unable
to capture sufficient profits to make participation worth their time, line waiting
and otherwise. However, price controls are the central focus of the next
principle.
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77. The reimbursement rate for Medicare was, on average, 44% less than private insurers. Cristina
Boccuti & Marilyn Moon, Comparing Medicare and Private Insurers: Growth Rates in Spending Over
Three Decades, 22 HEALTH AFF. 230 (2003), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/
full/22/2/230. The reimbursement rates for hospitals vary. The result is the inability to recoup costs and
creative behaviors to recover those costs. The U.S. government spent $1.13 billion for what the Department
of Justice (DOJ) calls “integrity activities” directed at detecting Medicare fraud. The focus of the program
is overbilling and the program measures its success by what happens to the levels of billing in areas in which
it has had significant enforcement activity and resulting fines and imprisonment. In the Miami area, for
example, a DOJ series of cases resulting in billing reductions of over $2 billion in durable medical
equipment and treatment claims from doctors, hospitals, and providers for Medicare patients. Criminal
Prosecution as a Deterrent to Health Care Fraud: Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2–3 (2009) (statement of Lanny A. Bruer, Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/09-05-
20BreuerTestimony.pdf. The cases are primarily billing cases by health-care providers, i.e., cases in which
the providers overbill the government. Medicare guidelines limit reimbursement and the providers use of
upcoding, unnecessary medical equipment, and other ploys used to collect more in reimbursements.
78. The under-the-radar markets have existed in ticket sales since the mid-1800s in the United States.
The only question was how visible the black market would be for tickets in any given area, a factor
controlled by the level of enforcement of local and state antiscalping laws. Indeed, reports on events of the
day often carried a description of the original ticket prices followed by what happened to those prices as the
event approached. Colonel Ingersoll’s Sunday night May 14, 1880 lecture at the Booth Theater offered
tickets for $0.75. Demand was so great, with standing room only left, that tickets were selling for $2.00 just
before the Colonel’s lectures (on the folly of faith and religion) began. The price had climbed steadily from
$0.75 to $1.00, to $1.25 and so forth until it reached, in quite orderly fashion, its $2.00 high. Col. Ingersoll’s
Lecture; Talking to a Crowd in Booth’s Theater, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1880.
79. But see infra at note 107 and accompanying text.
Principle Five: Price Controls Do Not Bring Relief for Consumers
Elected officials cannot resist a good ticket story. So many cannot resist
price controls. And the secondary ticket market attracts both species. Socialists
(for want of a better term) resent profits, but embrace queues. Principle Five
persists in secondary ticket markets because such individuals neither
understand nor work within or with the flow of economic market forces. The
effects are predictable: fraud (as with Medicare),77 black markets,78 and
asymmetrical information (consumers not fully informed about available
seats).79 Price controls are not only attempted through regulation, but often by
primary sellers, the event promoters and sponsors.
Price controls represent an effort to keep the secondary market at the same
price levels as the primary market. As noted in the discussion of Principles
One through Three, other irrefutable economic principles drive ticket prices
in the secondary ticket market to higher levels. Dismissing these principles,
including ignoring the real additional costs associated with obtaining tickets
for resale in the secondary ticket market sales, imposes an artificial constraint
that, while appeasing consumers enamored with “fairness” and bringing good-
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80. SEGRAVE, supra note 1, at 16 (indicating that Pennsylvania’s statute prohibited resale on public
streets, highways, in front of theaters, or amusement or entertainment centers).
81. Controls have been attempted at the federal level. Gary Ackerman, a Democrat Congressman
from New York (currently in his 12th term), tried to introduce the Ticket Scalping Reduction Act in 1998,
H.R. 3951, 105th Cong. (1998). It would have prohibited the sale of five or more tickets in a single
transaction at a markup in excess of $5.00 or 10 percent of face value (whichever is greater) throughout the
country. The bill was referred to the Judiciary Committee but no cosponsors came forward and hearings
were never held. This attempt at extensive national price controls died an early legislative death. The act
would have amended 18 U.S.C. to include § 1822 with the described provisions.
82. Hannah Montana does not play Anchorage. However, there are some states with significant
collegiate and professional sports presence as well as being locations for world tours that have moved from
regulation to de-regulation such as, as noted in the list that follows, Oregon, Texas, and Tennessee. The
states with no regulation of resales (with statutes affecting ticket sales noted for information purposes and
to illustrate trends in the laissez-faire states) are Alaska, Hawaii (Hawaii does have a limited statute on
boxing events, H.R.S. § 440-17), Idaho, Iowa, Kansas (Kansas does permit local antiscalping ordinances
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-4104 (2009)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 2187 (2009) (Maine repealed
its statute prohibiting street scalping in 1995)); Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 357:F4 (LexisNexis 2009) (requiring ticket agents to disclose on the ticket whether performance in a
musical concert will involve prerecorded music)); North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee (TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-17-1105 (West 2008) (making it a crime to sell software to circumvent security measures
on a ticket seller’s website) and TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-115-208 (West 2008) (prohibiting event promoters
intentioned or accolade-driven regulators their desired attention and re-
election, will create other unintended but eternal-and-universal-in-nature
consequences within that market. In other words, tweak or control the price,
and the nuisance effects intended to be addressed by the price controls may go
away initially only to re-emerge in a different form.
Statutory Price Controls
Price controls take various forms in the secondary ticket market. The
original form of price control was the prohibition on ticket resales. In theory,
these restrictions on resale are the ultimate price controls. If the act of reselling
tickets is treated and prosecuted as a crime, then the presumed result because
of the imposed illegality is either limited or no resales and, hence, prices
maintained at the primary market selling price. However, that the price will
remain at the primary market level assumes effective enforcement of these
prohibition statutes. Such a presumption has always been flawed.
Prohibitions on resale in the United States can be traced to Pennsylvania’s
1884 statute, one of the earliest state laws in the country.80 Today, there are 39
states with some form of ticket sales or resales laws that vary in scope and
purposes.81 Those states without any form of regulation tend to be states of
low-density population, thus states least likely to have the nuisance effects of
ticket selling from professional sports events or world tours.82 The types of
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from giving away more than 2% of the tickets for an event as complimentary admissions)); Texas (TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. § 9008 (2009) (prohibiting ticket resales above face value repealed in 1975, but local
ordinances such as time and place restrictions permitted)); Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wyoming.
83. See ALA. CODE § 40-12-167 (2009) (selling above face value requires a license); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 13-3718 (2009) (resale above face value of ticket restricted to locations greater than 200 feet from
event location); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-63-201 (2009) (no resales above face value to high school and college
sporting events; no resale of music event tickets above face value except for service fees); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 346 (West 2009) (permitting no resale above purchase price on grounds of event without permission of
the owner); S.B. 09-071, 67th Gen. Assem. (Colo. 2009) (postponed indefinitely) (limiting ticket resale
amounts to percentage of face value; prohibiting a ticket broker from charging more than the face value of
a ticket plus $5 or 25%, whichever is greater; authorizing the attorney general or a district attorney to bring
an action to forfeit the tickets or the proceeds of the tickets; prohibiting an event sponsor from charging fees
greater than 10% of the face value of an event ticket; proposing amendment to COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-1-718 (West 2009) (permitting season ticket holders to resell their tickets without penalty)); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 6-1-720 (West 2009) (prohibiting the use of devices, including software, designed to
circumvent ticket acquisition limits in online sales); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-289a, 289b, 289c (West
2009) (regulating service fee disclosures, refund requirements, and time-and-place restrictions even though
there is a proposed elimination of these); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 918 (2009) (selling above ticket face
value is prohibited at NASCAR events, certain campuses, and state and federal highways on the day of an
event); FLA. STAT. § 817.36 (LexisNexis 2009) (limiting resale to $1 for certain types of events); GA. CODE
ANN. § 43-4B-25 to -30 (West 2009) (permitting original purchaser, charities, and brokers to resell tickets
without limitation; unlawful for anyone else to resell tickets for more than $3.00 above face value; extensive
regulation of brokers); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 440-17 (LexisNexis 2008) (prohibiting resale of boxing
event tickets above face value); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 375/1.5 (2005) (prohibiting resale above ticket face
value except for sporting events, theater, musical performances, or place of public amusement); IND. CODE
ANN. § 25-9-1-26 (LexisNexis 2009) (permitting no resales above amount printed on ticket and no sales of
tickets beyond venue capacity); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-4104, 19-101a (2009) (permitting cities and towns
to enact anti-scalping regulation pursuant to Op. Atty. Gen. No. 2002-48 (Oct. 18, 2002), 2002 WL
31373428); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 518.070 (LexisNexis 2009) (rendering resales above ticket face value
unlawful unless such resale is authorized by the issuer); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:1 (2009) (prohibiting sale
above face value with exceptions for college sports events, when done with authorization by school or
through alumni events and sale above face value permitted via the Internet when the issuer permits such
sales; full regulation of Website operators such as requirement of refunds for cancellations of events as well
as clear statements about nonrefundable processing fees; no limits on college student ticket resales for
college sports events and no limits on legislators; resales of tickets given to them for college sporting
events); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 2187 (2009) (repealing its statute prohibiting street scalping in
1995); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. § 4-318 (West 2008) (prohibiting resale of complimentary tickets for an
amount above face value in regards to boxing); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 185A-G (West 2009)
(prohibiting resale by anyone without a license, with the exception of charitable organizations; resale limited
to $2 above face value unless additional fees are for service charges with membership fees not counted in
computation of above-face-value amount); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.465 (2007) (prohibiting resale without
permission and resales must take place at location other than event/box office and some consumer
regulation encompassed in the laws include prohibitions on resale, price
controls (i.e., maximum amounts above face value), time-and-place-for-sales
limitations, limits on types of tickets that can be resold, as with no restrictions
on charitable raffles of tickets, and other varying forms of controls on Internet
sales and primary market hold-backs of tickets by promoters and owners.83 As
2010] REGULATORY FUTURE OF TICKET SCALPING 143
disclosures required on surcharges; no resales of tickets issued at less than face value; complimentary tickets
may only be used by original recipient); MINN. STAT ANN. § 609.806 (West 2009) (repealing its anti-scalping
law in 2009 and enacted protective provisions for Internet sales and primary market fraud, which makes it
a misdemeanor to interfere via software with equitable distribution of tickets); MINN. STAT ANN. § 609.807
(West 2009) (becoming effective August 1, 2009, it makes it a misdemeanor for event sponsor or forum
owner to divert tickets from the initial public sale); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-23-97 (West 2009) (prohibiting
resale of college and university tickets for amount above face value unless done by an individual who
purchases the ticket for personal use); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-23-99 (West 2009) (prohibiting employees
from giving away merchandise of value without full payment); MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.395 (West 2009)
(prohibiting resale of ticket for above face value except for service charges, but was repealed in 2007); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 56:8-33 (West 2009) (prohibiting resales for more than 20% above face value or $3.00,
whichever is greater; no limits on resales amounts for anyone who is not a ticket broker); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 357 (requires ticket agents to disclose on the ticket whether performance in a musical concert will
involve prerecorded music); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-46-1 (West 2009) (prohibiting resales above face value
except for service fees and if the seller has an arrangement with the promoter or owner for the fees and
resale); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 25.01, 25.03, 25.07 (McKinney Supp. 2010) (effective until
June 2, 2009) (requiring licensing and provides consumer protections for refunds but not limiting resale
price); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-344 (West 2009) (prohibiting service fee greater than $3 per ticket); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 40-05-01 (2009) (permitting municipalities to regulate); OHIO. REV. CODE ANN. § 715.48
(West 2009) (permitting municipalities to regulate ticket sales and resales); 4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 201-215
(2008) (requiring a license for resale above 25% over face value; extensive regulation of licensees; Internet
sales exempted; applicable only to sales in Pennsylvania; charities exempted; state statute supersedes all
municipal laws and regulations); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-22-26 (2008) (resale above face value limited to $3.00
or 10% of ticket price, whichever is greater); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-710 (2008) (resale limited to $1.00
above face value except for “open market ticket events, defined to include Internet sales and predetermined
physical locations); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 7-18-29 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1105 (2008) (making
it a crime to sell software to circumvent security measures on a ticket seller’s website) and TENN. CODE
ANN. § 68-115-208 (2008) (prohibiting event promoters from giving away more than 2% of the tickets for
an event as complimentary admissions); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.432 (Vernon 2009) (prohibition on
ticket resales above face value repealed in 1975, but local ordinances such as time and place restrictions
permitted); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-969 (2009) (prohibits resale for profits except for charitable events and,
under a 2009 amendment, for Internet sales); WIS. STAT. § 42.07 (2008) (no sale above face value and
tickets are considered licenses). It is beyond the scope of this article to explore the municipality and county
levels of regulation, but there are anti-scalping laws at all levels of government that vary significantly with
the types of sports franchises available in those locales. States that do not have anti-scalping regulation, such
as Texas, may have significant local regulation. See, e.g., SAN ANTONIO, TEX. CODE.
84. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-710 (2008) (exempting specifically Internet sales from the maximum-
amount-above-face-value limitation it imposes on brick-and-mortar sales); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 39-17-1105, 68-115-208 (2008) (regulating the circumvention of software to acquire tickets over the
Internet as well as the give-aways by promoters); ALA. CODE § 40-12-167 (2009) (limiting ticket resales to
ticket brokers who are licensed through the state); ALA. CODE § 40-12-167 (2009).
noted, only a handful of states place no limitations on resale of tickets, with
recent legislation in some states opening up unlimited ticket resales for Internet
sales.84
Antiscalping laws that focus on price controls and other means of limiting
sales, whatever their form, have been upheld by the courts. Statutory
impositions on market pricing have made their way to the U.S. Supreme Court
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85. Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 447 (1927)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (indicating that Justice Holmes would have upheld the right of the people of New
York to regulate what they believed to be a public nuisance, although, as Justice Holmes noted about the
imposition of controls, “I am far from saying that I think this particular law a wise and rational provision”).
This would implicate that there is, thus, a difference between laws that are valid and laws that are
economically sound.
86. Gold v. DiCarlo, 235 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
87. Enforcement round-ups generally occur only upon public outcry. See supra note 70. Following
the Barney broker round-up, however, tickets for the Rangers and Knicks playoffs were selling for 10 times
the face value. Further, see infra notes 93–94 and accompanying text for the discussion of packages and an
explanation as to why brokers are not charged with selling for an amount above the statutory maximum and
why the arrests are for license violations, not resale.
88. The dates of the cases in which those who were prosecuted challenged the antiscalping laws
indicate the few-and-far-between nature of full prosecution. See generally Tyson & Brother-United Theatre
Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Gold v.
DiCarlo, 235 F. Supp. 817, 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); People v. Shepherd, 141 Cal. Rptr. 379 (Cal. Ct. App.
1977); New Jersey Assoc. of Ticket Brokers v. Ticketron, 543 A.2d 997 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988);
State v. Spann, 623 S.W.2d 272 (Tenn. 1981).
89. Seattle v. Charlesworth, No. 420709, 2004 WL 3670445 at *3–5 (2004) (noting that because
and are constitutional if the state or local government that has imposed the
maximum price is able to show that there is some public interest served
through the price limitations.85 That barrier of establishing “public interest” has
long been broken through with several decisions in both state and federal
courts referring to the 1927 U.S. Supreme Court case that struck down a
statute for the state’s failure to show public interest as an “antiquated” view of
constitutional requirements for business regulation.86 As a result, this basic
form of control of secondary ticket markets through price remains a part of
both state and local laws.
However, despite their legal validity, these attempts at price controls are
ineffectual. Enforcement is limited to an occasional media splash for isolated
arrests.87 The statutes and ordinances also do not present much of a deterrent
because the penalties are so low and local judges tend to reduce those
penalties, such as a reduction to loitering, or dismiss the charges altogether.88
Further, when resale laws are enforced on a catch-as-catch can basis, law
enforcement officials risk challenges from ticket resellers of disparate or
arbitrary enforcement. For example, the Seattle Mariners had requested help
from local law enforcement officials in stopping its season ticket holders from
selling their game tickets on eBay. The police department did random checks
on eBay to find ticket holders who were trying to sell their tickets via the
Internet, but a municipal judge concluded that such limited enforcement
techniques directed at only certain sellers were arbitrary because the city did
not enforce the antiscalping laws generally.89
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neither the Seattle Mariners nor the Seattle Police Department had attempted any enforcement of the city’s
anti-scalping ordinance on the Ticket Marketplace site any enforcement of the ordinance against the fan with
single sales was arbitrary). In 2004, Seattle’s anti-scalping ordinance was lifted. There was no chaos in the
city or at Safeco field, a prediction from the Mariners if the scalpers were not controlled by the rule of law.
See Peter Lewis, Ticket Scalping Cases Tossed; Judge Cites Selective Police Enforcement, M’s Internet
Sales, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 31, 2004, at A1.
90. For more discussion of the interstate nature of the ticket markets and the issues of regulating
ticket sales across state lines, see infra notes 189–94 and accompanying text.
91. Yael Schacher, Ticket Scalping, GOTHAM GAZETTE, June 6, 2001, at 1–2, available at
http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/issueoftheweek/20030112/200/165 (citing Jonah Benitah, Anti-
Scalping Laws: Should They Be Forgotten?, 6 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 55, 56 (2005)). For more
information on the migration of secondary ticket sales sellers to more favorable states, see supra note 90 and
accompanying text.
92. Kahneman et al., supra note 25, at 735 (“[t]he profit-seeking adjustments that clear the market
are as natural as water finding its level—and as ethically neutral”).
93. John Capone, Scoring Shakespeare Tickets No Walk in the Park, NBC N.Y., July 13, 2009,
http://www.nbcnewyork.com/around_town/the_scene/Scoring-Shakespeare-Tickets-No-Walk-in-the-
Park.html (“I am NOT selling tickets to Shakespeare in the Park. . . . The tickets are free! What you are
purchasing are the services of my wife and I aquiring [sic] YOUR tickets. We were able to get tickets today
and will be enjoying the show . . . however, as struggling college students, we have decided to do it all over
again. We will wait in line from midnight until we have your tickets in hand. The breakdown is this:





Grand Total = $250.00
Seeing Anne Hathaway in Central Park on the final weekend = Priceless.”).
Even with heightened enforcement, antiscalping laws remain ineffectual
in curbing secondary markets. Indeed, the effect of stepped-up enforcement is,
particularly in population-dense areas, to transfer the ticket markets to cities,
towns, and states in which there are no antiscalping laws.90 Rocco Landesman,
who was with Jujamcyn Theaters of New York, referred to the laws that New
York then had that tried to contain secondary market ticket sales as “useless
and stupid” because the end result of tight regulation of the secondary ticket
market in New York was the migration of ticket sales to brokers who are
headquartered out-of-state.91
But, apart from the limited enforcement, there are unintended
consequences of state controls on the secondary ticket markets. Artificially
imposed price constraints unleash the forces of the secondary market, a market
that finds a different way.92 In 2009, New York City prohibited the reselling
of the free tickets to its Shakespeare in the Park. The tickets still showed up on
Craigslist for $85, a fee imposed by the sellers as one for “waiting services.”93
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94. Buyers who cannot obtain tickets for a concert in Las Vegas because of a limited forum size can
try to obtain tickets in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and even farther concert sites. Upon factoring in airfares
and available discounts, the price of a ticket in other markets than Las Vegas may actually be less, even
when transportation costs are incorporated. Further, forum sizes are larger and major cities may have second
offerings over two days, something that increases the supply and brings down the price in those markets.
The additional cost of tickets can be masked in similar ways by brokers.
For example, brokers are able to circumvent the ticket price controls by
working with hotels, airlines, and tourist sites to put together packages that
allow them to sell the tickets as packages. The ticket, which is not part of a
bundle of goods and services, is priced well within the price limits imposed by
statute, but the package allows all of those involved, including the ticket
broker, to profit. In addition, the consumers benefit because of the scope and
components of the package. Four merchants working together benefit from
increased competition of packaging even as the consumer who wanted a ticket
is able to score a weekend package and extras to go along with attendance at
the desired event. Tickets packaged with transportation, weekend getaways,
and other incidentals are profitable for brokers and their partners and provide
consumers with increased choices and options, i.e., competition. In effect, the
price controls serve as an economic stimulus in states and local markets that
control secondary ticket sale pricing. These packages allow the brokers to
avoid prosecution for scalping because the additional benefits included with
the ticket provide the necessary value required, a defense to selling a ticket at
an above-face-value price. From autographed pictures to dinner after events
to limo transportation to and from the events, brokers are able to pull together
ticket amenities that provide a fairly large loophole to these above-face-value
restrictions in order to prevent prosecution.
In addition to this economic loophole, there is a procedural issue in
prosecution of secondary ticket sellers. The very basic constitutional question
of who has jurisdiction over the secondary ticket sellers has developed into a
critical one as ticket markets for even local events have expanded to national
and international markets of buyers. Internet sales, relatively cheaper airfares,
and travel packages have opened up ticket event sales to a geographically
disbursed market.94 For example, ticket sales on eBay often involve a buyer
and a seller from two different states, and the law of the state of the venue for
the event is inapplicable when the two parties are from different states. A
broker can simply establish a host of eBay accounts with billing addresses
located in various states that provide the broker with a virtual ticket resale
forum that exists in a regulatory nether land. The simple act of registering
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95. Jurisdiction over Internet companies has been litigated in other industries with the law reduced
to fairly straightforward standards.
96. Andrew T. Williams, Do Anti-Ticket Scalping Laws Make a Difference?, 15 MANAGERIAL &
DECISION ECON. 503 (1994).
97. Id.; Sherwin Rosen & Andrew Rosenfield, Ticket Pricing, 40 J.L. & ECON. 351 (1997). See also
Depken, supra note 19 (concluding the same, i.e., higher prices for tickets, but recommended that primary
ticket sellers in those NFL markets support antiscalping regulation).
98. Some may fancy these limitations as an invention of today’s concert promoters, but it all has been
tried. See SEGRAVE, supra note 1, at 92. See also World Series Opens in New York Oct. 8, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 1912, at 9 (indicating that for the 1912 World Series between the New York Giants and Boston
Red Sox no seats for the games at the Polo Grounds in New York were sold by mail. Additionally, for the
entire lower section of 15,400 non-reserved seats, tickets were only sold on the day of the game. All
applicants had to queue in line, could only buy one seat each, and had to go directly into the stadium as soon
as the ticket was bought.).
different eBay names affords brokers a way around the antiscalping laws.95
Technology and its national and international ubiquity has exacerbated the
elusive task of trying to prosecute scalpers for violations of laws that attempt
to control pricing in the secondary ticket markets.
Price controls imposed on the secondary ticket market also have an
unintended consequence that affects sellers in the primary market. At least one
study concludes that in those cities and/or states where there are antiscalping
laws, the season ticket prices for NFL teams are lower.96 That is, the primary
ticket sellers are able to command fewer profits when the regulatory climate
inhibits the secondary market. The findings are consistent with the notions
related to underpricing. The prices in the primary market can be higher once
the secondary market has shown a tolerance for that higher level. The
conclusion of the study was the promoters and owners should join with
secondary market participants in vigorously opposing any attempts to control
the secondary market or its prices. Artificial constraints on secondary market
pricing result in artificial constraints in primary ticket markets.97
Private Price Controls
Another method of price control is an indirect one that is not statutory but,
rather, comes through primary sellers (promoters, owners,) who seek to put
primary market limitations on the number of tickets that one individual or
credit card number can purchase during the primary sale phase.98 The idea
behind these private limitations was that if restrictions worked, they would
shut out the ticket brokers from the market. If there were no brokers who were
supplied with tickets, there could be no secondary market, and without the
secondary market, prices, in theory, would fall to their printed value levels.
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99. Mireya Navarro, Pout and Shout, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2007, at SS1.




Again, attempts to control a high-demand, low-supply good prove to be largely
futile as the market capitalizes on everything from weak security in ticket
sellers’ web pages to employing a form of cyber digger to thwart the primary
seller’s limitation. As usual, the market finds a way around an artificial
constraint on demand for a price set at less than equilibrium. These ticket
limitations have resulted in the opposite effect intended (or as stated as
intended) by the primary seller, which was halting the concentration of tickets
and ensuring that the supply of tickets is spread more broadly and thinly
during the primary sale phase.
While a motivation for these acquisition-limitation policies is to keep the
tickets out of the hands of secondary sellers, and, in theory, keep the prices of
the tickets at face value, the result has been secondary market sellers
developing the means to circumvent the limitations, means that came so easily
that they were able to corner the primary market. For example, one of the
controls on ticket acquisition imposed by musical acts has been that members
of fan clubs receive first crack at the concert tickets.99 Brokers responded by
joining every fan club available. Indeed, some have speculated that the
speculators themselves began the fan clubs for purposes of achieving queue-
free tickets to concerts. Another evasive tactic emerged among fans. Rather
than pay $29.99 to join a fan club for Kelly Clarkson, one fan posted an ad
offering to pay $4 to any member of the fan club who would disclose the
password that permitted access to the fan-club tickets.100 Building on this idea,
Ultimatepresales.com sells memberships to fan clubs through its site so that
users can exchange prices for membership.101 Fan clubs have premium
memberships and other tiers that offer varying concert ticket benefits.
Ticketmaster indicates that it polices the sites to determine who is selling
codes, but describes its efforts as “Whac-a-Mole.” Primary sellers can only end
memberships of those they catch because fan club membership terms make the
rights non-transferable and the sale of codes a violation of the contract for the
membership, a breach that allows the fan club to terminate the membership.102
Primary sellers who try to contain the tiger by holding the tail find
innovation, technology, and combinations of both thwart the allocation
mechanisms. Indeed, they may simply be making the secondary market more
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103. For the 1912 Series the day-of-the-game approach to ticket sales to the Polo Grounds meant that
the only reserved seats were those in the upper tier. For the sale of these seats the National Baseball
Commission, which had injected itself into the market in an attempt to stop scalping, established a priority
list for the remaining seats, and following the priority seats, sales to the general public of those non-queue
seats were limited to a maximum of two seats per person. Secondary market prices jumped significantly in
this year of control from the previous year’s sales—from a “usual” price of $6.25 for a $3.00 face-value seat
to a “usual” price of $12.50 and going as high as $60.00. The National Baseball Commission essentially
threw up its hands at this point, leaving it to the teams in the following World Series (from 1913–1917) to
fend for themselves in their ongoing efforts in quash scalping. See SEGRAVE, supra note 1, at 93–94.
104. Ethan Smith, Hannah Montana: Are Websellers Cutting in Line?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2007, at
B1.
105. See Randall Stross, Hannah Montana Tickets On Sale! Oops, They’re Gone, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/16/business/16digi.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=
hannah+montana+oops&st=nyt; see also Bruce Mohl, Cases Could Have Ticket Reseller Facing the Music,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 21, 2007, at http://www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/2007/10/21/case_
could_have_ticket_reseller_facing_the_music/; Ethan Smith, Hannah Montana Battles the Bots, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 5, 2007.
106. See Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Techs., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2007). However,
the decision was one based on copyright infringement by the software developer of software related to
Ticketmaster’s website and software. Specifically, the court found that the automatic use by the software
company of automatically-made cache copies of Ticketmaster’s webpages could not be considered fair use
under the U.S. copyright laws. Also, because Ticketmaster’s terms of use limited requests to no more than
one every three seconds, the software program resulted in the user’s violation of the terms of use for the site
profitable.103 Principles One through Four establish that attempts to contain
secondary sales in a market with these irrefutable principles results in a market
with far fewer opportunities for competition.
Responses by Brokers to Primary Seller Limits on Number of Tickets
When primary sellers placed limitations on the number of tickets that
could be acquired in the primary sale market, the secondary market turned to
innovation and the use of the primary seller’s own technology to acquire more
tickets than they ever would have been able to acquire through the
queue/digger situations of yesteryear. Companies have developed software
programs that permit accumulation of large blocks of tickets by secondary
sellers. These software application programs are called “Ticket Broker
Acquisition Tools” or “TBATs.”104 They have proven to be very effective tools
that secondary market participants can use during the primary market ticket
sales for purposes of acquisition. The 2007 Hannah Montana tour found its
primary-sale tickets very quickly in the hands of brokers, and a face-value
ticket of $64.75 was being sold for $600 in the secondary market.105 In one
case, a federal court granted an injunction against a company in which it was
prohibited from marketing the software.106 However, even without the
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and, ergo, allowed Ticketmaster to banish the user from use. The decision is not one grounded in laws or
the economic structure of markets except to place the constraint on software developers that prohibits them
from using a webpage’s software as part of their program for circumventing ticket limitations. Although the
decision has been used in litigation by primary ticket sellers to support the notion that injunctive relief is
appropriate to halt ticket purchases that violate antiscalping laws or as inherently illegal activity, its use in
that context is misplaced. See, e.g., Herman v. Admit One Ticket Agency, L.L.C., 2009 WL 1247266
(Mass.) (Appellate Brief). The decision is limited to terms of use of primary market ticket websites and the
development of software and when there is infringement in that development that can be enjoined from use
or sale.
107. See supra notes 82–84 (noting in the discussion of the state laws on secondary ticket sales that
some states have passed or are in the process of passing laws that make it a crime to use software to
circumvent ticket limitation programs in primary ticket sellers’ sites. With these statutes, the private and
expensive litigation of infringement and other theories to obtain an injunction are complemented by state
enforcement of these anti-circumvention laws.).
108. Stross, supra note 105.
109. Joel Stonington, Four Charged in Bid to Buy, Resell Tickets, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703943504575095622582020594.html.
110. The authors obtained this information from ticket brokers in a panel discussion at the NATB
software, secondary market sellers find a way around encryption devices and
other obstacles designed to limit ticket access to humans who are typing in
information.107 For example, one company indicated, “[w]e pay guys in India
$2 an hour to sit and type in letters,” referring to the visual puzzles of distorted
letters that web customers must type in to authenticate themselves as
humans.108 However, these circumvention methods may be short lived. In early
2010, four individuals from the company Wise Guys, Inc. were indicted for
wire fraud as well as gaining unauthorized access to computers for their
cornering of the ticket markets for the 2006 Rose Bowl, the 2007 MLB
playoffs, the play “Wicked,” and concerts for Bruce Springsteen and Hannah
Montana.109 The four had hired Bulgarian programmers to circumvent the
controls placed on ticket sites to require entry of data prior to being able to
purchase tickets. The result was that the four cornered the primary and,
consequently, secondary ticket markets and prices, for the events noted.
Underpriced goods in a high-demand market spawn innovation, in everything
from sophisticated programs to the simple act of hiring a new form of “digger”
for Internet sales. Ironically, the secondary ticket market returns to the
practices that began as early as English theater: spend the time or pay someone
to spend the time to gain access to high-demand, underpriced events.
In addition to the simple digger strategy for typing letter recognition and
the sophisticated software circumvention is another relatively simple solution
that smaller brokers employ to work around limitations: they apply for and use
different credit cards and e-mail addresses to buy their ticket limits under
several different names.110
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meetings, held annually in July. The authors have attended the meetings since 2008.
Primary Seller Limitations on Internet Site Usage
There is, however, for each strategy employed by secondary ticket market
participants to get more tickets, a defensive response by sponsors and
promoters in the primary market. For example, recognizing that they may not
be able to keep up with the technical programs that will allow the purchase of
more tickets via the Internet, primary sellers are now creating terms and
conditions of use on their websites. For example, the terms of use limitations
imposed on users of ticketmaster.com are quite detailed in nature, designed to
cover every possible circumvention by brokers and are in place with the idea
of limiting broker access:
These Terms give you a non-exclusive license to copy the Site for your own personal use
only so long as you comply with all of the terms and conditions set forth herein. Any
violation of these Terms exceeds the scope of that license.
You agree that you will only use credit cards belonging to you, friends or immediate
family members who expressly authorize such use, for the purpose of purchasing tickets.
You further agree that you will not attempt to conceal your identity by using multiple
Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses or email addresses to use or to purchase tickets on the
Site.
You [the viewer] agree that you are only authorized to visit, view and to retain a copy
of pages of this site for your own personal use, and that you shall not duplicate,
download, [or] modify . . . the material on this Site for any purpose other than to review
event and promotions information, for personal use . . . .
Commercial Use
No bulletin board, chat or other areas of this Site may be used by our visitors for
any commercial purposes such as to conduct sales of tickets, merchandise or
services of any kind, except that TicketExchange can be used to resell tickets to the
extent compliant with law.
Access and Interference
You agree that you will not use any robot, spider or other automatic device, process
or means to access the Site. You agree that you will not use any robot, spider or
other automatic or manual device, process or means to give yourself or others acting
for your benefit or on your behalf the ability to navigate the Site or purchase tickets
on the Site faster than users of the Site who use a standard commercial browser and
manually enter on their computers all information needed to navigate the Site and
purchase tickets. You agree that you will use no robot, spider, program or other
automatic or manual device, process or means to circumvent, avoid or defeat any
security measures or systems used on the Site, including but not limited to the
“CAPTCHA” system used as part of the Site’s ticket purchasing process. The
CAPTCHA system requires the retyping of characters on your computer screen.
You agree that the retyping will only be done manually by you on the keyboard for
the computer that you are using to access the Site. Nor shall you use any manual
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111. Ticketmaster Terms of Use, http://www.ticketmaster.com/h/terms.html?tm_link=tm_homeA+i
+terms (last visited Mar. 14, 2010).
112. See supra notes 90–109 and accompanying text.
113. For example, the experience with the 2007 Hannah Montana concerts could actually be perceived
as a function of the primary market frenzy. With so many tickets sold so quickly, the secondary market
brokers actually benefit from a perceived false demand. The controls placed on the primary market created
the driving force behind the numbers-control-circumvention software, a circumvention that worked so well
process to monitor or copy our web pages or the content contained thereon or for
any other unauthorized purpose without our prior expressed written permission.
You agree that you will not use any device, software or routine that interferes with
the proper working of the Site nor shall you attempt to interfere with the proper
working of the Site. You agree that you will not take any action that imposes an
unreasonable or disproportionately large load on our infrastructure. You agree that
you will not access, reload or “refresh” transactional event or ticketing pages, or
make any other request to transactional servers, more than once during any three
second interval. You agree that you will not copy, reproduce, alter, modify, create
derivative works, or publicly display any content (except for your own personal,
non-commercial use) from the Site without the prior, express written permission of
Ticketmaster.
You do not have permission to access this Site in any way that violates . . . these terms
of use.
You understand and agree that . . . Ticketmaster may terminate your access to this Site,
cancel your ticket order or tickets acquired through your ticket order . . . if Ticketmaster
believes that your conduct or the conduct of any person with whom Ticketmaster
believes you act in concert . . . violates or is inconsistent with these Terms or the law, or
violates the rights of Ticketmaster, a client of Ticketmaster or another user of the Site.111
With limits on purchase, controls on use of the web page materials, rights
of termination, and non-commercial use, primary sellers have established some
level of contractual restrictions that present brokers with challenges in
obtaining more than the predetermined per-person allocation of tickets.
However, there are two end results. One is that, as repeatedly emphasized, the
market finds a way around what seems, in the planning and initial stages of
ticket sales, to be foolproof.112 The second effect is that access to and the
supply of tickets is more limited, with no possibility of the broker competitive
packaging discussed infra in Principle Five. Further, the limitations on supply
serve to drive the available information about ticket supplies into the black-
market type of atmosphere in which consumers cannot gauge how many
tickets are available and whether there is or will be competitive pricing for
those tickets. Because the primary controls drive the secondary market
underground, the less-than-transparent market creates a market of
asymmetrical information. Consumers do not know who has tickets, how many
tickets are available, and this perception of limited supply drives the secondary
ticket market prices higher.113
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that the quick sell-out made the secondary market more intense in terms of demand and higher priced
because of a lack of transparency in the primary and secondary market.
114. This form of auction has been used in online bidding and is referred to as “reverse bidding,”
wherein contractors can all see the bids submitted and are free to go lower. In theory, the result is lower
prices. However, one of the concerns that has emerged is the quality of the contractors submitting the lower
and lowest bids as well as the concern about whether the work can actually be done at the bid price. Some
see “reverse bidding” as a means of keeping prices low whereas some document instances of higher costs
resulting from the need to substitute performance for low bidders or repair lower quality work (in the case
of construction contracts).
115. SEGRAVE, supra note 1, at 24.
116. Rich Philips, Brokers Snatch Joy from Hannah Montana Auction, CNN, Oct. 12, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/SHOWBIZ/TV/10/12/montana.tickets/.
Primary Seller Control of Price and Access Through Dutch Auctions
Periodically, sellers do recognize the true price of tickets to high-demand
events and have tried to establish different price levels in a way that they
believe allows the market to do the valuations. As noted in the discussion of
Principle One, however, the problems with fairness perception may be
exacerbated. For example, the Dutch auction has been tried by primary market
sellers as a means of allowing real-time demand to determine accurate market
pricing and provide a way for the public to enter the market at a price level
they find comfortable. In a Dutch auction the initial price is set very high and
then comes down over time.114
In general, the auction system is not new to 20th century concerts. For
instance, in 1860, the New York entertainment venue Niblio’s Garden
auctioned 250 of its most desired seats (all the remaining seats were sold at the
box office) for an upcoming performance. However, without restrictions on
number of tickets, speculators penetrated the auctions and were able to
capitalize on what was perceived as substantial demand at high prices. Theater
managers were forced back to controlling the number of tickets per buyer or
placing restrictions on acquisition of certain types of seats, such as those seats
on the aisle or other highly desirable locations.115
There is another unintended consequence of auctions, one that affects
access and skews demand. The 2007 Hannah Montana concert tour attempted
an auction form of pricing.116 However, the auctions begin with high prices, a
level that effectively squeezes brokers and other secondary sellers from the
market. Secondary sellers will labor mightily to acquire a $50.00 ticket for a
good seat at an event, knowing that the ticket can be resold at a substantially
higher price. But, brokers would not enter the auction early and pay an
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117. In fact, because of the public backlash from the Hannah Montana auction, the Miley Cyrus 2009
tour changed to the limited-tickets-per-person and ID format. See Branch, supra note 28.
118. The authors observed these prices in the classified section of the Arizona Republic at the time
of the 2001 series.
119. Indeed, for game six in Phoenix, prices on the street just before the first pitch were down to face
value. In 1995 the City of Phoenix passed an ordinance just before the NBA All-Star Game requiring all
resale ticket trading in the downtown area to take place in a particular location (a trading pit). As with the
2001 World Series, ticket prices came down as game time approached. See Stephen K. Happel & Marianne
M. Jennings, Herd Them Together and Scalp Them, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1995, at A14.
opening high price of $500 for a ticket because buying at the highest price
means that the ticket, absent some unforeseen event or change in artist
popularity, cannot be resold at a higher price.
During a Dutch or reverse auction, the prices are descending, and with
descending prices, the two phenomena of perceived unfairness as well as the
loss of the psychological draw of high-demand, moderately-priced events often
leave the primary sellers with either an event that is not a sell-out or demands
from early buyers for refunds. The initial stages of the auction, in effect,
control the price, and not necessarily at a level that an open market would
reach. The participation of secondary market sellers, in effect, provides the
market with an opportunity to settle on a price that reflects actual value, not,
as auctions create, a value based on the ability of a few consumers to pay a
much higher price. In auctions, most, if not all, of the profits are now going to
the owners or promoters, but perceptions of unfairness are more pronounced
under this system.117
As noted in the discussion of primary market pricing under Principle One,
those profits may be artificial because the promoters and primary sellers may
only be able to capitalize on the initial high prices in an auction on a one-time
basis before the backlash arises, forcing change, decreasing demand for future
events, or having opening bids in the next auction that reflect the lowest bids
in the last auction. The bidding process in the primary market does not provide
the market real-time pricing that secondary sales offer. That real-time
adjustment serves to bring prices down, but according to supply and demand,
not according to isolated buyers’ perceptions about value. For example, when
the 2001 World Series teams were determined, the Yankees and the
Diamondbacks, initial ticket sales in the secondary market for the first game
of the series brought prices as high as $3000.118 By the day of the first game
in Phoenix, those prices had dropped considerably as the market was better
able to place supply, demand, and pricing in equilibrium with full information
about ticket availability and actual demand.119 Auction sales conducted in the
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120. See infra note 121 for more information on this awareness.
121. In People ex rel. Cort Theater Co. v. Thompson, 119 N.E. 41 (Ill. 1918), a theater owner entered
into a secret ticket sale scheme with a ticket scalper. The uniqueness of this arrangement was that the box
office and the scalper worked hand-in-glove. There was no physical hand-off of tickets until the consumer
approached the scalper with a need for a ticket. Consumers were told that tickets at the theater box office
were sold out, so consumers were directed by the box office to the ticket scalper that Cort Theater had its
arrangement with for the sale of tickets in the secondary market. Consumers were permitted to select seats
and the ticket scalper then called the theater to provide the desired tickets to the consumers at a price higher
than the advertised price. The theater owner shared in the profits with the ticket scalper. The scalper was
selling directly from the theater’s inventory. The court found that there was a violation of the ticket scalping
act through this circumvention. Id.
primary market do not provide sufficient time or information for that
equilibrium to be achieved.
Primary Market Controls Through Secondary Market Participation
Artificial controls on ticket prices and supply in high-demand markets
result in overwhelming temptation at all levels of the market. No matter how
effective the controls, the market finds a way (see Principle Seven for more
discussion of this market force), and the artificial controls find insiders
recognizing the profit potential and then finding the means for participating in
the higher profit margins of the secondary markets. In the late 1800s in New
York City, theater owners were not blind to the profits in the secondary
market.120 Even as they lobbied for regulation of that market, the owners hired
their own “brokers,” called “lobby men,” who sold tickets above face value in
the lobby of theaters at the time of the performances. The owners were
participants in the secondary market they were trying to curb through
regulation. These lobby men gave a substantial percentage of their revenues
to the theater managers. The result was a near complete vertical monopoly by
the theater managers/owners of both the profits of the primary markets and a
substantial portion the secondary markets through their lobby men. These
types of sales were also “under-the-table” when it came to the owners’ and
managers’ profit-sharing clauses with the lobby men as well as with artists and
producers that were paid when their tickets awarded in the primary market
were sold in the secondary market.121
A sub-principle emerges with this example: primary sellers have always
participated in the secondary market with the degree of participation
expanding even as some of the participation by owners’ and managers’ agents
remains an unknown. For example, in a 1925 investigation journalist Morrow
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122. Mayo, supra note 13.
123. See SEGRAVE, supra note 1, at 142–43, 174–76; see also Andrew Kandel & Elizabeth Block, The
“De-Icing” of Ticket Prices: A Proposal Addressing the Problem of Commercial Bribery in the New York
Ticket Industry, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 489 (1997).
124. Enforcement has not been a crackerjack effort; Nikola got 60 days. See Melinda Newman, Joseph
Nekola Pleads Guilty in Jones Beach Tix Theft Case, BILLBOARD, June 27, 1998, http://www
.allbusiness.com/retail-trade/miscellaneous-retail-retail-stores-not/4630364-1.html.
125. Frontiere, in turn, inherited the team in April 1979 from her deceased husband Carroll
Rosenbloom, who also faced separate accusations of scalping. In 1980 Georgia married Dominic Frontiere,
an Emmy Award-winning composer.
Mayo concluded, “[u]nder the system of speculation which is found in most
large cities the theaters give as many as half their orchestra seats to brokers.”122
U.S. Attorney Charles Tuttle found, during the course of investigation
between 1927–1929, that the “box-office men” were skimming off tickets and
getting payola, also called “ice,” as a reward.123 Those who worked for the
primary ticket sellers were quick to see the profit potential in the secondary
market as they witnessed, first-hand, not just the demand but also the
secondary market unfolding just outside their ticket booths.
What exists in theater has found its way into the modern concert tour.
Joseph Nekola, the box office manager at the Jones Beach Theater in New
York, entered a guilty plea in 1998 to charges of second-degree grand larceny
and third-degree computer tampering in the theft of tickets from the Wantagh,
N.Y. venue. A routine audit, following a Hootie & the Blowfish concert,
uncovered the fact that the first 10 rows of tickets, a total of 534 prime location
seats, were taken off the computer before the primary sale began. The best
seats anyone buying in the primary market could obtain would be in Row 11.
Once the primary ticket sales were over, Nekola, the employee, went back into
the computer and freed up the seats and sold them to brokers. Nekola repeated
the scam over the course of years and many concerts, selling 8,000 seats in
total to brokers using the same process.124
Sports have not been immune from “ice.” Late in 1980, Al Davis, CEO
of the Oakland Raiders, brought an antitrust action against the NFL, a suit that
resulted from the NFL’s refusal to allow him to move his team to Los Angeles.
Included in the suit were allegations that Georgia Frontiere, owner of the L.A.
Rams, had scalped tickets to the January 1980 Super Bowl.125 Moreover,
Mr. Davis also alleged in the suit that NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle may
also have profited from these sales.
Davis’ suit painted an insider trading scenario that involved
Mrs. Frontiere confessing to Rozelle that her late husband, Carroll
Rosenbloom, had promised to sell 1000 Super Bowl tickets to former
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126. Id.
127. SEGRAVE, supra note 1, at 200–01.
128. Id.
executive Harold Guiver of the L.A. Rams.126 Although Mr. Rozelle objected
to this ticket distribution, he felt a moral and ethical obligation to follow
through on the arrangement. The suit alleged that Mrs. Frontiere charged the
former executive a price of $100 a seat rather than the $30 printed face value
of the Super Bowl ticket. According to Mr. Guiver, Mrs. Frontiere said the
$100,000 was to cover a $48,000 loan from the late Mr. Rosenbloom (which
Guiver claimed had already been forgiven), $22,000 as payment for a football-
club-owned Mercedes car Guiver had been driving, and $30,000 to cover face
value of the seats. Mr. Rozelle said subsequently he knew only about the
$30,000 to cover printed face value.127
This NFL scandal and the resulting publicity caught the attention of
various law enforcement agencies including the IRS, which was probing tax
issues for tickets sold in the underground economy. Unreported scalping
revenue for this Super Bowl was estimated to be as high as $7 million.
Mr. Rozelle commented, “[t]here is a sickness about this whole thing. You feel
a sickness in your stomach. There hasn’t been anything like this in my 21
years as commissioner.”128 Mr. Rozelle acknowledged he knew of NFL owners
and broker ads in newspapers offering to buy and sell tickets, but he continued
to insist that he was not aware of the volume of premium sales by owners.
Mr. Rozelle’s reaction is fairly typical of primary ticket sellers, but may or
may not have been forthright. Getting one’s arms around the scope of primary
market participants in the secondary market is difficult because of its under-
the-table nature. However, there is information about its pervasiveness and
profit levels that emerges anecdotally.
In some cases, the promoters and owners find their ways into the
secondary ticket market and also express a form of vengeance born of their
self-perceived unalienable right to the profits of the secondary market. In
2001, the producers of the hit Broadway show, The Producers, began a new,
more public strategy of primary-market involvement by withholding
approximately fifty seats from sale to the public and then selling them on the
day of the performance. The producers of The Producers were able to
command $400 per ticket by selling them to their self-created ticket brokerage
firm, a gross profit of $300 per ticket on the tickets that had a printed value of
$100. However, their brokerage firm was then able to add 20% to the $400
before selling them to the public for $480, yet another $80 in gross profit to
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the primary seller.129 Such profit margins have brought other theater owners
and producers to the secondary market, and all with the protective cover of the
public service aspect of these sales. The theater owners maintain a public
posture of goodwill by repeating a theme: they are providing tickets for
individuals who come into New York City for business and need to acquire
tickets for the time they are in town. This withholding of tickets has been
called a “war on scalpers.”130
This new open structure of primary market sellers in the secondary market
ran nearly parallel in time in its evolution in sports and is perhaps most evident
today in the secondary market for tickets for sporting events. The move to
integration of professional sports teams into the secondary market began in
2000, when the San Francisco Giants’ Double Play Ticket Window began.131
At the Ticket Window, a season ticket holder who did not want to go to a
particular game could log onto this official team website, put the ticket up for
sale (in the Giants’ case at face value or above), with service fees (10–15
percent) charged to both the seller and buyer. The ticket, made available at the
will-call window, meant buyers purchased free of concerns about counterfeit
or stolen tickets. In exchange, the Giants received a percentage of the service
fees.
The idea soon spread. In 2001, the Seattle Mariners, in conjunction with
LiquidSeats and Major League Baseball, created a website called Ticket
Marketplace, a site promoted through letters and e-mails to season ticket
holders. Like the Giants’ Double Play Ticket Window, Mariners season-ticket
holders could resell their tickets to particular games, and in 2002 the Mariners
received about $100,000 to $120,000 as its share of the profits from these
secondary sales.132
One of the fascinating studies in the involvement of owners and promoters
in the secondary markets for their own tickets is the intricate effort to avoid
violating state and local antiscalping laws. For example, at the time of the
LiquidSeats venture, a Seattle ordinance made it a misdemeanor to sell tickets
to sporting and entertainment events for more than face value. While the
Mariners website included a warning about the ordinance and the illegality of
selling tickets for more than face value in Seattle, the team, as market
participants in high-demand, low-supply events tend to do, found a clever
loophole or evasive tactic for the local law. Sellers who lived in the city could
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135. Cavoto v. Chi. Nat’l League Ball Club, Inc., No. 02 CH 18372, 2003 WL 25777926, aff’d, 2006
WL 2291181 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003), appeal denied, 861 N.E.2d 653 (Ill. 2006). 
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$1,047. Id.
enter addresses outside the city to circumvent the law. In a local challenge to
the regulation that existed at the time that prohibited resale above face value,
a court concluded that those who were selling on the site were permitted to
handle delivery of tickets and payment within the city.133
There was another tactic used to insulate the team owners from running
afoul of antiscalping laws. The Mariners were also using the website to sell
never-before-sold charter seats, similar in nature to the Chicago Cubs Premium
Seats secondary sales conducted through its wholly owned subsidiary. To
avoid local ticket scalping laws, the Mariners’ never-before-sold seats had no
established price (printed face value). A ticket with no pre-printed face value
could not violate the ordinance because the sales of these types of tickets were
primary, not secondary, ticket sales.134
The Chicago Cubs had a more intricate mambo to dance in circumventing
both antiscalping and consumer fraud laws when its Premium seat subsidiary
began selling tickets in the secondary market. In Cavoto v. Chicago National
League Ball Club, Inc.,135 the Chicago Cubs’ intimate involvement in the
secondary market was revealed through litigation brought by a fan who sought
to halt the secondary market activities through either a finding that the Cubs’
system violated the antiscalping laws or that it resulted in violation of Illinois
consumer protection provisions. The Cubs had incorporated Wrigley Field
Premium Ticket Services, Inc., a ticket broker that had as its officers some of
the same officers who ran the Cubs organization. The Cubs, prior to the start
of the baseball season, allocated high-demand VIP seats to Premium, with an
actual sales transaction taking place between the Cubs and Premium.136
Premium, with ads placed by the Cubs, then began selling seats as a secondary
ticket market participant with the Cubs eventually earning the profits from
Premium’s sales because of the subsidiary relationship.
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The consumer fraud claim was based on the failure of the Cubs to disclose
its relationship with Premium, a disclosure that had conflicting evidence in the
record. The antiscalping claim rested on the fact that the Cubs were
participating in the secondary market without a brokers’ license because there
was no actual sale between the parent and subsidiary. The court held that a sale
on credit was still a sale and a transfer between a parent and subsidiary can still
be an arms’ length transaction.137 Although the evidence on how much was
disclosed about the relationship was not clear, the court concluded that there
was no bait-and-switch tactic that would have violated the consumer
protections afforded in Illinois. The effect of the Illinois decision was to open
up the secondary market for sports teams in a way that guaranteed them
unfettered access to the secondary market without the requirements of
disclosure of total number of primary market tickets as well as the number and
types of tickets to be transferred to team-sponsored brokers.
The open participation of primary sellers in the secondary market is now
pervasive through companies like StubHub. And while not fully transparent
in terms of numbers of tickets, the presence of these companies provides a
different involvement from primary sellers’ nefarious and undisclosed
participation in the secondary ticket market or participation by primary sellers’
agents without permission or even the knowledge of the event promoters or
owners. A longstanding presence in ticket markets has been the corruptibility
on the part of insiders. Some market observers have labeled the achievement
of a free market in the sale of high-demand, limited-seat events as an illusion
as long as insiders are controlling or affecting the market with their pricing or
the withholding of information from buyers who are assessing optimum prices:
“There cannot be a free market when the price of a product is controlled at the
original point of distribution by a conspiracy based on bribe-giving and bribe-
taking (i.e., payments of and receipt of “ice”).”138
Ticketmaster recently acknowledged to the Wall Street Journal that its
online secondary marketplace, Ticketexchange.com, has been used by
performing artists and their managers to sell their own concert tickets.139 The
site is touted as one for fans only to be able to resell their tickets, but
2010] REGULATORY FUTURE OF TICKET SCALPING 161
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Chad Bray, Ticketmaster Settles Complaint Over Reseller, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2009, at D2.
143. Id. (Mr. Springsteen was not pleased with the practice, “[t]hey did this when other seats remained
available at face value. We condemn this practice.”); see also Ethan Smith & Evan Perry, Springsteen Slams
Ticket-Vendor Merger, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2009, at B8 (Mr. Springsteen would later publicly oppose the
merger between primary and secondary ticket sellers because of his experience with the insider trading for
his concert); see also Mitchell Peters, Ticketmaster Settles Springsteen-Sparked Attorney General Probe,
BILLBOARD, Feb. 23, 2009, http://www.billboard.com/news/ticketmaster-settles-springsteen-sparked-
1003944146.story#/news/ticketmaster-settles-springsteen-sparked-1003944146.story.
Ticketmaster disclosed that the site, in fact, sells tickets withheld from the
primary market and then sold at a premium. In fact, the site has operated in
advance of even the opening of the primary market. The interconnections
between primary and secondary market sellers have become increasingly
entangled, regardless of whether each is aware of the others’ activities. For
example, AEG won a court injunction against its own agent for the sale of
tickets to the ill-fated 2009 Michael Jackson tour. AEG’s agent, Viagogo Ltd.,
was using its StubHub-like website to sell 1,700 (or about 10% of the tickets)
on the site as premium seats.140 An email from Viagogo that offered bulk rates
to brokers and resale services was a significant part of the evidence offered by
AEG in obtaining the injunction against its own agent that it had hired to
handle primary ticket sales from selling in the secondary market in violation
of its fiduciary duties as an agent.141
The phenomenon of end-run secondary market sales preceding primary
market ticket sales is not limited to Michael Jackson concerts. Again, as
Principles One through Four establish, the high-demand, limited-supply events
command a price that is not charged in the primary ticket market sales (see
Principle One) and is, therefore, reaped in the secondary market. Those doing
the reaping, however, also happen to be involved and repaying or repairing in
the primary market. For example, before the primary market ticket sales had
begun for a February 2, 2009 Bruce Springsteen concert, the Ticketmaster
online site already had 2,000 tickets posted for sale at premium prices, the
secondary market prices.142 However, the secondary market being open for
business before the primary market caught the attention of both consumers and
regulators. In a settlement with the New Jersey Attorney General, Ticketmaster
agreed to pay $350,000 for investigation charges and promised not to put any
tickets on its online site for sale until the primary market ticket sales were
complete.143
The practice of “hold-backs” runs across events and industries. These
“hold-backs” are tickets that are held back from the primary market by event
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promoters and owners and then distributed to artists, staff, radio stations,
politicians, and others who can provide owners and promoters with something
in exchange, whether it be promotional press from their sheer presence, radio
play time, legislative or regulatory favors, or just loyalty.144 For example, the
NFL holds back about 25% of its tickets.145 These tickets are then used to get
the movers and shakers to the Super Bowl and other critical games. However,
the hold-backs do make their way into secondary markets and those in the
secondary markets have no way to determine the scope of the supply in a ticket
market when the event promoter or owner is holding back tickets for later
release, either directly or through donees seeking to make a profit on a
generous gift from a promoter or owner.
Principle Six: Allowing Market Participants to Structure Government
Regulation of Their Market Adds Vertical Integration and/or Monopolies
The undisclosed, unspoken, open, and/or nefarious entry of promoters and
owners into the secondary market is perhaps the most compelling evidence that
the regulatory control of that market is not possible. Their participation is a
classic example of the if-you-can’t-beat-’em phenomenon.146 It is difficult to
argue effectively against apparent efficiency, and the secondary market does
provide the efficient function of matching buyers with sellers at a price level
that finds them meeting at an equilibrium point that the primary market is not
able to reach because of the artificial constraints Principle One imposes on
these high-demand, limited-supply events. Primary sellers’ participation in the
secondary market, whether transparently or under the radar, shows the legal
recognition that market prices, no matter how high they go and no matter the
hypocritical actions by the teams that greatly anger the general public, are the
best solution in the resale marketplace. Efficiency to many economists takes
precedence over perceived inequity.
However, the entry of primary market participants into the secondary
ticket markets produces additional economic concerns. Since 2005, there have
been extensive movements in the primary and secondary ticket markets
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through mergers, acquisitions, and the selling activities highlighted by the
Cubs and Mariners examples, leading to vertical integration.147 In the Cavoto
case, the attorney representing the plaintiffs explained presciently what would
happen with the court’s conclusion that what the Cubs accomplished was
neither a violation of Illinois antiscalping laws nor deceptive under consumer
protection laws: “I expect a lot more teams are going to jump on the
bandwagon. Why not do it, if they can restrict the supply, drive up prices and
sell them for more.”148 Vertical mergers create the possibility of extensive
market controls on ticket distribution that may result in less information for
consumers in terms of how many tickets are available, what true demand is,
and whether the supply is dominated by demand or the strength of vertical
controls. In addition to the vertical mergers, there have been horizontal
mergers as well with the result being shifts in the secondary market to fewer
companies that have ties to or are owned by primary sellers. The present and
historical structure of the primary and secondary ticket market is summarized
below in Table I.
Table I: The Evolving Structure of the Primary and Secondary
Ticket Markets
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149. The authors are grateful to Mr. Fred Rosen (legal counsel for Jay Pritzker, who purchased
Ticketmaster in 1982 for $4 million, making Mr. Rosen its CEO), for his March 2003 interview (along with
Peter Gadwa) with the authors that provided the history of Ticketmaster as well as insights about the primary
and secondary ticket markets.
150. Interview with Fred Rosen and Peter Gadwa (Mar. 2003). Running parallel to the Ticketmaster
model for selling was the evolution of the musical/concert acts from being grateful for whatever the
promoter gave them to demands from the artists of 75% of concert revenues. Profit margins for promoters
changed dramatically from the 1960s multi-artist tours to single-act concerts with sell-out power who used
that power to negotiate better percentages with promoters. In effect, Ticketmaster was wearing the “black
hat” promoters were afraid to wear and that resulted in their underpricing of the tickets in the primary
market. Ticketmaster understood the price the tickets could command, charged that amount, and rebated a
portion back to the promoters who still appeared to the public to have clean hands.
151. Interview with Al Leffler (Mar. 2003). The authors are grateful to Al Leffler, one of the founding
students who remains a Vice President at Ticketmaster, for graciously taking the time to discuss the history
of the company in March 2003.
152. The acquisition was challenged as monopolistic, but in Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d
1136 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1102 (1999), a federal court ruled that those who had purchased
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153. Initially, the fee was 10%. The process for StubHub is described as follows: “Sellers register their
tickets on the site. When a buyer is found, the seller receives an e-mail requiring them to schedule a FedEx
pickup time and location. FedEx shows up with a pre-printed label with the buyer’s address and your return
address. The return package is sent to the seller with the buyer’s money. StubHub makes its money by
charging the seller a 10 percent fee.” Jeff Houck, Get Your Tickets Here: New Site Helps Fans Sell Unused
Season Tickets, Feb. 9, 2001, www.FoxBizSports.com (last visited July 2, 2009).
154. The stated immunity the company feels it has may be shifting. With the so-called “Craigslist
killer” developments, Craigslist has undertaken a new policy of more extensive policing of areas of its site.
A potential legal shift in liability for activities of users of online sites could result in additional
responsibilities for compliance by online ticket exchanges. Brad Stone, Under Pressure, Craigslist to
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155. During the time of Clear Channel’s ownership there were a series of antitrust actions against the
company. See Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1048
(D. Colo. 2004) (a case that survived summary judgment and was later settled); Jam Sports and Entm’t, LLC
v. Paradama Prods., Inc., 382 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (Clear Channel was sued for tortious
interference of contract and prospective advantage, as well as Sherman Anti-Trust violations); Clear
Channel Settles Case Brought by Denver Rock Concert Promoter, 26 ENT. L. REP. 17 (2004).
156. Live Nation, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Mar. 5, 2009). Merger was approved on
January 10, 2010. See Dawn C. Chmielewski, Ben Fritz & Randy Lewis, Ticketmaster-Live Nation Merger
Gets Justice Department’s Approval, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2010, available at http://articles.latimes.com/
2010/jan/26/business/la-fi-ct-ticketmaster26-2010jan26.
157. Live Nation, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1.
158. The companies, as listed in the 10-K, include: Heineken Music Hall, January 2008; AMD,
January 2008; DF Concerts, April 2008; Mirage, May 2008; Fantasma, 2008; Luger and Moondog,
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159. Two MIT Sloan School MBA students, Gerry Wilson and Hagis Mehreteab, developed a
business plan for creating organized futures market for major based on the work of the authors. Happel &
Jennings (2002), supra note 7 (The authors have spoken with the two founders and offered insight into their
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161. The authors arrived at these estimates by examining revenues of the various companies and ticket
sales reports. Much of the information is in the hands of privately held and small firms, but the volume of
ticket sales on StubHub and the ticket sales at LiveNation provide some indication of the level of activity.
With eBay’s acquisition of StubHub, its revenues are now consolidated and that integration makes estimates
more difficult.
162. These estimates are the authors. Ticketmaster’s 2008 revenue was $1.45 billion. See Ticketmaster
Entm’t LLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 30 (Mar. 31, 2009). Again, sites such as StubHub no longer
have public information available so the estimates are based on activity, pricing, and demand.



































The merger and acquisition activity is not complete. For example, the
merger between Ticketmaster and LiveNation attracted significant regulatory,
congressional, and market attention because of the sheer market share, in both
primary and secondary markets, that such a combination would create.163 The
following is an excerpt from testimony offered before the Senate Judiciary
Committee in its hearings on the proposed merger, the nature of the primary
and secondary ticket markets, and the impact of consolidation, something that
seems to be ongoing, as noted in Table I:
Ticketmaster operates in 20 global markets, providing ticket sales, ticket resale services,
marketing and distribution through www.ticketmaster.com, one of the largest
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164. The Ticketmaster/Live Nation Merger: What Does It Mean for Consumers and the Future of the
Concert Business? Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights, S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of David A Balto), at 2009 WL 459002. 
e-commerce sites on the Internet; approximately 6,700 retail outlets; and 19 worldwide
call centers. Ticketmaster controls the sales of tickets for over 80% of the venues in the
United States. In 2008, Ticketmaster entered into the entertainment promotion business
by acquiring a controlling interest in the Front Line Management Group. Front Line is
the world’s leading artist management company, with nearly 200 clients and more than
80 executive managers. Front Line represents a wide range of major artists, including the
Eagles, Jimmy Buffett, Neil Diamond, Van Halen, Fleetwood Mac, Christina Aguilera,
Stevie Nicks, Aerosmith, Steely Dan, Chicago, Journey, and Guns N’ Roses.
Ticketmaster also offers resale ticket services through its acquisition of TicketsNow in
2008.
LiveNation is the world’s No. 1 concert promoter, owns 140-plus venues. Live Nation
is the world’s largest live music company. Globally, it owns, operates, has booking rights
for and/or has an equity interest in more than 155 venues. In addition, LiveNation owns
multiyear comprehensive rights deals covering the tours of Madonna, Jay-Z, U2,
Nickelback and Shakira. In 2008, LiveNation entered into an agreement with SGM, one
of the world’s largest venue management company and Ticketmaster’s largest client.  In
2008, Live Nation ended a long-term contract to sell its concert tickets through
Ticketmaster, and launched its own ticketing service for its venues in January 2009.
That termination resulted in a loss of at least 15% of Ticketmaster’s revenue and set the
two companies up for a head-to-head fight to win ticketing contracts.
If Ticketmaster is permitted to acquire LiveNation a single firm will: (1) sell most of the
concert tickets in this country through its contracts with venues (11,000 venue clients
across 20 countries); (2) manage a significant number of the marquee performers in the
world or controls their tours (e.g., Madonna, U2, Jay Z, Shakira, Nickelback, Eagles,
Christina Aguilera, Aerosmith, Jimmy Buffett, Guns N’ Roses, Steely Dan and more than
200 others); (3) own touring, recording, merchandise, fan clubs, etc. rights to many
relevant performers; (4) own most of the amphitheaters in the US and also owns more
‘club’ venues as well as controlling, thru owning/leasing a large amount of other clubs
and theatres; (5) purchase tours for its own amphitheaters and venues as well as other
buildings they don’t own or control; (6) own a merchandise company that sells the
performers’ shirts, hats, etc.; (7) own a company that provides ‘fan club’ services to
performers; (8) own all the data to track ticket sales to provides a huge competitive
advantage; (9) own the data to all competing promoters fan bases; (10) and own all data
generated through the sale of tickets to provide their newly formed company with the
best and largest Internet system to offer their fan base more services and products beyond
live performances such as the bundling performers’ products for sale on-line as well as
sponsorship opportunities . . . .164
In short, such a merger, approved by the Justice Department after one year
of investigation in January 2010, and other combinations that are reflected in
Table I bring primary and secondary sellers into joined entities. In fact, as the
LiveNation situation illustrates, the primary and secondary markets are now
merging with the artists and promoters with a resulting creation of three levels
of integration. Limited competition in primary and secondary markets means
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165. The authors compared the purchasing terms for online ticket services and found that Ticketmaster
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including going after other secondary sellers with claims of fraud, its revenue increased, not because of more
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higher prices and poorer quality service. Market dominance for Ticketmaster,
for example, has resulted in service charges, something that is unique to
entertainment and sports events in terms of consumers’ purchases online.165
Ticketmaster has also attempted vertical control through legislative
efforts. Ticketmaster, a behemoth in the primary market, has been trying to
work legislatively to reach the same stature in the secondary market. During
2006, Ticketmaster backed legislation in four states—Florida, Louisiana,
South Carolina, and California—that would have allowed the primary seller
in those states to designate the legal resellers of its tickets.166 That is, no one
apart from the primary-designated secondary seller would be able to resell
tickets. The legislative strategy was brilliant. After having attained open and
competitive secondary ticket markets in these states, the primary sellers then
moved to limit competition in the secondary market to sellers they could
control and/or hold an interest in or have a profit-sharing agreement with. If
such legislation had passed, there would have been only one seller in the
secondary market, no independent brokers, and ultimately, fewer options and
higher prices for consumers. Vertical integration represents regression, not
progress in ticket markets.167 Vertical integration also impedes the international
market place that the Internet has served to provide.168 Simply understanding
who favors such mergers and legislative proposals provides the groundwork
for raising questions as to whether the integration will increase or decrease
competition.
Even without the merger activity, Mr. Diller’s response reflects either a
naiveté about the ticket markets or a spin to deflect attention from the reality
of under-pricing and the available profits in the secondary markets. Principle
One contradicts Mr. Diller’s statements. In fact, Mr. Diller misunderstands or
masks the root of the problem in ticket markets that will always exist: It is the
pricing by the artists that creates the secondary market. Mr. Diller’s merger of
his company, a primary and secondary market player, with the artists, produces
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170. Ticketmaster already exercises control over artists. In 1994, the grunge rock group Pearl Jam,
at the height of its market splash, wanted Ticketmaster to drop its service fee to $1.80 a ticket for its summer
tour, but Ticketmaster refused to go below $2.50 per ticket. Pearl Jam tried to book its own venues, but that
failed. So the band filed a complaint with the Justice Department over TM’s monopolistic practices. The
Justice Department launched an investigation, and the Subcommittee on Information and Justice of the
House Government Operations Committee also opened an inquiry, holding hearings in July and September.
The Justice Department antitrust investigation ended abruptly in July, 1995. Following a year of
charges and counter charges, cross firing of legal papers and insults between Pearl Jam and TM, a meeting
was set but then cancelled by the Government side the day before saying the inquiry was being dropped.
Instead, it was going to continue “to monitor competitive developments.” Ralph Blumenthal, Oddities
Continue with Ticketmaster and Pearl Jam, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1995, available at http://www
.nytimes.com/1995/08/23/arts/oddities-continue-with-ticketmaster-and-pearl-jam.html?pagewanted=all.
171. Cavaliers Operating Co. v. Ticketmaster, Nos. 07CV2317, 08CV240, 2008 WL 4449466 (N.D.
Ohio 2008).
a dominance of the vertical chain of distribution that will reduce the
opportunity for competition and market entry at all levels of that chain.
These types of mergers are antithetical to competition because they do not
actually result in growth through the acquisition of new customers; they are,
in effect, treaties with competitors to limit competition.169 Growth in this
manner does, however, result in the ability to raise prices and exclude
competition, the essential terms of the antitrust laws. The effect of mergers
such as this one is the ability of Ticketmaster to do on a regular basis what
happened with the Bruce Springsteen tour: primary market tickets can be
diverted over to the company’s TicketsNow site and sold for the secondary
market levels, not the primary market face value. Artists and primary sellers
have the same market interests, which will be, by the merger, now linked to the
secondary market. The wheres and whens of ticket distribution will be
controlled by an entity that represents interests in all levels of the market, all
of whom have the same goal of profit maximization.170 That maximization can
be achieved, however, without alienating the fan base by keeping the primary
market price low even as the supply of tickets is diverted to the secondary
market to command higher prices and profits. Moreover, Ticketmaster has
exclusive arrangements with certain owners and promoters that prevent them
from using other ticket services for different types of ticket sales. For example,
in Cavaliers Operating Company, LLC v. Ticketmaster, Ticketmaster filed suit
against the Cleveland Cavaliers for breach of its exclusive contract as ticket
agent when the Cavaliers entered into an agreement with Flash Seats to handle
the secondary ticket sales for the Cleveland Cavaliers.171 The court granted
summary judgment to Ticketmaster because a clear provision in the contract
between the two required exclusivity. However, the court also had to deal with
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172. The essence of Cavaliers/Flash Seats’ antitrust allegations is that Ticketmaster dominates the
market for primary ticketing and is intentionally engaging in anticompetitive behavior in an effort to
establish monopoly power in the secondary ticketing market. Ticketmaster has just transferred exclusive
ticketing rights at Quicken Loans Arena (home of the Cavaliers) to Veritix, which owns Flash Seats. The
district court ruled that the use of Flash Seats as an online venue for season ticket holders to unload seats
violated the club’s contract with Ticketmaster. The details of the settlement between Flash Seats and
Ticketmaster were not made public. See Peter Krouse, Veritix Gets Exclusive Ticketing Rights at the Q,
Replacing Ticketmaster, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, July 20, 2009, at 1.
173. A bearer instrument, as defined under U.C.C. Article III, is one that is made payable to bearer
or cash does not state a payee or is indorsed in blank. U.C.C. § 3-109 (2002). A bearer instrument can be
transferred by delivery only. See U.C.C. § 3-203 (2002).
the Cavaliers’ counterclaim for violations of federal antitrust law by
Ticketmaster in its demand for exclusivity of the secondary ticket market sales
as well as the primary ticket market sales. In effect, the contract issue was
clear-cut, but the antitrust implications of Ticketmaster’s vertical control of the
ticket market for the Cavaliers presented a more challenging legal issue that
has not yet been resolved.172
Economic theory offers support for the decrease in competition that
results from vertical integration. The buyer of a Ford product is not prohibited
by the Ford Motor Company from reselling the car and, likewise, Ford does
not have the authority, right, or power to dictate the car’s resale price or even
prevent it from being advertised as a Ford. With the exception of selected
copyrighted items such as computer software programs or airline tickets,
almost all products become bearer instruments upon original sale in the
primary market.173 Principles One through Five and the support provided
demonstrate that owners and promoters want to control prices, restrict sales,
and dominate their secondary ticket markets. However, microeconomic theory
reveals long-run harm for consumers in a market structured with such vertical
integration.
Microeconomic Models and Insights
Primary Ticket Sellers as Pure Competition
One way to model the market for primary ticket sellers (owners/
promoters) is as a case of pure competition. Strictly speaking, this pure
competition model is the only approach in which both market demand and
supply curves can be drawn (microeconomic theory does not draw supply
curves for any other market structure). When the ticket market is broadly
defined as the entertainment industry, there are “many” sellers, and there are
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174. Localized monopoly power is the result. Even so, there may be more of a national market for
tickets now than in the past because of the ability to travel (at relatively low costs) and the fact that the same
event is offered in cities around the country, thus creating events that are more homogeneous from seller to
seller.
175. MARTIN FARIS & STEPHEN HAPPEL, MODERN MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 232–36 (1987).
176. Phillip Leslie, Price Discrimination in Broadway Theatre, 35-3 RAND J. Econ. 520, 524 (2004),
available at http://www.stanford.edu/~pleslie/broadway.pdf (Leslie formulates a model that includes both
second- and third-degree price discrimination when analyzing the Broadway play “Seven Guitars.” The
marginal cost of every ticket sold for a given performance is assumed to be effectively zero, so the goal of
“many” buyers, all of whom take price as given. However, there are four
problems in trying to apply this model to ticket markets. First, tickets are not
homogeneous if desired seat locations exist. Second, sellers may engage in
market-power pricing rather than take price as given. Third, certain buyers
may have the ability to negotiate prices. Finally, when the market is broken
down into more select segments, there may be substantial barriers to entry.174
The Models of Monopolistic Competition and Pure Monopoly
The model of monopolistic competition may be adapted to characterize
primary sellers. In this case barriers to entry are few, many buyers exist, and
firms have many rivals just as in pure competition. However, an individual
firm does have slight monopoly power, i.e., a downward sloping demand
curve, in which higher prices do not result in a loss of all seats because of
brand loyalty. This model has a certain appeal because of the product
differentiation. Generally, microeconomic competition in this model is
characterized by ongoing price wars as firms try to capture rivals’ markets.175
However, this is not the case for many primary ticket market sellers.
Another alternative for modeling is to classify primary ticket sellers for
particular events being a form of a pure monopoly. For purposes of modeling,
assume that tickets are sold only on the day of the event, an assumption that
results in no significant secondary market. If seat locations are viewed as
essentially homogenous by consumers, and if concessions are ignored, then the
finding is straightforward for a profit maximizing firm faced with a seating
constraint. The firm sets marginal revenue equal to marginal cost, where
marginal cost for each additional seat occupied becomes quite low (but still
positive) after some point, meaning the incentive is to achieve a sell-out while
operating in the elastic region of the demand curve.
However, if substantial demand exists for certain seat locations over
others, the primary ticket seller can become a price discriminating monopolist
and “scale the house.”176 Similarly, concessions turn a profit-maximizing
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the firm is to maximize revenues from ticket sales. Because there are no subscriptions, ticket bundling, or
the sale of a series of different shows, then is eliminated. Leslie distinguished between full-price sales and
discount sales. To obtain discount tickets, consumers must be at the discount booth on the day of the
performance, and the number of discount tickets sold varies and is inversely related to ticket demand in the
full-price category.). But see Rosen & Rosenfield, supra note 97, at 353 (Rosen & Rosenfield assume sellers
are extremely selfish, do not want resellers to profit, and so preclude secondary markets. They then use the
theory of classes-of-service price discrimination in looking at situations where two kinds of seats exist: high-
quality and low-quality. All customers prefer high-quality seats, but their willingness to pay is not the
same.).
177. See, e.g., Daniel Marburger, Optimal Ticket Pricing for Performance Goods, 18 MANAGERIAL
& DECISION ECON. 375 (1997). Marburger uses concessions to explain why estimates of point elasticity of
demand in the 1970s, 80s and 90s were in the inelastic range. The fixed number of seats means that the
variable (marginal) costs associated with the number of tickets is essentially zero. This means, in the absence
of complementary products, profit maximization occurs where marginal revenue is zero (elasticity of
demand equals one).
178. DeSerpa, supra note 23, at 512–13 (taking the property rights of ticket holders into account when
examining the pricing decision by monopoly sellers. For professional sports leagues he argued that team
expectation of many sellouts, combined with the possibility of playoff games, led to the primary seller
promoting season ticket sales and an active secondary market. With a perfect resale market, the same price
is charged for all games even though high-demand game will be overpriced. For the playoffs, the primary
seller does not “exploit” season ticket holders by charging very high prices because the end result would be
fewer season ticket sales thereafter.); Courty, supra note 38, at 167 (considering the case of a monopoly
ticket agency who sells tickets to consumers who learn new information about their valuations over time.
The monopolist can sell early to uninformed customers and/or late to informed over, or it can ration tickets
and strategically allow some ticket holders to resell. He argues that in his generic setting the selling date,
the ticket supply, and the decision to allow resale are complementary pricing instruments that should be
chosen jointly for overall pricing coherence.).
179. Paul Sweezy, Demand Under Conditions of Uncertainty, 47 J. POL. ECON. 568 (1939).
monopolist into a multiproduct seller, with its pricing required to separate
substitute goods from complementary goods.177 Lastly, if a profit-maximizing
monopolist competes against itself over time by offering repeat (season long)
performances, it has to engage in dynamic pricing by taking into account the
present value of future costs and revenues and avoiding “spoiling the
market.”178
Primary Ticket Market Sellers as an Oligopoly
In contrast, if there are a “few” primary sellers who are close rivals selling
similar products and are keeping careful watch on each other, oligopoly
models can be applied. One such model that can be used is the kinked demand
curve.179 In this case there are many buyers and a few firms able to sell close
substitutes. A particular firm is afraid to raise prices for fear that rivals will not
match the price increase and so cause the firm to lose significant sales, and the
firm is afraid to lower price because rivals will immediately match the price
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180. DEIDRE MCCLOSKEY, THE APPLIED THEORY OF PRICE (2d ed. 1985), presented the “typical”
textbook analysis of ticket scalping. Scalpers simply resell tickets that are offered at set prices in the primary
market on a first-come-first-served basis. They charge the highest prices the market will bear, in the extreme
being first degree price discriminators getting everyone to pay their reservation price. Economic efficiency
is enhanced, but consumer surplus is eliminated. 
181. See James Swofford, Arbitrage, Speculation, and Public Policy Toward Ticket Scalping, 27 PUB.
FIN. REV. 531 (1999) (relying on McCloskey’s model, supra note 180, but turns to the issue of why a profit-
maximizing firm allows the purchase of its product (tickets) for speculation and arbitrage. One reason
Swofford offers is uncertainty and risk, illustrated by primary market sellers’ use of ticket resellers as partial
underwriters. Another reason is that trying to prevent the secondary market may be quite costly to the
primary seller. A final reason is that the revenue functions are different; either the reseller may be a far
superior price discriminator or the primary seller is looking at dynamic (long-run) profits rather than static
(short-run) profits). See supra notes 15–47 and accompanying text for a discussion of why primary market
sellers underprice.
182. For example, Ticketmaster and its secondary ticket company, TicketsNow, face several lawsuits
for allegedly redirecting buyers to more expensive tickets. Despite denying the allegations, the two firms
have taken steps to make changes in the way their systems operate. Alfred Branch, Jr., Ticketmaster and
TicketsNow Sued Again Over Their Business Practices, TICKETNEWS, July 10, 2009, http://www.ticketnews
.com/Ticketmaster-and-TicketsNow-sued-again-over-their-business-practices7091091.
183. See Lacey, supra note 166, and accompanying text.
decrease causing expected profits to decline. A kink in the demand curve
develops at the going market price. Substantial shifts in marginal cost
conditions can occur and still marginal revenue equals marginal cost at the
same price and output levels. This expectational theory of price stability may
be applied to situations such as Broadway theaters in New York City where
narrow ticket price ranges have existed over extended periods of time.
Adding Secondary Sellers Into the Modeling
Once secondary ticket trading is introduced, the economic modeling
becomes more complex.180 Here the primary ticket sellers must think beyond
direct rivals and consider what scalpers and ticket brokers will do.181 Some
secondary market participation may prove useful in helping to maximize
profits for the primary seller (as was discussed with lobby men or brokers
buying up any excess seats).182 Secondary sellers who are independent of the
primary sellers change market dynamics. Because of the economic uncertainty
secondary sellers introduce, there is economic incentive for primary sellers to
try take over the secondary markets for their tickets, thereby eliminating all
immediate rivals, and becoming a vertical monopoly (as Ticketmaster has tried
to do in selected states).183
If the secondary ticket trading firms are small and highly competitive,
then the dominant firm theory of oligopoly appears to have some application.
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In this case, a dominant firm like Ticketmaster is surrounded by a competitive
fringe. When the dominant firm cannot eliminate the fringe, it determines price
and quantity by taking into account the cost conditions of the fringe. Once the
dominant firm sets price, the fringe immediately responds and uses that price
as a starting point. The microeconomic conclusion is that the dominant firm
will ultimately face major rivals since it provides an umbrella under which the
fringe survives. Certainly this market structure has some relevance for
Ticketmaster in secondary ticket markets. At the same time, an important issue
with the dominant price leadership model when applied to ticket trading is that
the basic model assumes the fringe firms are purely competitive selling
identical products and taking price as given. Yet ticket scalpers and brokers do
not have identical costs, do not sell completely homogenous goods, provide
varying levels of service, advertise differently, and do not take as a given the
printed face value (the price set by the dominant firm).
Further, secondary sellers are not always small. Some are quite powerful
and bargain with the primary seller over price (for instance a large broker
buying up seats for a Broadway play with just moderate demand). In the
extreme, a single primary seller (a pure monopoly) confronts a single buyer (a
pure monopoly) and the model of a bilateral monopoly becomes relevant, a
model in which the selling price depends upon the relative bargaining skills of
the buyer and seller.
Microeconomic Conclusions
No single market model in microeconomic theory can apply to all event
ticket sales. The application of antitrust law is, as a result, difficult at times,
because there are, at times, many primary sellers offering a (relatively)
homogeneous product. However, at other times there are many primary sellers
offering highly differentiated products. At other times there may be only a few
sellers or in the extreme a pure (local) monopoly.
Consumers who wish to attend events are typically price takers. But some
consumers may possess buying power and not accept price as a given in the
ticket market. However, other buyers beyond the consumer in the primary
market include brokers and scalpers, who then become sellers in the general
ticket sales market by competing with the primary firm(s). In fact, one idea
that is gaining traction among consumer advocates is prohibiting firms such
as Ticketmaster, who sell in the primary market, from owning operational
subsidiaries in the secondary ticket market.
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184. Kandel & Block, supra note 123 (“The issue of the proper role of the law in regulating ticket
resales has been a source of much debate and rhetoric.”).
185. John Corry, Some Theater People Say that Skimming Profits and the Scalping of Tickets Persist
on Broadway, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1980, at B6.
Attempts at Restrictions by Primary Sellers
In addition to the ongoing combinations among and between primary and
secondary market participants, there is a parallel effort to structure markets
through statutory protections. That is, primary sellers are active in lobbying
efforts that use concerns about fairness, nuisance effects, and fraud to convince
government regulators to adopt laws and regulations that will “clean up the
secondary marketplace.”184 The emotional tug that primary market sellers have
is the public’s perception of fairness, the above-face-value ticket prices, and
the argument that the brokers are earning profits without the attendant risk that
the event sponsors and promoters have. After investigating insider trading in
and among box office employees in New York theaters, the New York Times
reported that “[a]mong theater people, ticket scalping is resented not
necessarily on moral grounds, but because the brokers, who have neither an
artistic nor a financial connection with a show, are making money from the
labors of others.”185
All of the market controls discussed in Principle Five are the result of
extensive efforts by primary market participants to obtain legal protections that
limit the operations of the secondary market. The efforts are ostensibly made
in the name of consumer protection. However, the ultimate effects are limited
consumer options through reduced competition, no bundling/packaging to
capture the best of several markets, and regulation without full information.
For example, legislators grapple with the issue of how extensive ticket hold-
backs are and the impact of the insider activities, including resale of free
tickets in the secondary market. In other words, the questions focus on market
activities that are inevitable given the underpricing in the primary markets.
One of the recent developments in primary market controls has not
involved legal restrictions on resales per se, but rather involves the exercise of
primary market sellers’ controls over ticket holders. Vertical integration does
not result from mergers and acquisitions; rather, it results through the
imposition of controls over transfers once the tickets have had the initial
primary sale. For example, owners of professional sports teams state that
consumers actually purchase a “license” to a seat and the license is subject to
certain rules. If the ticket is treated as a license, owners use their right of
revocation of these licenses of those season ticket holders who try to resell
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186. Herman v. Admit One Ticket Agency, 2009 WL 1247266 (Mass.) (Appellate Brief) (challenging
the revocation of a season ticket on the grounds of it being a revocable license only).
187. Owners and promoters that prohibit re-barcoding are also emerging. For example, the 2009 Miley
Cyrus tour requires the presentation of a credit card and ID of the ticket purchaser for access to the venue.
The original purchaser must be in attendance. In effect, the tickets cannot be transferred. See Branch, supra
note 28.
188. For example, Colorado passed legislation in 2008 that provides for the following:
(3)(a) It is void as against public policy to apply a term or condition to the original sale to the
purchaser to limit the terms or conditions of resale, including, but not limited to, a term or condition:
(I) That restricts resale in a subscription or season ticket package agreement as a condition of
purchase;
(II) That a purchaser must comply with to retain a ticket for the duration of a subscription or
season ticket package agreement that limits the rights of the purchaser to resell the ticket;
(III) That a purchaser must comply with to retain any contractually agreed-upon rights to
purchase future subscriptions or season ticket package agreements; or
(IV) That imposes a sanction on the purchaser if the sale of the ticket is not through a reseller
approved by the operator.
(b) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prohibit an operator from prohibiting the resale of a
contractual right in a season ticket package agreement that gives the original purchaser a priority or
other preference to enter into a subsequent season ticket package agreement with the operator.
(4) A person or entity, including an operator, that regulates admission to an event shall not deny
access to the event to a person in possession of a valid ticket to the event, regardless of whether the
ticket is subject to a subscription or season ticket package agreement, based solely on the ground that
such ticket was resold through a reseller that was not approved by the operator.
(5) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit an operator from maintaining and enforcing
policies regarding conduct or behavior at or in connection with the operator’s venue. An operator
may revoke or restrict season tickets for reasons relating to a violation of venue policies and to the
extent the operator may deem necessary for the protection of the safety of patrons or to address fraud
or misconduct.
Colorado Consumer Protection Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-718 (West 2008).
tickets at above face-value to games they cannot or do not want to attend.186
The teams enforce their restrictions either through spot-checking websites for
ticket sales and, upon finding a season ticket holder in violation, revoking the
rights, or by using bar codes that require the name that appears electronically
with the ticket purchase is the name on the identification presented for
entrance. With barcode technology, tickets become like airplane tickets that
require re-barcoding each time it changes hands, along with an accompanying
form of identification in order to be able to use the barcoded ticket.187
There is some push-back from the states on the controls primary market
sellers are placing on secondary sales as some promoters and owners have
been denying entrance to those who have purchased their tickets from non-
team sources or who have purchased tickets to one game from a season ticket
holder.188 These restrictions on resale shut down the secondary market except
for the market controlled by the owners and promoters. Season ticket holders
are able to sell their tickets to a single game and those who wish to sell event
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tickets after their primary market purchase are still able to do so, but only
through the team’s site or an authorized ticket broker for the promoter or
owner. These authorized sites may place price controls on resale except for the
premium seats offered by the promoter or owner. The effect is monopoly
pricing because the promoters and owners control the ticket source, the
primary market price, and the secondary market price. Consumers are left with
few alternatives, including fewer choices in terms of the quality of the seats as
well as the loss of the bundling and package that brokers use in their secondary
market sales.
Principle Seven: Regulation Without Recognition of Market Forces Will
Thwart a National Ticket Market
The assumption many regulators make when attempting to control
secondary tickets markets is that they are still grappling with the annoying
street-corner scalpers or the local broker who takes advantage of high-demand
situations by “price gouging.” Ironically, those limited types of behaviors that
they are trying to address may actually be exacerbated by the controls they
place (whether price or sale restrictions) on ticket sales. Table I shows the
extent of the national ticket market, a market that makes ticket prices and
ticket market supply data readily available online. At least one site provides
a sort of electronic ticker-tape on prices and updated access to real-time
availability of tickets to various events and for concert locales for a particular
artist or tour. The ticket markets, the nature of ticket buyers, and the
availability of relatively cheap transportation (including that offered as part of
a bundling or package by brokers) means that consumers need not buy tickets
on street corners or even rely on a local broker who may appear to have a
monopoly.
State and local statutes and regulations that prevent secondary market
activities for profit will inhibit the ability of all consumers to secure tickets to
desired events. Regulation or legislation that affects ticket markets should be
undertaken only after a complete examination of three factors: the nature of
tickets; the potential for tax revenues from allowing secondary markets to
operate efficiently; and the nature of interstate commerce and constraints on
state regulation of ticket markets.
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189. A bearer instrument is one that has no specific payee; that is, it is transferred from party to party
simply by delivery. There are no restrictions on its transfer. U.C.C. § 3-109 (2002).
190. The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) thus provides one of the few exceptions in law that
allows a thief in a chain of valid title without affecting the quality of title that is passed. U.C.C. § 3-201
(2002).
191. Printed face value, however, introduces those transferring the bearer paper to others to the
antiscalping laws that prohibit resale for profit or for an amount over a statutory maximum markup over this
offer price if a ticket is resold in the secondary market.
192. The process of transferring title to any form of commercial paper is known as “negotiation,” and
under the U.C.C., “[i]f an instrument is payable to bearer, it may be negotiated by transfer of possession
alone.” U.C.C. § 3-201 (2002).
193. The nature of commercial instruments and the need for protection of the flow of funds was such
that bearer instrument theft was a risk that drawers of the instruments, transferors and transferees assumed
in the interest of nationalizing and internationalizing the flow of funds through commercial paper.
The Nature of Tickets
Tickets purchased online were at first simple bearer instruments.189 A
bearer instrument is one that is freely transferrable and can be used by anyone
in possession of it.190 Historically, event tickets have typically been “hards”
(also known as “flats” or “pasteboards”) with a printed face value. Printed face
value was a function of having a value attached for purposes of a refund
purposes if the event was cancelled or if an expelled fan had to be
compensated.191 The significance of face value has been given more meaning
in ticket markets than in, for example, the bearer bonds market or even in the
sale of securities. The printed face value is simply what could be known as the
instrument’s par value. Its actual value is determined by the market, not what
is preprinted.
Bearer instruments are easily transferrable with no signature or
identification required. Under Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.), adopted in some form in all of the states, a bearer instrument’s
title is transferred by mere delivery.192 Also, under the U.C.C., because of the
no-identity-required-no-signature-required nature of bearer instruments, even
a thief can pass good title to a bearer instrument.193 So, as ticket markets
existed in their early stages, prior to the involvement of regulators, whoever
had the ticket in hand at the entry point had the right to a seat in a particular
location (as marked on the ticket or via general admission) at the time of the
event. Given their paper nature and bearer quality, hard tickets do carry
counterfeiting opportunities and temptations, especially for high-priced tickets.
However, restricting market transferability because of the potential for
shenanigans is antithetical to open markets as well as the existing regulatory
frameworks across subject matters in the United States. Fraudulent shares of
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194. For example, in a 1956 edition, Good Housekeeping published a consumer guide to obtaining
tickets in New York. It suggested that the best approach was to start early, order through the mail, not be
overly demanding on location requests, but be more specific than asking for any seats for any performance.
It also pointed out that it is virtually impossible to get tickets at the box office for that night’s performance.
So you could either go to ticket brokers (who at the time in New York could legally charge a premium of
$1.00 per seat when printed face values ranged from $1.75 to $5.75 for dramatic plays and $2.00 to $8.05
for musicals), or you could go to ticket scalpers whose telephone numbers could be obtained at most first-
class restaurants, hotels, or ticket agencies in New York. Their premiums ranged from $5.00 to $50.00 a
ticket.
The article noted that among the “chislers” in the marketplace were crooked box-office treasurers.
While it attempted to distinguish brokers from scalpers, the article concluded, “[a]nd even among the
licensed ticket brokers, there are some who evade legal restriction on what they are allowed to charge by
adding a service fee to the monthly bill of favored customers.” Is It True That You Can’t Get Tickets for the
New York Theaters?, 143 GOOD HOUSEKEEPING 52–53 (1956).
stock, counterfeited bonds and money, and even fake Rolexes do not result in
controls of prices or restrictions that prohibit transfer of these items of personal
property in secondary markets. Markets can be vibrant even as they co-exist
with complex mazes of registration, authentication, and records without
interfering with transferability. But, there are no open markets that exist with
restrictions on transfer of the goods in that market.
The types of controls that can prevent fraud, at least as well as the stock
markets have done ala Madoff, are now easily attainable because of
technology that is accessible even by consumers in their homes. The airline
industry, one that faces security issues in terms of matching passenger IDs to
tickets, allows consumers to print airline boarding passes at home, complete
with their identifying barcodes. There are various means for controlling fraud,
a concern that should not be used to eliminate or hamper free transferability.
Changing the character of tickets from bearer to a type of order instrument
that requires promoter or owner approval for transfer has been tried in the past.
Historically, scalpers were solo operators who purchased tickets from the box
office, tickets that were a form of a bearer instrument. However, at the height
of New York’s statutory control of pricing and transfers of tickets, confusion
and higher prices reigned.194 Theater managers, irked by the profiteering and
the nuisance presence of the scalpers, tried to change the bearer character of
the tickets. Their tactics included efforts to prevent those who had not
purchased tickets from either the box office or authorized agents from entering
the theater. The effect of these constraints was that the bearer character of the
ticket instrument was changed to one of order paper, a type of instrument that
requires signature and transfer from the original drawer of the instrument, i.e.,
the theater owner or event sponsor. The problem with this change of
instrument character was that the tickets did not include, as would an order
2010] REGULATORY FUTURE OF TICKET SCALPING 185
195. Id.
196. DAVID P. TWOMEY & MARIANNE M. JENNINGS, ANDERSON’S BUSINESS LAW 1166 (21st ed.
2010).
instrument, the transfer restrictions or requirements that order instruments
have. The lack of uniformity left consumers without an understanding of the
expectations of theater owners for transfers of the instruments.195
Unlike the standard transfer requirements provided for commercial paper
under the U.C.C., there was no national set of laws on negotiation, transfer,
and title for tickets. When primary market sellers place controls on secondary
market transfers, the secondary market becomes limited, and consumers are
left to seek tickets from promoters and owners who can charge more because
of the secondary market demand created by the very restrictions those owners
had imposed. 
The bearer nature of tickets is critical for a national market as well as for
the commodities markets that are now developing that permit consumers to
buy ticket futures. If the tickets cannot be transferred as bearer instruments,
even with some form of bar code registration of the transfer, the national
market cannot continue to develop. Regulation of transfers (i.e., preventing
transfers by prohibiting scalping) or even promoters and owners requiring ID
matches with bar codes for admissions limits the size of the ticket market,
thereby reducing the supply of tickets, something, as Principle One notes,
drives prices higher. State and local laws and regulations and promoter
restrictions on transfer effectively change the bearer character of tickets, a
necessary element for a national market.
As pointed out earlier, another legal issue has re-emerged to prevent ease
of transfer: the characterization of the ticket as a license. A license is a
temporary right to use another’s property for a limited time.196 A license is,
under the law, granted at the discretion of the owner and can be revoked at any
time, with appropriate notice. This antiquated notion of property law has re-
emerged among promoters and owners as a means of controlling the flow of
tickets to the secondary market. The types of license revocations that have
begun to appear on tickets address the right of revocation and cover everything
from transfers of the tickets to nuisance effects. For example, Major League
Baseball tickets have long had the following license restrictions:
The Office of the Commissioner of Baseball reserves the right, without refund of any
portion of the purchase price to revoke the license granted by this ticket and refuse
admission or eject any person who appears intoxicated or whose conduct is deemed by
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197. St. Louis Cardinals World Series Game 5 Ticket (2007).
198. University of Missouri Football Ticket, Oct. 28, 2006.
199. Arizona Diamondbacks Ticket, May 7, 2007.
200. Super Bowl XLII Ticket, Feb. 3, 2008.
201. Id.
the Office of the Commissioner of Baseball to be disorderly or unbecoming or who uses
vulgar or abusive language.197
A typical college football game ticket provides: “Throwing of items or
smoking is prohibited. Unauthorized field access before, during, and after the
contest/game is prohibited, and violators are subject to arrest.”198 Tickets also
cover other legal topics that are typical of a license:
Liability for personal injury.
The holder assumes all risk, danger, and injury incident to attendance at the event,
whether occurring prior to or at any time during or after a baseball game (including, but
not limited to, the danger of batted balls or thrown bats, balls or other items; agrees that
no persons or entities (including, but limited to, Major League Baseball, the National
League, its member Clubs, the American League, its member Clubs, management of the
Leagues and Clubs, their Agents and Players) are liable for any injury to the holder
resulting from such causes and releases and holds harmless such persons and entities.199
Similarly, for the Super Bowl there is the following disclaimer: “Ticket holder
assumes all risk incident to the game or related events, including the risk of
lost, stolen or damaged property or personal injury.”200 The search and seizure
rights appeared on tickets universally after September 11, 2001:
You and your belongings may be searched upon entry into the stadium, and prohibited
items may be confiscated. By tendering this ticket and entering the stadium, you consent
to such searches and waive any related claims that you might have against the NFL, its
Member Clubs, its affiliates, or its agents. If you elect not to consent to these searches,
you will be denied entry to the stadium.201
Today technological capabilities have introduced yet additional license
restrictions on tickets. For example:
The holder of this ticket is admitted on condition and by using this ticket agrees he/she
will not transmit or aid in transmitting any description, account, picture or reproduction
of the event to which this ticket admits him/her. The ticket may not be used for
advertising, promotions (including contests and sweepstakes) or other trade purposes
without the expressed written consent of the Tostitos Fiesta Bowl. Breach of the
foregoing will automatically terminate this license. The holder grants permission to the
Tostitos Fiesta Bowl and Fox Sports and their agents to utilize the holder’s image or
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202. Tostitos Fiesta Bowl Ticket, Jan. 1, 2007.
203. Id.
204. Id. (emphasis in original).
205. Simon, supra note 38, at 1213. See also boxofficetickets.com for a description of the handheld
likeness in any live or recorded video display or other transmission or reproduction, in
whole or in part, of the event to which this admits him/her.202
Despite making the argument for control purposes that the ticket is a
license, most tickets do contain warnings about their bearer nature, i.e., the
natural risks of bearer instruments. The following disclaimer is an interesting
one that combines the law of commercial paper and bearer instruments with
the law on revocable licenses, a disclaimer that reflects the current confusion
about the form of property or right is contained within a ticket. The following
statement is found on almost all event tickets today in bold print:
NO REFUNDS, EXCHANGES OR CANCELLATIONS.
This statement is quickly followed by, “[The Tostitos Fiesta Bowl] is not responsible for
lost, stolen, or damaged tickets, or tickets obtained from sources other than
representatives of the Tostitos Fiesta Bowl.”203
If a ticket is a license, and not a bearer instrument, it is simply a basic
property right granted temporarily to another with title remaining with the
original seller: “This ticket is a revocable license that may be withdrawn and
admission refused anytime upon refunding the printed purchase price. Resale
or attempted resale at a price higher than that printed herein is grounds for
seizure or cancellation without refund or other compensation.”204
The emergence of Ticketmaster into licensed secondary trading through
the formation of its TeamExchange in 2002 followed by its TicketExchange
in 2006 brought the issue of the nature of tickets to the legal forefront.
Ticketmaster realized the potential character-changing nature of an identifying
barcode. If a ticket is a license, accomplished by requiring identification of the
licensee through barcode controls, then the ticket/license is revocable at any
time by those who grant the license, thereby allowing primary market control
of transferability. In addition, the very characterization of a ticket as a license
makes the antiquated personal property law the dominant legal force in ticket
markets, a source of law that gives the owner/promoter control over transfers
because a license is personal in nature. A license cannot be transferred
unilaterally because it is based on privity in the relationship: the
owner/promoter grants the license to the individual who is identified by the
barcode.205 Obviously such limited transferability, obtained through the
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scanner technology sold to event sponsors to facilitate access. 
206. At the time the suit was brought against StubHub, the Patriots’ tickets contained the following
warning:
ANY NON-LICENSED INDIVIDUAL RESELLING THIS TICKET BY ANY METHOD
INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, IN PERSON, ON AN AUCTION WEB SITE, OR
OTHERWISE OVER THE INTERNET AND ANY LICENSED INDIVIDUAL OR ENTITY
RESELLING THIS TICKET IN VIOLATION OF APPLICABLE LAW, IS SUBJECT TO
ARREST, LEGAL ACTION AND LOSS OF SEASON TICKET PRIVILEGES.
See NPS, LLC v. StubHub, Inc., No. 06-4874BLS1, 2009 WL 995483, *1 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Jan. 26, 2009).
The language was changed in 2007 to the following:
This ticket is a non-transferable revocable license. . . .
ANY PERSON NOT LICENSED PURSUANT TO M.G.L. c. 140, § 185A RESELLING THIS
TICKET BY ANY METHOD INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION IN PERSON, ON AN
AUCTION WEB SITE, OR OTHERWISE OVER THE INTERNET, AND ANY PERSON OR
ENTITY SO LICENSED RESELLING THIS TICKET ON AN AUCTION WEB SITE OR IN
VIOLATION OF APPLICABLE LAW, IS SUBJECT TO ARREST, LEGAL ACTION AND LOSS
OF SEASON TICKET PRIVILEGES.
Id. at n.5.
207. Brief of Amici Curiae, New England Patriots, L.P. and NPS LLC, Herman v. Admit One Ticket
Agency, 912 N.E.2d 450 (Mass. 2009) (No. SJC-10326).
application of common law, means that national and international markets are
limited, a further constraint on supply.
Sports teams have also realized the value of classifying tickets,
particularly season tickets, as a license. In its litigation against StubHub, Inc.
over StubHub’s listing of tickets for resale, the New England Patriots alleged
that StubHub was engaged in intentional interference with advantageous
relations through StubHub’s knowing solicitation of ticket holders to violate
the terms on which their tickets for access to Patriots home football games are
granted (i.e., the license restrictions on transfer of the tickets).206 During the
course of that litigation, there was another case before the Massachusetts
Supreme Court that focused on the question of whether a ticket is a license or
simply a transferable bearer instrument. The Patriots filed a brief in the case
an amici that included the following analysis of the team’s rights:
Under long-standing Massachusetts law, tickets to entertainment events are revocable
licenses, which a venue owner may revoke at any time and for any reason. See, e.g.,
Yarde Metals, Inc. v. New England Patriots, L.P., 64 Mass. App. Ct. 656, 658 (2005).
The Patriots make substantial investments in the team and the stadium, take the
entrepreneurial risks in making those investments, and assume certain liabilities as
property owners. In doing so, the Patriots rely on, inter alia, the protections afforded
property owners under the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, including the
status of tickets they issue as revocable licenses, the ability of a venue owner to adopt
rules for granting access to private property, and the freedom to revoke revocable tickets
at any time for any reason.207
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208. Ticketmaster and TicketExchange are the authorized sellers for the Patriots. StubHub, 2009 WL
995483, at *2 (Revoked season tickets are also sold through this arrangement. The Patriots keep a wait list
for tickets for a fee of $100 per fan, a fee that goes toward the purchase of season tickets should the fan
make it to the top of the lengthy list). 
209. Id.
210. Rick Reilly, Be the 74,659th In Line, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 15, 2007, at 72.
211. Id. The Packers permit interfamily transfers of season tickets, so you are behind brothers, sisters,
aunts, uncles, and all the way down the family tree to first cousins. The secondary market for single-game
tickets is critical. Packers’ control of transfer rights creates a sort of intergenerational fiefdom. Odd that fee
tails and Austenesque property rights should re-emerge in the 21st century in sports.
212. Stubhub, 2009 WL 995483, at *1–3 (The litigation began when many fans began to show up at
games with tickets purchased through StubHub and found that they had been voided. StubHub provides its
fan protection guarantee, but the Patriots filed suit for StubHub’s intentional interference with its relations
with its fans and ticket holders.).
Ninety-five percent of the tickets sold by the Patriots are season tickets,
with the remaining 5 percent being Premium seats sold through the team’s
official site.208 With the season tickets being classified as a license, the effect
is a shut-out of the secondary market for Patriots’ games because the
secondary market will be limited to the 5 percent of tickets sold for single
games.209 Other teams follow a similar approach that controls the market. For
example, the Green Bay Packers do not sell single-game tickets, with fans who
placed their names on the season ticket waiting list managing to earn the right
to purchase those tickets about 37 years after they added their name to the list
(1970).210 If you added your name to the list in 2007, you were 74,659th in
line. The control of the teams is unlike that in any other good or market.211
In a memorandum decision in which the court denied StubHub’s motion
for summary judgment, the court described the reason behind and process for
the Patriots’ enforcement of its ticket revocation policy:
In an effort to maintain what the Patriots describe as a safe, secure, and family-friendly
environment for home games, they have exercised their right to revoke season tickets
when ticket holders, either the ticket owners themselves or their guests, have engaged in
what the Patriots consider to be unsafe or unacceptable conduct. See Yarde Metals, Inc.
v. New England Patriots, LP, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 656, 660 (2005). Thus, for example,
should a season ticket holder give his or her tickets to another person for any single home
game, and should the Patriots eject that person for unacceptable conduct, the Patriots
may revoke the season tickets, regardless of the fact that the original holder was not
present at the game. Upon learning that a ticket holder has impermissibly transferred a
ticket or tickets, the Patriots have revoked that holder’s season tickets and refunded the
full face value. In this way, all season ticket holders are responsible for the behavior of
their guests. In order to effectuate this policy, each ticket bears a unique bar code that is
electronically scanned upon entrance. Should the Patriots cancel a ticket, the bar code
is voided, and the ticket is useless.212
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213. However, the authors have serious trouble understanding how a season ticket holder who sells
his or her seat to one Patriots game somehow affects the ambience of Gillette Field and the rowdy pre-game
behavior of selling a ticket to another somehow affects the family atmosphere of the games unless the
Patriots are interviewing and screening season ticket holders for comportment. Further, if the StubHub ticket
buyers prove to be rowdy, the right to expel for conduct can still be a part of any ticketholder relationship
and the riff-raff from the secondary market can be weeded out on a game-by-game basis as their conduct
and the Patriots’ moral authority requires.
214. The research that concluded the end result of regulation is higher ticket prices is found in Daniel
W. Elfenbein, Do Anti-Ticket Scalping Laws Make a Difference Online? Evidence from Internet Sales of
NFL Tickets, 23–24 (Sept. 24, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), quoted in Glantz, supra note 61, at 291–92.
215. The loss-of-revenue potential in secondary ticket sales has resulted in litigation between state
revenue departments and secondary ticket sellers. See, e.g., Ticketmaster, LLC v. Comm’r of Revenue, 2008
WL 650294 (Minn.Tax).
The court went completely with license and property rights in its decision:
the Patriots have the right to control who attends their games.213 The result of
this decision is that the question of the character of event tickets becomes one
for legislatures because of the ticket-market issues that the iron-hand policies
of teams create with their resulting lack of competition in or availability of
tickets for the games of a popular team. In addition, the Massachusetts
interpretation of the nature of a ticket precludes consumers from participating
in several layers of the ticket market, including the futures market, and costs
Massachusetts the potential tax revenues that accompany the presence of an
active secondary market.
The most compelling result of the Massachusetts case is that primary
sellers are able to rely on common law property principles (rights of property
owners to revoke licenses) to achieve a form of antiscalping regulation that has
not been subjected to the rigors of the democratic process that previous and
existing antiscalping laws endured to become law. Nonetheless, the effect is
the same. Whether achieved by labeling, character, or judicial decision, a ticket
that is a revocable license precludes resales or limits mark-ups. The result is
a secondary market that is smaller with ticket prices, as a result, higher.214 The
resurrection of property law is a means of achieving a vertical monopoly.
The Potential for Tax Revenues From Allowing Secondary Markets to
Operate Efficiently
Economists have noted that the irony of restrictive regulation such as that
imposed by the basic property notion of license is that the states deprive
themselves of tax-producing activities through such market controls.215
Assemblyman Joseph Pillittere, a Democrat who sponsored a bill to lift ticket
resale restrictions at a time when New York was controlling secondary markets
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216. SEGRAVE, supra note 1, at 187.
217. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142–43 (1970) (state law requiring that cantaloupes
grown in the state be packed for shipment in the state before being shipped in interstate commerce was a
burden on that commerce and could not be justified on the basis of the state’s interest in preserving the
reputation of the fruit grown in the state).
218. NPS, LLC v. StubHub, Inc., No. 06-4874BLS1, 2009 WL 995483 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Jan. 26, 2009).
and, in effect, prohibiting resale above face value, explained the New York
loss of a pool of tax funds, “[m]y concern is that we have driven ticket brokers
out of state. We have given up a lot of tax revenue, and I believe that we will
have to do something to get the brokers back.”216 The secondary ticket market
is a source of tax revenues for state and local governments, but the Patriots’
control of the secondary market, accomplished through statutes and similar
license protections in other states, results in limitations in the size of the
secondary ticket market as well as the number of transactions. In addition, the
secondary ticket market in states with extensive controls necessarily slips
below the primary seller’s and regulators’ radar, thereby resulting in issues
about consumer protection as well as off-the-books transactions that do not
bring tax revenues.
The Nature of Interstate Commerce Constraints on State Regulation of the
Ticket Market
The use of state laws and even state common-law-property-principles
accomplish little more than protection for the primary ticket sellers in the state.
However, there is some level of economic discrimination at work through the
impact of these local laws that discriminate against out-of-state ticket sellers
and favor in-state businesses. That is, ticket sellers are unable to compete in
Massachusetts as long as the protections for the Patriots and their ticket
agent(s) are in place. The regulation is incidental and does not affect direct
competitors of the Patriots, but it does prevent secondary ticket market
participants from doing business in Massachusetts as well as serve to preclude
Massachusetts residents from participating in interstate ticket markets.
Cases that address state laws that affect interstate commerce negatively
while favoring in-state businesses, prohibit such out-of-state discrimination
unless the laws/regulation: (1) serves a legitimate interest; (2) substantially
reaches the interest; and (3) is the only method available for reducing the
discriminatory effect between in-state and out-of-state businesses.217 State
courts in Massachusetts have ruled that the Patriots’s need to control the type
of fan in Gillette Stadium is a legitimate exercise of its license rights.218
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219. Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. Reilly, 218 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2000).
220. “The plain language of the regulations, which makes it unlawful to ‘cause to be advertised’ cigar
products in Massachusetts, imposes liability on manufacturers for advertising in national magazines that are
distributed in the Commonwealth, as well as for advertising on the Internet which can be viewed from a
terminal in Massachusetts. As the district court recognized, this ‘would place a great burden on interstate
commerce since it would require the Massachusetts Warning to be carried by a national magazine in order
to ensure that any copies ending up in Massachusetts carry the Warning.’ Lorillard II, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 203.
The court also concluded that ‘the Commonwealth’s local interest in capturing national magazines [and
Internet media] is outweighed by the burden it would place on interstate commerce.’ Id. We agree with this
evaluation of the burden imposed by the regulations, and we similarly conclude that in this respect § 22.05
runs afoul of the Pike analysis.” Id.
However, the effect of that license protection is that Massachusetts residents
cannot use any interstate companies for trading or selling their tickets. In order
to meet the constitutional test for favoring in-state businesses over out-of-state
businesses, Massachusetts must be able to establish, beyond the Patriots
arguments related to the quality of fans, that this restriction on ticket transfers
reaches that interest and that it is the only method available for doing so. As
discussed earlier, it is not clear how a transfer restriction helps to control the
behavior of fans in the stadium unless the Patriots are conducting some type
of prescreening in awarding season tickets to fans. The Patriots’s offer to
individuals to be on the waiting list for season tickets is available to anyone
who can plunk down $100. The same comportment of fans in the stadium can
be achieved by security during the games. Revoking the ticket license of a
season ticket holder who sells his or her single-game tickets on StubHub does
not address the ambience issue the Patriots claimed in state court as the
justification for the restrictions on ticket sales by fans on sites other than that
of the Patriots. The effect of the controls is the exclusion of all secondary
ticket market services and sellers from Massachusetts and a limitation on the
people of Massachusetts to one ticket broker, that belonging to a
Massachusetts entity.
In Consolidated Cigar Corp v. Reilly,219 the court held that a
Massachusetts statute that required specific ad content for tobacco ads in
magazines and on product labels (20 percent of the ad had to be devoted to
warnings about the harms of tobacco use) placed an undue burden on interstate
commerce because it would have required companies to alter ad content and
publication of magazines specifically for Massachusetts or not advertise within
the state.220 The alternative for the tobacco companies would be not doing
business in Massachusetts, with the result being that local companies were
favored, and Massachusetts residents were deprived of access to the products
of interstate firms.
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221. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES (1939); CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY
(1942).
222. Table I presents a host of firms that drew upon the changing technology.
The use of the license restrictions under state property laws presents an
arguable constitutional issue. Eliminating a line of interstate businesses from
revenue-generating activity within a state for a purpose that can be
accomplished in a less restrictive way (i.e., the Patriots can control the stadium
participants without shutting out national ticket sales) would have difficulty
passing constitutional muster.
Principle Eight: Schumpeter’s Forces of Creative Destruction Are Always
at Work for Ticket Markets.
Schumpeter’s theory of creative destruction is descriptive of American
capitalism.221 Existing market constraints and structures are dissolved through
innovation in what seem to be chaotic movements, but the result is a different
structure that resolves the issues that gave rise to the chaos. In the context of
this article, primary market ticket sellers find new ways of marketing and
distributing tickets in an effort to control secondary sales, but secondary sellers
find ways around those new methods that were implemented with the very
goal of thwarting or curbing secondary market activities. As computer
technology has evolved over the past three decades, ticket-market activity has
evolved in tandem. Internet sales, along with a host of companies employing
this new technology, have produced new methods for selling tickets, new ways
for doing business, and a broader marketplace that addresses the limited access
to tickets in the primary market.222 These technological changes, coupled with
ease of movement across state lines, have resulted in a shift from the
limitations and price controls of local ticket markets to a national one with
more options and availability for buyers. The following chart illustrates what
the creation of a national ticket trading market for events such as play-offs and
championship games has done. FirstDIBZ is an online ticket futures trading
market. Its national customer base allows those who might never have access
to Super Bowl tickets to use this trading option to obtain tickets in a manner
that would not be possible if they were restricted to the traditional local
markets at the time of the actual game. The chart also shows the savings that
come from such an opportunity for ticket buyers.
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223. Again, the listed prices do not reflect service charges added at the check-out phase of the ticket
transaction.
224. However, the New York Times, in a bit of a commentary that was also a precursor to the world
of ticket resales today, referred to them as scalpers and noted, “[t]he offices of the brokers, as they are
pleased to title themselves, are unpretentious places, but at all seasons of the year are scenes of bustling
activity.” Scalpers and Scalping: A Business Which Has Reached Vast Proportions, N.Y. TIMES, May 19,
1882, at 5.
225. Id. (This article on the entrepreneurial spirit of the “scalpers”/brokers refers to the risks of buying
fraudulent tickets. At that time brokers were required to report any attempted sales in bulk under suspicious
circumstances as when a railroad lineman offers a bundle of tickets for sale. The brokers had a sort of code
of ethics that required them to refuse the tickets and report the culprit.). See infra notes 238–45 and
accompanying text for more discussion of brokers, self-regulation, and related issues such as fraud. Also,
interestingly, one of the largest ticket broker agents in New York City had revenues of $1,000,000 in 1881.
SEGRAVE, supra note 1, at 5.


















Ohio State    $5 $225 $230 $1,800 $1,570
Super Bowl
XLII NY Giants  $30 $700 $730 $3,000 $2,270
Source: www.FirstDibz.com.223
Schumpeter’s theory is best understood with a simple summary
emphasized previously: The market finds a way and has been doing so since
the time tickets were used as a means of access. An example from the 1800s
illustrates the Schumpeter chaos that produces reform. A New York Times
article from 1882 pointed to successful brokers who had been in business for
30 years.224 In particular, the article discusses the activities of speculators for
railroad tickets that were the result of customer demand for purchasing
portions of tickets that the railroad was not making available for sale.225 The
market structure void that these railroad speculators filled is nearly identical
to the void ticket brokers fill with regard to season ticket holders. Some fans
want one or two games, not a full season ticket pass. The speculators break
down the larger portion into smaller, marketable component parts. The
particular product may change, but the market needs are similar, and market
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226. True to the pattern of general ticket scalping regulation, the railroads attempted city-by-city
controls of the practice of scalping. Cincinnati had success in minimizing scalper activity while other cities
admitted that they were “busily engaged” in ticket sales elsewhere. Railroad Notes, N.Y. TIMES, May 22,
1875, at 10. The practice was so pervasive that by 1879, the General Passenger Agents group had proposed
rules for termination of employment of agents who cut tickets or reduced rates on unused tickets and did so
to earn commissions from brokers. The group also decided to impose rules that prohibited the use of partial
fares beyond certain westerly points, such as Indianapolis and Cincinnati. A Plan Adopted to Prevent Cutting
and Scalping, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1879.
227. See supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text.
228. For the game in New Orleans, the 75,000 seat distribution included 16,425 tickets to each
competing team, of which the Philadelphia Eagles allocated 12,000 to season ticket holders and the Oakland
Raiders allocated 10,000. Both the Raiders and Eagles ignored Rozelle’s guidelines and allocated 30 and
20 tickets respectively to each player at face value. The rest of the distribution included: 7,300 for the host
New Orleans Saints; 876 to each of the other teams (each NFL player could purchase a minimum of two
tickets at face value); 2,500 to luxury box owners in the stadium; and 10,950 to the NFL Commissioner’s
office.
229. William Nack & Robert Sullivan, Football’s Little Bighorn?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 26,
1981, at 33. See SEGRAVE, supra note 1, at 201–02.
participants find a way to deliver a product that consumers want. The railroad
brokers were selling unused portions of long-distance railway tickets.226 What
the railroads were selling, in terms of mandatory routes, was not what the
public wanted. Through the brokers, the market found a way to address the
pricing and access issues that mandatory route tickets imposed. The result was
travel that was more convenient and less expensive.
A century later, the NFL provided a similar example—same story,
different era, but same result thanks to Schumpeter. As a result of the 1980
Davis Super Bowl allegations,227 the tickets for the 1981 Super Bowl were
distributed according to written guidelines that Rozelle developed to contain
the distribution and resale of tickets. The Rozelle guidelines suggested that
Super Bowl teams should establish a “firm policy” regarding the number of
seats that would be made available to players, coaches, and staff members,
with a maximum of 15 per individual.228 Reporters did their research on the
impact of Rozelle’s rules. Of the 75,000 attending the 1981 Super Bowl, an
estimated 50,000 paid the single-price face-value of $40 with the remaining
25,000 attendees buying their tickets on the secondary market, paying between
$150 and $500 per seat.229
The eight principles guide ticket markets and their would-be regulators to
one inescapable conclusion, one that was reached in 1893 by Daniel Frohman,
manager at that time of the famed Lyceum Theater in New York: “The abuse
can never be cured wholly until the people refuse ever to buy seats from
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230. Fighting the Speculators, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1893, at 8.
231. In reality, the Internet already makes the ticket market international, but this article is confined
to addressing the need for a regulatory scheme that allows free trade of tickets across state borders.
speculators, and it is not reasonable to suppose that such a heavenly state of
things will ever come to pass.”230
The quibble arises with his use of the term “abuse.” One man’s “abuse”
is another man’s chaotic adjustment to an inefficient market. Perhaps curing
the “abuse” is not the correct approach. Rather, the eight principles suggest
that an efficient market exists, one that provides consumers with what they
along with necessary protections for them even as it delivers the profits to
sellers without the nuisance effects that plague regulators.
PART III: A PROPOSAL FOR STRUCTURING THE LAW FOR A NATIONAL
TICKET MARKET
The eight principles provide the insight on key components of ticket
markets that cannot be controlled, but they also warn of the perils of the
various forms of regulation applicable to those markets. In simplest terms, the
principles offer some overarching themes for regulatory structure: (1) fraud
happens; and (2) ticket markets must be transparent and national to provide
full benefits for consumers.231 When fraud happens, the tendency for regulators
is to pass territorial types of reforms that hamper the transparency of national
markets. A national regulatory scheme for primary and secondary ticket
markets must address fraud before there can be acceptance on a state-by-state
basis of national regulation that will allow the free flow of tickets and, as an
incidental benefit, provide the states with all the revenue that will result from
above-the-table ticket transactions.
Too much of the existing state regulation has focused on price restriction
and resale as a means of controlling fraud, a focus that has proved ineffectual.
The desired goal of consumer protection is better achieved through meaningful
anti-fraud provisions as opposed to ineffectual market controls (see Principle
Five). Eliot Spitzer, the short-lived governor of New York, who had made
efforts as New York’s Attorney General to enforce New York’s then-
antiscalping laws, finally came to understand the market dynamics in high-
demand events and reached the correct conclusion about how tickets markets
should be regulated:
Consumers will be better off if we deregulate scalping, let the market function, and get
rid of the corruption in the box office. You have people who are being paid bribes to
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232. Jayson Blair, Attorney General Favors Elimination of State Anti-Scalping Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 2001, at 38.
233. The authors recognize that recent actions by the Obama administration could be interpreted as
accomplishing the same thing, but the authors prefer to think of the actions of this one presidential
administration as an anomaly born of fear in an economic downturn and hold great faith that the markets
will be permitted to return to transparent and independent operations, profits and all.
secrete tickets out without the general public ever getting a chance to buy them. What
we need to do is focus on theft. That is where the fraud is.232
Fraud Happens: How to Minimize It
There is not a period in the 400 years of ticket sales to high-demand
events that there have not been shenanigans that cost consumers. However,
there also has not been a period in the sale of any type of good or service
where there has not been fraud. Because there is fraud in the sale of securities
does not mean that the way to eradicate fraud is by placing caps on the resale
price of those securities, preventing the transfer of those securities without
authorization from the issuer, or requiring sellers and buyers to go through an
exchange run by the issuer of the shares. Nor do we decide that investment
firms that deal in secondary trading are making far too much money from the
increase in value in the stocks and should be, therefore, cut out of the markets
with their economic rents going back to the company.233
Such suggestions seem ludicrous when we know that the stock market has
functioned for a very long time with substantial rewards for participants
despite the economic cycles. So it is with ticket markets. Limitations on
transparent trading through price controls and purchasing prohibitions will not
address the fraud. Indeed, with the eight principles always fueling secondary
trading, what will happen with such curbs is more fraud as the transactions are
driven underground in a manner that does not allow consumer remedies or
regulatory oversight. If fraud happens, the best regulatory schemes will target
the fraud, not curb the markets that offer returns that do tend to attract fraud.
Regulations require methods that get at the actions of a few and do not
eliminate the temptation for fraud, something all markets have in common
when they are successful. The secondary ticket market is a successful,
growing, and continually evolving one. It attracts entrepreneurs who will
continue its expansion, but the purpose of any ticket market regulation should
be to foster growth even as it curbs deception.
There are several ways to limit the proposition that “fraud happens” in
markets. The goals in all of the proposals for regulatory change in the ticket
markets are: (1) to draw on what has worked in open markets in other fields;
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234. Commercial bribery is commercial bribery, whether the recipient of the bribe is a box-office
employee or a purchasing agent for a contractor. Reliance on the more general statutes facilitates a national
ticket market in the sense that all businesses function with slight differences in state law on these types of
issues and ticket sellers should not be required to adhere to a state-by-state standard that is unknown when
more general statutes can address the issues adequately.
235. See antiscalping proposal by Congressman Gary Ackerman, supra note 81; see also Glantz, supra
note 61, at 297. The proposal incorporates many of the recommendations of the 1999 New York Attorney
General Report on ticket scalping. OFFICE OF N.Y. STATE ATTORNEY GEN. ELIOT SPITZER, WHY CAN’T I
GET TICKETS? (1999).
236. “Kicking against the pricks” is a Biblical phrase. Acts 9:1–5 (King James). Verses four and five
represent the final steps in Saul’s conversion (who would become Paul the Apostle). “And he fell to the
earth, and heard a voice saying unto him, Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me? And he said, Who art thou,
Lord? And the Lord said, I am Jesus whom thou persecutest: it is hard for thee to kick against the pricks.”
This is mentioned again in Acts 26:14. This refers to the oxen responding to the tillers of soil who used a
pointed spike (prick) to goad the oxen into going in the direction the tiller desired. However, oxen being
stubborn would often kick out at the prick. The more the oxen kicked, the more the tiller drove the prick into
the flesh of the animal. These were pre-PETA times of yester year. The more the oxen kicked, the more the
suffering. Most of the regulation that has been passed in order to rein in secondary markets (continuing with
the animal husbandry theme) has simply resulted in more creativity and expanding secondary markets.
Regulation is, of course, the stubborn oxen in this metaphor and the tiller and his stick are free market
forces.
(2) to provide a regulatory framework that relies as much as possible on
universally applicable laws and regulations, that is, to avoid ticket-specific
statutes or regulations when a general statute or regulation serves to address
the concern;234 and (3) to provide a simple framework that allows national
operations even as it allows states the opportunity to police fraud by those who
are involved in selling tickets to residents in the state, whether through
physical presence or online reach.
Others have proposed sweeping national reform for the ticket markets. For
example, one proposal is The Federal Uniform Ticket Resale Act (FUTRA).235
The proposal consists of licensing, extensive recordkeeping requirements,
lawful sell-backs, a central enforcement authority (akin to the SEC for
securities), limitations on the use of diggers, and a maximum premium price.
There are two significant problems with the proposal. The first is that many of
its provisions attempt to kick against the pricks,236 that is, the provisions in
FUTRA exacerbate the problems that exist because regulatory controls run
contra to the Eight Principles. The fact that a price is a premium price above
existing permissible levels does not make it any less of a price control. The
second problem is that presently the patchwork of existing statutes and
regulations is wide and deep and equally as rich in political issues that resulted
in their passage. A sweeping national reform would meet resistance because
of those vested local interests.
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237. Wisconsin had played in the Rose Bowl three times prior to the 1994 game: 1953 (USC 7,
Wisconsin 0), 1960 (Washington 44, Wisconsin 8), and 1963 (USC 42, Wisconsin 37). After winning the
1994 game (Wisconsin 21, UCLA 16), the school played again in 1999 (Wisconsin 38, UCLA 31), and 2000
(Wisconsin 17, Stanford 9). Tournament of Roses, Past Game Scores, http://www.tournamentofroses
.com/history/gamescores.asp (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
Further, there is room in a national ticket market for local regulatory
eccentricities. There are state and local forms of regulation in every market
that work consistently for goals for a national market that allow uniform
trading. IBM stock still trades in Arizona even though Arizona is a merit
review state when it comes to approving securities offerings. IBM simply
needs to file the specific Arizona information, information that is provided in
a uniform form used by all the states as they review stock registrations. Each
state has its own standards for review, but the process is national. Once
approved, the sales sally forth. In other words, the proposals offered below
will, in effect, allow for simplicity and nationalization in terms of licensing but
still allow local controls and even application of state-specific statutes. Rather
than attempt centralized control, the following proposals for reform allow for
state eccentricities even as they serve to allow the creation of a national and
transparent market for tickets.
Foster and Expand Self-Regulation
Where there is fraud, there is consumer unrest, and where there is
consumer unrest, there is regulation (see Principle Four). If ticket markets are
to continue their growth and foster creativity in making tickets more widely
available at lower prices, those who sell products in ticket markets must take
steps to rein in fellow participants. A constant theme running through the
development of the secondary ticket market has been the presence of consumer
unrest, most of it justified because of the conduct of sellers.
The 1994 Rose Bowl provided an example of how self-regulation can
keep an open market going and out of the hands of price-controlling
regulators. The University of Wisconsin was one of the teams in the 1994 Rose
Bowl, playing in it for the first time since 1963. Brokers had put together
extensive travel packages for Badger fans, who were many and motivated.237
However, in a page borrowed from the hedging activities of Wall Street, some
of the brokers offering the packages were selling short. The brokers did not
physically have the tickets to the Rose Bowl. They were offering the packages
based on their assumptions about markets and consumer behavior that led them
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238. Wisconsin Official to Pursue Rose Bowl, SPOKESMAN-R., Jan. 12, 1994, at 1.
239. Gary Adler, lead counsel for the National Association of Ticket Brokers (NATB), conveyed the
intensity of the media commentary to the authors when the formation of the NATB was first broached.
240. National Association of Ticket Brokers, http://www.natb.org (last visited July 3, 2009).
241. Previously there had been regional and event-specific associations such as the Theater Ticket
Brokers Association of Greater New York, which was organized in 1920 to oppose legislation that limited
ticket premiums to 50 cents. SEGRAVE, supra note 1, at 114. Interviews with members of the broker industry
indicate that there was, for a fleeting time, also the East Coast Ticket Brokers Association, a forerunner to
the NATB.
242. The authors work with NATB in a variety of ways: discussing current legal trends with NATB
legal counsel, making presentations at the annual convention, and testifying before various state committees.
With the exception of travel expenses, all of the work has been pro bono.
to conclude that they would be able to buy the tickets at “reasonable prices”
sometime before the game.238
Though rare, the brokers were wrong in their economic forecasts. Intense
demand that continued through the pre-game period resulted in ticket prices
that were so high that some of the brokers concluded that it was better to
refund than to cover their short positions. The signed contracts between the
brokers and the fans indicated that ticket buyers would be reimbursed
monetarily (perhaps with a premium) if the seller could not provide the actual
ticket. Refunds meant little to the Wisconsin fans who had already journeyed
to California and were sitting in their Pasadena hotel rooms waiting for ticket
delivery. The media commentary was scathing, and all the “scalper” backlash
from centuries of mark-ups reared its ugly head with heart-string-tugging
stories of defrauded Badger fans.239 Regulation seemed a certainty.
Markets function on self-interest, not selfishness. It is in no one’s best
interest to have dissatisfied consumers, and certainly not consumers who
happen to be jilted Badger fans. Recognizing the implications for their
industry, a group of brokers, concerned about the Pasadena missteps and the
harmed consumers, as well as the public perception of their profession as a
result of these events, formed the National Association of Ticket Brokers
(NATB).240 There had been previous forms of voluntary organizations and
codes, but this effort was unique in that it was a national group that reflected
the national nature of ticket markets.241 Since its inception, NATB has
continued to lobby extensively for free markets, but perhaps more importantly
it established industry standards, a code of ethics, and enforcement
mechanisms.242
NATB’s Code of Ethics establishes 17 conditions of membership,
including the five critical elements that focus on the prevention of fraud and
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243. NATB’s enforcement/compliance mechanism is governed by NATB’s Ethical Complaint
Procedures document, which contains seven sections: Committee for Standards and Ethics; Member
Responsibility; Receipt of Complaint; CSE Committee Determination; A Board of Appeals; Sanctions; and
Miscellaneous. These conditions and procedures provide protections for ticket customers when dealing with
one of the now 200 current NATB members. National Association of Ticket Brokers, Complaint
Information, http://www.natb.org/complaints (Follow the “Complaint Procedures” hyperlink) (last visited
Feb. 16, 2010).
provisions for consumer remedies when things go wrong in terms of ticket
purchase and delivery:
(1) maintaining a good character and reputation in the community;
(2) not deceiving, misleading, misinforming or otherwise misrepresent seat location
information;
(3) maintaining complete and accurate records;
(4) maintaining a refund and cancellation policy, something that must be
conspicuously posted at each location where the member does business;
(5) agreeing to arbitration by the American Arbitration Association to resolve any
disputes with another Association member or purchases.243
In addition to trade groups, individual ticket-market participants, whether
sellers or ticket-sales facilitators, have developed their own sets of visions,
standards, and ethics that are disclosed to consumers prior to their use of the
sellers’ services or online site. For example, StubHub provides a description
of the ticket market and what it does to prevent fraud and how it seeks to
operate in a manner that is consistent with the principles of the U.S. stock
market:
Sporting and live music events in this country have been main entertainment options for
the public for decades. But prior to Y2K the common fan was not being adequately
served by the existing options for purchasing tickets to these events. The best tickets were
never even available because season ticket holders, corporate sponsors and newly
created fan clubs were securing all the tickets in advance. For the very hottest events,
even the remaining less desirable seat locations were selling out in mere minutes. For
years the only option fans were left with was hoping to find a street scalper outside of the
event and take their chances. Counterfeit tickets were a concern and without knowing all
the pricing options there were risks of scams and unfair ticket values.
These imperfect options left fans without a trusted source of getting access to the live
events they wanted. Fans were confused and had many unanswered questions. Where to
go? What’s a fair price? How does the buyer actually get the tickets? Will they get them
in time? How do they know they are legitimate tickets?
Contrast this dynamic with that of the U.S. Stock Market for instance. The situation is
very different when an investor makes a decision to buy or sell a share of stock; they
have clear expectations and systematic processes are in place to provide:
• Fair and open visibility to pricing
• Timely execution
• Guaranteed performance for a specified fee
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244. Stubhub.com, StubHub Story, http://stubhub.com (last visited Apr. 26, 2010).
245. The authors attended the NATB meeting in Las Vegas in July 2009 and had the opportunity to
interview members and vendors about the spec ticket process. There was disagreement among the members
about the nature of spec seat sales and whether there should be provisions in the NATB code on promises
about specific seats sold prior to the broker’s acquisition of those tickets.
StubHub’s innovative approach solves the problems that existed previously:
• Pricing is transparent and reflects fair market conditions. StubHub is a true
trading platform with fair market prices that are driven by supply and demand (i.e.,
the buyers and sellers).
• The process is 100% guaranteed. Tickets arrive in time. StubHub utilizes
overnight delivery as well as local will call centers for “last minute” transactions,
so that buyers receive their tickets in time to attend the event and sellers receive
timely confirmation of their funds.
• The costs are clear and consistent. StubHub charges a minimal transaction fee to
both buyers and sellers, so that everyone involved in the transaction knows exactly
what the total costs will be.244
This self-imposed regulation focuses on the importance of transparency
but also provides a remedy for those buyers who are harmed because of fraud,
as with counterfeit tickets. Fraud happens, but providing buyers with a remedy
is the appropriate response, not the elimination of the marketplace that
StubHub provides.
There are evolving issues in the marketplace of ideas that will require
NATB to be vigilant in its standards and self-regulation. For example, the
practice of so-called “spec seats” has now developed. When a broker sells
“spec seats,” the broker simply commits to a customer to obtain tickets to an
event; the broker makes no representation about the location or quality of the
seats, but the broker does not have tickets to the event yet in hand. Self-
regulation here requires careful and full disclosure to consumers. In addition,
there are brokers who are promising seat locations as part of their spec seats
sales. That is, the brokers are promising certain rows and sections to the
buyers. The opportunity for misunderstanding in such guaranteed spec seats
is great and self-restraint may be necessary for this competitive tool.245
Licensing
One control that inhibits fraud but does not curb open markets is requiring
market participants to be licensed. From ticket brokers to state registration of
online traders, any statute or regulation that is designed to provide full
information about sellers, how to reach them, and ensure that they have
appropriate resources for refunds is welcome. These forms of registration and
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246. Blueskylinks.com contains the uniform forms used for registration of securities.
licensing should parallel the stock market where participants are required to
pay fees, file annual disclosure statements that update information, and even
mandate contributions to state funds that are used to compensate those who are
defrauded. These forms of licensing serve to pare market participants to those
who are willing to enter markets in a transparent manner, providing
background information and a means for consumers and regulators to hold
them accountable for their business practices.
In fact, the ticket market may be of a sufficient size now that there could
be a standardized licensing form and process. The states could join together for
a central filing process in which ticket market participants could file one form
that is then accompanied by the payment of each state’s licensing fee. With so
much of state government business now done online, this process could be one
in which ticket brokers, for example, could file only in those states in which
they will be doing business. The benefit is the same achieved by the
mechanisms now in place for state securities registration: one form is filed in
each of the states in which the company wishes to sell securities with the
appropriate fees being paid via Internet to the states chosen for doing
business.246
This national licensing approach would eliminate the current areas of
jurisdictional confusion over ticket brokers and whether they are doing
business in a particular state for purposes of being subject to that state’s
jurisdiction for enforcement purposes. Currently, online sellers, exchanges,
and brokers are posting warnings about users’ responsibilities for compliance
with state and local regulation.
Stringent Penalties and Strict Enforcement of Laws Against Insider Trading
Fraud occurs in the shadows—in the ticket markets many of those
shadows exist because of the undisclosed involvement of primary market
insiders in secondary market ticket sales. Their undisclosed involvement
means that market transparency suffers because neither the supply nor market
price adjustments to reflect that supply are available to buyers. Their
undisclosed involvement also means that buyers do not have the remedies
available from licensed participants. Their undisclosed involvement also
means that a source of state tax revenues is lost because these transactions are
not reported.
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Because of these three factors states should have legislation that addresses
specifically the activities of those who work for promoters and owners. The
legislation should have a commercial bribery component and a penalty for
secondary sales by insiders that exceed a fixed percentage of the total number
of seats available for the venue. For example, the legislation could require
primary sellers to disclose publicly the number of venue seats that will be
withheld from the initial public offering of the tickets. Such regulation would
be designed to more accurately mirror an IPO in the stock market. That is,
those who purchase shares in an initial primary offering are fully aware of how
many shares will be sold and are not subject to the dilution losses that would
occur if the primary offering were released in spurts of shares, the number of
which is not known for each incremental release, or in toto.
The regulation should not focus on eliminating the hold-backs; hold-backs
are the right of event promoters and owners. However, the disclosure of the
hold-backs allows the markets to better gauge pricing as well as the
involvement of the primary sellers in the secondary market. Regardless of how
the antitrust concerns about primary sellers’ acquisitions and activities in the
secondary market, there remains the issue of their participation after they have
skewed the price or plan to use the release of tickets as a means of increasing
their profits in a manner that deceives buyers about the true size of the
market’s supply of tickets. An example from a high-demand good can
illustrate how primary sellers’ undisclosed involvement in secondary markets
can allow the control of price. Suppose that Apple released a new iPhone for
a price of $50, with a very limited supply. The queues would be long, and a
secondary market would emerge. Suppose further than Apple continued to
control the primary market supply even as it participated in the secondary
market sales. With complete access to the market goods and control over their
release, the primary seller is able to manipulate price in the secondary market.
Primary market sellers should not be denied secondary market profit
participation (corporations do buy and sell their own shares in the secondary
market), but primary seller participation should not result in vertical
monopolies or disguised monopolistic profits made because of a lack of
transparency in the initial stages of ticket sales or their controlled release as the
market price adjust to perceived supplies.
Time-and-Place Restrictions on Resales at State and Local Levels
The Eight Principles necessarily mean that there will be casual traders
who, on the day of an event, simply choose not to or cannot attend an event.
These proposals for a national market are not intended to eliminate the ability
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247. See supra note 119 and accompanying discussion.
248. In the later 1990s, the Baltimore Orioles designated an area behind center field for their new
Camden Yards ballpark where all legal trading was to take place. However, prices above face value were
prohibited, and as the authors told officials, no trading would occur there for important games (like when
Cal Ripken was setting the record for consecutive games played).
249. The authors have noted some states that have specific types of event and game limitations. For
example, in some states college football and basketball games between rivals seem to bring out the need for
regulation of price. The authors recognize the political nature of these specific statutes, but would encourage
state legislators and regulators to rethink these specific limitations in the interest of alumni who are in
locations around the country and who could benefit from the tickets to the rivals’ annual game being
of a casual ticket trader to show up on game day and sell. State and local laws
that are time and place restrictions on day-of-event sales do not inhibit the
national ticket market. Indeed, sales until the last minute are a key element in
accurate pricing for event tickets. Nothing in this proposal would eliminate the
right of state and local governments to limit the location for such day-of-event
ticket sales or require a one-day license for the sales. These types of statutes
and regulations address the nuisance effects that are a legitimate concern of
event promoters and site owners as well as local law enforcement officials.
However, it could be possible for a uniform code to exist that covers these
time-and-place restrictions.
For example, such a code could follow that place in effect when the Super
Bowl was held in Glendale, Arizona. In 2003, the City of Glendale, home of
both the Arizona Cardinals’ University of Phoenix Stadium and the Coyotes’
Jobing.com Arena, adopted an ordinance like that passed by the City of
Phoenix, in 1995.247 All ticket trading before events was free of antiscalping
laws so long as it took place in a designated area. This ordinance had a major
effect on the 2008 Super Bowl. One of the authors observed ticket prices
markedly falling ultimately to face value the final two hours before the start
of the game.
The Arizona model has moved to other NFL cities. In 2005, the Pittsburgh
City Council designated a “resell zone” for Pirates and Steelers home games
where anyone can conduct unofficial ticket transactions, no license needed.
But, the Pittsburgh leap to a free market structure was not as large as the ones
taken in Arizona. There were strings attached to the free-trade zone. Inside the
resell zone sellers could earn no more profit than $5, or 25 percent of the value
of the ticket, whichever is greater, or they would violate existing state laws.248
However, the national approach would eliminate such state statute maximum-
price limitations because the principles dictate the effects of such limitations
actually increase ticket prices and foster fraud as below-the-radar transactions
increase.249
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available on national exchanges, including participations in futures options in the event of play-offs between
the rivals.
250. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text for example of state laws that make it a crime for
buyers to circumvent ticket sellers’ software that limits the number of tickets sold per credit card or
individual or screen name.
The Rights of Owners and Promoters on Ticket Limitations and Access
Circumvention statutes have already begun to appear.250 Circumvention
statutes exist generally in criminal codes. That is, those involved in the ticket
markets should be subject to the general criminal statutes that exist at both
state and federal level that prohibit trespass, circumvention of controls, and
other tactics designed to work around the software controls of those who
operate a site, whether the site is a blog or that of a ticket seller. Ticket sellers
are free to revoke the rights of such users and states are free to pursue
prosecution of those who violate the property rights of those who operate the
sites. It is not the ticket limits themselves that produce perverse market effects.
It is the ticket limitations coupled with hold-backs and the nondisclosure of the
actual number of available tickets that affect the ability of the secondary
market to reach equilibrium.
Clarification of the Nature of Tickets
A national ticket market cannot exist if those who grant tickets as licenses,
something that owners and promoters can do, are entitled to revoke those
licenses if the licensee sells the ticket (or a portion thereof) in the secondary
market. Such license restrictions have the effect they have had in
Massachusetts with the Patriots: the secondary market is severely constrained
and ticket buyers have only one source for primary and secondary ticket
purchases. The use of the ticket license to control secondary sales is a form of
vertical integration that results in monopoly power and higher ticket prices
controlled by the promoter or owner. The ability to purchase tickets to
individual games is not only restricted but risky because the buyers may not
know until they arrive at the game whether the license has been revoked
because of the monitoring activities of the team in online sales forums. The
barcode allows the owner to prevent transfer even without revocation of the
license because those who present their tickets for admission must have ID that
matches the team’s records for the name associated with that barcode.
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251. Colorado has already passed such a statute. See supra note 81.
Presently it is not clear that states are ready to adopt a national standard
that a ticket is a bearer instrument that is fully transferrable. The push-back
may come from a legitimate need to have some of the legal rights, notices, and
restrictions that are necessary for orderly events that require hard tickets for
admissions. Because the time for the leap to bearer paper may not yet be here,
states should be permitted to retain their basic license laws that permit owner
revocation for misconduct that is related to the ticket holder’s activities at the
game. The liability and safety issues that arise on the part of the owner for
licensees require this clarification. However, a national ticket market cannot
function in a piecemeal state law environment where statutory protection
prohibits revocation of a license for attempting to sell the ticket that granted
that license.251 This statutory clarification may, as discussed earlier, be
constitutionally necessary because the Massachusetts structure is perhaps
economic discrimination against interstate trade.
The promulgation of the Uniform Commercial Code and its adoption in
49 states was the result of frustration among businesses as they tried to ship
goods nationally into states that had varying laws and regulations on price,
shipment requirements, and even contract terms. In some situations, sellers
surrendered and did not do business in certain states. When there were disputes
on the contracts underlying the sale of goods, there was lengthy litigation over
which state’s laws governed the transaction and what happened when state
laws produced inconsistent results on the interpretation of the contract. The
U.C.C. provided the means for a national market with clarity on terms,
jurisdiction, and disputes and opened the door to national trade. Presently,
ticket market participants operate in an environment in which each legislative
session and state court decision brings and new and different obstacle to
operating nationally. The legal environment for ticket markets is restrictive
and, sadly, unstable. Neither characteristic is conducive to efficient markets.
Stability and property rights are critical to efficient economic systems.
Continuing Antitrust Monitoring and Enforcement
The structure of this national ticket market continues to evolve with
ongoing combinations, mergers, and acquisitions that will continue as
participants begin to fully understand the market and its potential. However,
as the earlier discussion of Principle Six noted, these combinations are often
not conducive to market efficiencies or superior skill, foresight, and industry,
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252. Hey, I Got the Ducks, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 5, 1979, at 32.
but are, rather, undertaken to attain the ability to set prices and exclude
competition. Again, a national ticket market does not require change to
existing antitrust laws. A national ticket market, however, cannot operate
transparently and efficiently when horizontal and vertical combinations serve
to create monopolists that set prices in the primary market and then through
vertical integration control prices in the secondary market. Antitrust laws do
not prohibit mergers that serve to create efficiencies and a better ability to
compete. At the same time, where the effect of the merger, whether in ticket
markets or any other area of business, is to reduce options for consumers in
pricing, bundling, or service, they should be carefully reviewed and monitored.
PART IV: CONCLUSIONS
An examination of the Eight Principles, with the history of the ticket
markets interwoven, is evidence of the adage that the more things change, the
more they remain the same. Regulators and market participants have long
attempted the same forms of controls to stop the secondary ticket market. The
concepts of fairness, gouging, fraud, and risk are the emotional terms that have
emerged to provide support for legislative actions that attempted to do
everything from making ticket resales a crime to placing price controls to
requiring licensing. The common thread in all of these various attempts has
been they have not contained the market but instead have introduced circuitous
activities that have only served to expand the market, not constrain it.
The time has come for the recognition of the truth of two basics:
secondary ticket markets are inevitable and they are expanding. Accepting
these truths and applying the eight principles leads to the reforms suggested
here. These reforms differ from previous forms of regulatory control in that
they work with the eight principles, not against them. That choice remains the
only option for ensuring that the ever-present notion of fairness is achieved.
Ray Blount, Jr. wrote a widely-read article on ticket scalping that appeared in
Sports Illustrated in 1979.252 Blount reflected the general emotional and initial
reaction most who do not understand the Eight Principles have to the
secondary ticket markets. He acknowledged that dealing with a scalper does
tend to leave a bad taste. However, Blount also understood something that
market participants and regulators need to understand as the foundation for the
Eight Principles. These secondary ticket market sales represent a sale that is,
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“the transaction is a kind of wildcat grassroots capitalism.”253 You can’t cap
a wildcat well. A groundswell exists on its own, and it finds a way to make its
point. So it is with ticket markets. Run with the force, keeping it within legal
boundaries, and it thrives and consumers benefit. Our suggested reforms are
designed to do just that.
